[By Guancha Network columnist Wei Zhan Meng]
Elon Musk has left the White House.
Although this was an expected outcome, many people couldn't help but imagine another possible scenario while his relationship with Trump was flourishing. Of course, there were also many who hoped to see whether their honeymoon would turn into enmity after their close relationship.
Now it seems that, although they haven't become bitter enemies, at least their communication is not harmonious.
Before leaving, Musk complained to the media, "The situation of federal bureaucracy is much worse than I imagined," and DOGE became the scapegoat in Washington. Besides disagreeing with Trump's tariff policies, he also expressed dissatisfaction with the recently passed large-scale tax and spending bill, believing that "it not only failed to reduce budget deficits, but actually increased them, and undermined the achievements of DOGE."
Although Musk's time at the White House was brief, his impact cannot be ignored. What he took away was not only dissatisfaction with the federal bureaucracy, but also a profound change in science and technology innovation and free market economy. What he left behind was a deep reflection on how tech giants can play a role on the political stage.
The Rise of the "Techno-Industrial Complex"
The concept of the "techno-industrial complex" can be traced back to the establishment of the post-war U.S. "government-industry-academic" collaborative innovation system. Unlike the traditional "military-industrial complex" which mainly revolves around corporate and individual interests, the "techno-industrial complex" is driven by national interests as its core force, forming a new power triangle consisting of the White House, Congress, and high-tech enterprises.
At Trump's inauguration ceremony, tech giants gathered. From right to left: Tesla CEO Elon Musk, Google CEO Sundar Pichai, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos and his fiancée Lauren Sanchez, Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan. Reuters
In this structure, tech companies are no longer solely focused on short-term commercial profits, but are willing to sacrifice some immediate benefits for national strategies, jointly planning long-term technological advantages with the government. In addition to Musk, Jacob Harberg and David Sacks also entered key government positions through the "revolving door." This high level of collaboration enables the decision-making layer of the government to have stronger expertise and decision-making capabilities, making policy implementation more flexible and efficient.
In terms of value realization pathways, the "techno-industrial complex" advocates enhancing national strength through technological innovation and industrial upgrading, rather than relying on traditional geopolitical expansion or military conquest. Its belief is that future great power competition will be decided by breakthroughs and industrialization capabilities in frontier technology fields. Technological innovation can not only help companies open up new markets, but may also become a strategic asset to enhance the national strength of the United States.
Projects promoted by the techno-industrial complex (such as "large-scale AI infrastructure construction") aim to consolidate America's technological leadership, achieving strategic pressure on competitors through peaceful competition means.
The operation of the "military-industrial complex" is built on a massive defense budget and interest chains: defense contractors influence congressional appropriations through lobbying and political donations, frequent personnel exchanges between senior government officials and arms dealers form a stable interest community in promoting military projects and external interventions.
For a long time, the military-industrial conglomerate has pursued maximizing its own economic interests, tending to exaggerate and hype external threats to ensure a continuous flow of military budgets and weapons orders. This profit-driven approach makes the military-industrial complex more willing to participate in or even actively create geopolitical conflicts, fabricating imaginary enemies for the United States and hyping up great power threats to manipulate U.S. foreign policy toward a warlike direction.
Maintaining hegemony through exporting wars and instability is a common strategy of the military-industrial complex. War not only consolidates the United States' global military presence but also becomes a means to generate profits and attract capital inflows, thus forming a vicious cycle: creating crises - profiting from arms sales - consolidating hegemony. Under this model, U.S. national security strategies are often closely linked to military interventions, establishing asymmetric control globally through military presence and intervention.
The "techno-industrial complex" and the "military-industrial complex" represent diametrically opposed national security concepts and global strategic orientations. The techno-industrial complex tends to suppress strategic rivals through technical competition during peacetime, with the core being to ensure U.S. leadership and security interests without directly resorting to force.
The U.S. government, under the participation of tech elites, adopts a more complex "competitive suppression" strategy abroad: for example, accelerating the dominance of international technical standards and governance rules, restricting opponents from accessing cutting-edge technologies and market opportunities, focusing on improving U.S. technological strength while lacking trust in allies, etc.
This strategic mindset views key technology fields as new battlefields in great power competition, emphasizing locking potential opponents in downstream positions through innovation advantages and institutional rules, thereby achieving effects similar to traditional warfare victories in "unseen smoke" competitions.
Compared to the military-industrial complex, which holds a hard-power security view and relies more on direct military deterrence and intervention to control global affairs, its characteristic is prioritizing military options when facing international challenges, maintaining U.S. interests through overseas troop deployments, armed strikes, or regime changes.
Therefore, security strategies pushed by the military-industrial complex often tolerate or even welcome a certain degree of international tension because conflicts themselves prove the necessity of maintaining high military expenditures and enable the U.S. to strengthen control over allies and regional situations.
The interests of the military-industrial complex align with the ideas of the Democratic right wing and the neoconservative faction within the Republican Party. This line of thinking was effective during the Cold War and the first decade after its end, but it cannot continue into the second decade of the 21st century; the American public sees little benefit, and the country gains far less than it spends.
This photo became a classic annotation of Trump and Musk's relationship.
"Techno-Accelerationism" Prevails
The reform Musk promoted in the Trump administration was a rare experiment in administrative mechanism transformation led by a tech entrepreneur in American history. Its concept originated from a new trend - techno-accelerationism. It advocates enhancing America's self-sufficiency in strategic industries through cooperation between private sector and government, stimulating the innovation enthusiasm and entrepreneurial spirit of all citizens by transforming social structures, so as to maintain leadership in the new round of technological competition.
In this context, the U.S. federal government is seen as an "outdated and inefficient machine" that must be reformed with powerful measures by introducing technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data, cutting bloated institutions, and achieving rapid decision-making of the government.
Techno-accelerationism clearly draws inspiration from and emulates China's political and economic development model. Musk has repeatedly praised China's institutional efficiency and development achievements in public, believing that America is being overtaken by China in many aspects. He attributes the narrowing gap between China and the U.S. to America's cumbersome bureaucratic system. He bluntly stated that America's safety and environmental standards and labor costs can only explain a small part of the gap between the two countries, "the real fundamental reason is exponential growth in bureaucracy and selfish consulting industries that maximize construction costs." He believes that China's efficient infrastructure construction reflects good governance capability.
In terms of specific governance methods, many of Musk's practices are familiar to Chinese people and coincide with traditional Chinese statecraft thought.
Firstly, China's "national system" and the idea of pooling resources to accomplish major tasks are often considered the secret to success in major engineering projects, and Musk also tried to replicate this point in the U.S. - through direct government intervention in resource allocation, cutting investments in non-priority areas, and shifting focus to emerging advanced technologies. He promoted relaxing regulations on the tech industry, providing policy incentives for future industries such as artificial intelligence, space, and clean energy, and accelerating breakthroughs in disruptive technologies.
Behind the national system lies the Confucian idea of "great unity" and the concept of mobilizing the whole nation, meaning that national goals take precedence over departmental and personal interests, requiring coordinated action across the board. The various measures Musk has advanced in the U.S., whether streamlining institutions nationwide or coordinating resources to develop technology, implicitly carry the idea of "one chessboard across the country." He attempts to shape an efficient government commanded by the top leadership and executed collaboratively by all parties, which undoubtedly carries the color of "national governance."
Secondly, Musk's large-scale layoffs and organizational restructuring are highly similar to China's efforts to streamline administration and strengthen anti-corruption. During Musk's tenure at the Department of Government Efficiency, he mercilessly cut down on "redundant staff" and what he viewed as inefficient departments: he streamlined tens of thousands of civil servants at once, offering buyouts to over a million officials to make room for institutional reforms. Such drastic institutional downsizing was unprecedented in American history.
In addition, Musk's emphasis on institutional stability and long-term planning is deeply influenced by China. He advocates reducing internal friction caused by frequent policy changes and proposes learning from China's strategy of setting long-term goals and sustained investment. In an interview, he greatly appreciated China's ability to formulate five-year plans, and he has repeatedly claimed to establish medium- and long-term development blueprints for cutting-edge technologies to avoid frequent changes in technical policies every administration.
Beyond operational-level imitation, Musk's techno-accelerationism also echoes certain values of traditional Chinese political philosophy.
Firstly, Musk criticizes the current bureaucratic system in the U.S. for being inefficient and disordered, autocratic yet incompetent. He advocates reclaiming power from "bureaucrats detached from voters" to rebuild governance order. Musk's demand to clear out accumulated problems and restore good order is highly similar to China's historical practice of rectifying officialdom. Similarly, Michael Schuman, a senior researcher at the Atlantic Council, believes that Confucius' ideas are highly similar to those of the Republican Party, advocating that the party learn from Confucian thought to improve electoral and governance quality.
Secondly, Musk's collective consciousness and patriotic awareness also align with Chinese thought. He highly praises the hardworking spirit and collective efficiency of the Chinese people. For example, he praised the diligence of Chinese workers, saying they "burn midnight oil," and remarked that "there are a lot of talented and hardworking people in China... not only working overtime but also working all night; whereas in America, people try to avoid work." These remarks reflect his recognition of values such as collective dedication and hard work. Nowadays, many people inside the U.S. hope to revive the Puritan spirit and awaken the hardworking spirit of the American people, but the results have been poor.
Thirdly, Musk's interest in technocratic governance can also be seen as echoing China's political tradition. A large number of officials in contemporary China have science and engineering backgrounds, considered a continuation of the technocratic system. As an engineer himself, Musk highly values the role of professional technical skills in governance and frequently criticizes U.S. politicians for lacking scientific literacy. He pointed out that Chinese policymakers often receive training in science and engineering, "are more responsible to the people," care about public welfare, and are more scientifically literate and pragmatic than U.S. officials. Musk admires a "virtuous and competent" government that combines technical rationality with putting people first, which aligns with Confucian ideals of meritocracy and the emphasis on serving the people since the founding of New China.
Elon Musk's 74-year-old mother happily concluded her trip to China and posted multiple posts expressing gratitude.
"Expansionist Conservatism" in Initial Practice
Musk's worldview of world order is neither liberal internationalism nor isolationism, but can be summarized as "expansionist conservatism," which actively exports conservative values globally.
Musk himself is a pioneer of this concept, utilizing his vast capital and social media influence to extend conservative political impacts to multiple countries nonviolently, nurturing like-minded conservative forces in more than a dozen countries worldwide.
On January 25, 2025, Musk delivered a video speech at a campaign rally for Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Associated Press
Unlike liberal internationalism, which tends to promote the values of freedom and democracy globally through military actions, expansionist conservatism chooses shadow intervention: without direct military involvement, it influences other countries' political directions through capital support and public opinion manipulation. Musk's interventions are not conducted in the name of the state but through wealthy individuals or private platforms, subtly shaping election outcomes. This method operates outside official diplomacy but actually reshapes the political landscape of various countries.
Musk promotes anti-"awakening movement" narratives and anti-immigrant sentiments worldwide, pushing the shared belief in "national conservatism," which particularly influences younger generations of netizens. More importantly, Musk harshly criticizes supranational institutions such as the EU for "eroding member states' sovereignty," calling on the public in each country to love their own nations, and hoping to establish a transnational "Patriot International," where each country has the right to maintain its own traditional culture and civilization.
Musk is enthusiastic about playing the role of a global conservative mentor. He advocates eliminating transnational corruption groups and reviving the vitality of nations eroded by "globalism" to maintain world peace. He has repeatedly publicly criticized so-called "woke doctrines" and elite corruption groups, stating that traditional elites sacrifice public interests for personal gain.
Musk portrays himself as one side of the "people versus the elite," claiming that only by breaking old power structures can social vitality be released. His article published in Germany frankly states that mainstream political parties have failed the country. Western mainstream views hold that world peace is achieved through cooperation among governments and mediation by multilateral institutions; but Musk and others believe that these institutions have been hijacked by vested interests and have become tools for aggression and expansion, breeding conflicts instead. In contrast, they advocate that peace must be realized through the establishment of new regimes in each country that "speak for the people."
In his view, the tough stance Western elites take against Russia will only exacerbate the war; it would be better if "rational" nationalists come to power and negotiate division of territories directly with figures like Putin to seek a ceasefire. Likewise, in the European far-right forces he supports, there is a prevalent opposition to intervening in overseas conflicts and a call to focus on domestic issues. He supports European countries cleaning up their own houses first before acting independently, building their own countries well, respecting each other's spheres of influence, which could reduce international conflicts caused by ideological opposition.
However, Musk's worldview of world order is full of idealism, and we should also see the negative impacts brought by expansionist conservatism. This ideology weakens the authority of multilateral institutions, damages international cooperation mechanisms, and reduces the ability of the international community to collectively address global challenges.
After multilateral frameworks loosen, great powers tend to return to the principle of power, directly competing bilaterally, and "transactional diplomacy" becomes more common. In the short term, this competitive-cooperative state may bring more uncertainties, but in the long run, it might form a new balance. For example, the U.S. and Russia may divide Eastern Europe's influence tacitly, and the U.S. and China may reach some form of power distribution in the Indo-Pacific region. This balance does not rest on common values, similar to the resurgence of the 19th-century "great power coordination" system.
When the governing ideologies of major countries lean toward conservative nationalism, global agendas will adjust accordingly. Issues previously focused on, such as human rights, women's rights, and sexual minorities, may fade from high-level diplomatic discourse, replaced by topics such as traditional civilizations, family ethics, counter-terrorism, and national sovereignty. However, issues like nuclear non-proliferation and addressing climate change may be weakened or even reversed.
We must be vigilant that expansionist conservatism may give rise to new bloc competition: one camp of conservative states and the other of remaining liberal states. There may even be a prospect where the U.S.-led "democratic alliance" transforms into a "national conservative coalition" led by the U.S., while its opposition is a minority of countries still adhering to globalism and liberal values (perhaps including Canada, Western Europe, and Northern Europe).
Currently, it is more likely that the liberal international order will gradually erode, major multilateral mechanisms will exist in name only, and be replaced by a few loose but like-minded right-wing strong countries forming默契 alliances. For instance, Trump will ease relations with Russia, build trust with India, and prioritize courting right-wing governments like Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Argentina to strengthen intelligence and defense cooperation, while taking a cold stance toward liberal governments like Germany and France. Global governance will become fragmented, and international systems will become more fragile and changeable.
Potential Impact of Musk's Political Legacy on China
Musk's practice of the "techno-industrial complex," his "techno-accelerationism" ideology, and his transformation of the world order will have multi-dimensional impacts on China, both positive and negative.
Musk and his supporters may believe that the techno-industrial complex can significantly enhance U.S. competitiveness, create higher wealth and value, and therefore does not need to suppress China technologically, and he even prevented several bills targeting China from passing Congress. However, in practice, the U.S. does not want to engage in fair technological competition with China and is concerned about being surpassed by China.
Tesla Gigafactory
The challenge posed by the techno-industrial complex to China is more subtle and institutional, making it harder for the international community to universally view it as "aggression," thus making it more difficult to counteract. Military threats are usually explicit, and China can respond by strengthening its defense deterrents. However, technological blockades and disputes over rule-setting belong to "gray zone" games, where the U.S. often uses national security or fair competition as pretexts to suppress others, making it difficult for China to break through with simple confrontation.
In addition, the techno-industrial complex promotes a systemic and long-term competition that raises higher requirements for China's overall strength. It is not a matter of winning or losing in one battle but a comprehensive comparison in research and development capabilities, industrial ecosystems, educational talents, and institutional vitality. Traditional military models pose challenges primarily in military security, while the techno-industrial complex may exert pressure on China in economics, security, diplomacy, and other aspects, constituting a comprehensive challenge. China needs to remain highly vigilant and strategically clear-headed, preparing for responses at institutional, technological, and international levels.
The rise of "techno-accelerationism" in the U.S. may trigger global normative competition. For a long time, the U.S. has advocated open markets and free innovation in high-tech fields, while China emphasizes state-led and secure controllability.
In terms of artificial intelligence ethics and regulation, if U.S. policies are influenced by tech capital and tend to be lenient and encourage innovation, the U.S. may be unwilling to sign too many international restriction agreements; whereas China may advocate responsible use of technology and enhanced regulation to demonstrate "great power responsibility." In digital trade rules, the U.S. may push norms consistent with its corporate interests, while China insists on digital sovereignty principles. These differences will project onto multilateral settings, forming a competitive posture in global norms.
More importantly, the techno-accelerationism trend is a typical case of "learning from China to surpass China," inevitably profoundly impacting the U.S.-China competition landscape and bringing multiple impacts and pressures to China.
Under the promotion of tech elites like Musk, the U.S. is elevating the争夺 of frontier technology dominance to an unprecedented height. This means that China will face a U.S. competitor that is more mobilized in terms of systems, with more tilted technological resources.
For China, this undoubtedly creates a positive competitive pressure: only by redoubling efforts to advance independent innovation and maintain high-speed and high-quality development of its own technology can China stay competitive in the new round of technological revolution.
America's "acceleration" will objectively force China to "accelerate" as well. If America achieves institutional optimization and efficiency enhancement through techno-accelerationism, the relative value of China's original institutional advantages may be compressed, and China must continuously enhance its governance effectiveness to cope with the situation.
No matter what, the institutional competition between China and the U.S. will enter a new phase due to techno-accelerationism—not just comparing which country's technology is more advanced, but also comparing which governance model can sustainably support technological progress and benefit society. This competition regarding the "integration efficiency of technology and institutions" will become a new dimension of strategic competition between China and the U.S.
Facing Musk's conservative international expansion trend, China must formulate practical strategies based on its own circumstances, avoiding risks while seizing opportunities.
On one hand, mutual assistance among right-wing forces in the U.S. and Europe may weaken the cohesion of traditional Western alliances applying pressure on China. This means that human rights pressure and value attacks from the West may weaken, providing space for China to seize international discourse power. In recent years, China has repeatedly defended the principle of non-interference in sovereign affairs at the United Nations, and conservatives also oppose value interference, which to some extent aligns with China's position.
On the other hand, China must also see the risks: many right-wing forces in the West, although anti-establishment domestically, may not necessarily be mild in their attitude towards China. Each country's right-wing parties have forces that appreciate China and those that are hostile to China internally. Right-wing parties generally oppose their own elites; China's relations with each country's elite groups and ruling parties affect China's relations with that country's right-wing forces. For example, the previous German government was relatively anti-China, prompting Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to adopt a very friendly stance toward China during this period, but there are also voices within the party wary of China's influence.
Musk is a global conservative promoter, and some of the American conservatives he collaborates with harbor hostility toward China. China must be vigilant against the impact of expansionist conservatism on certain areas of China's interests, such as technological decoupling and future U.S. territorial expansion in North America.
At the same time, China should strengthen communication channels with right-wing populist parties, skillfully interacting with different political spectrums in various countries to avoid passivity due to misjudgment. China could consider highlighting pragmatic cooperation issues when dealing with such parties, using economic and trade interests as a bond to stabilize bilateral relations, and finding new ways to coexist with different countries in the West amidst the fragmentation of Western countries.
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