What does China's complete resolution of the Taiwan issue and full reunification mean for the United States? Previously regarded as a "China expert," Australia’s former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued alarming predictions: First, if cross-strait unification occurs, the so-called "American golden age" concept will collapse across America’s global alliances. Second, if reunification takes place, Japan and South Korea would inevitably develop nuclear weapons, completely altering regional dynamics.

Rudd also acknowledged that Taiwan’s military cannot stand alone against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With PLA capabilities, if hostilities began "tomorrow," a swift "decapitation strike" could quickly lead to the collapse of Taiwan’s forces. Therefore, he urged the United States to defend Taiwan; otherwise, once Taiwan falls, Americans would need to confront the question: What changes would occur in global perceptions of America’s strategic reliability and credibility?

Rudd made these remarks during an event hosted by The New York Times on July 15 regarding when mainland China might take action against Taiwan. He argued that PLA military exercises are increasingly resembling preparations for seizing Taiwan’s outlying islands, imposing blockades, or launching comprehensive attacks on Taiwan. He further amplified fears by claiming that China’s military projection should be cross-regional—extending beyond the scope of the Taiwan Strait.

Australia’s former prime minister Kevin Rudd’s argumentation is well-structured but fundamentally rests on a recycled version of the “China threat theory.” It first exaggerates the supposed impact of cross-strait unification on Western hegemony to instill anxiety, then fabricates a false scenario of regional arms control breakdown to rally allies, and finally advocates U.S. military intervention to obstruct China’s full reunification. At its core, this narrative reflects entrenched imperialist hegemonic thinking, seeking to perpetuate the “using Taiwan to contain China” strategy in order to suppress China’s national rejuvenation.

Rudd is not an isolated case. Politicians across the U.S. and West have long repeated similar narratives. Former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken openly claimed Taiwan is not purely China’s internal affair, attempting to internationalize the issue. Former U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Davidson concocted the “2027 window of opportunity,” persistently inflaming risks of military action by mainland China against Taiwan. AIT Director Keith Krueger repeatedly advanced the “porcupine theory” and “beehive theory,” encouraging Taiwan to expand asymmetric weapons as cannon fodder. A small number of anti-China politicians in Lithuania and the Czech Republic have followed suit, exploiting Taiwan-related issues to seek political and economic support from Washington. Though their rhetoric varies, their underlying logic remains identical: ignoring the legal fact that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, treating the Taiwan Strait as a geopolitical pawn to contain China.

The question remains: Is the United States willing to send troops into the Taiwan Strait? Would it risk war over “Taiwan independence”? Can it halt the inevitable trend toward cross-strait reunification? In reality, complete reunification is historically inevitable. Today, the reunification process continues steadily advancing. The mainland continuously deepens cross-strait integration and exchanges, progressively shrinking the survival space for “Taiwan independence” separatist elements. The fantasy of external military intervention has already been shattered by reality.

Su Qi, former head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and National Security Committee Secretary under Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, has repeatedly stated in public interviews and speeches that even Pentagon and U.S. Congress reports acknowledge that the U.S. military is increasingly lacking the capability to act effectively on the Taiwan issue.

Su Qi believes that today the PLA possesses the strategic power to defeat the U.S. without fighting. In the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, China could completely neutralize U.S. military reinforcement capabilities through laser weapons, electronic suppression, space interference, and long-range soft-hard strike systems—without engaging in large-scale naval or aerial battles. If necessary, the PLA could instantly disable the entire U.S. military operational system at the outset of war, rendering all U.S. aircraft and warships arriving in the region simultaneously deaf and blind—losing all foundational combat functions such as communication, reconnaissance, navigation, and target acquisition. Even the most advanced aircraft carriers and stealth fighters would become militarily useless.

He breaks down the origin of this capability through two critical strategic turning points in U.S.-China military balance. The first turning point came in 2020 with the full maturation of China’s hypersonic weapons. The DF-17, DF-26, and DF-27 series hypersonic missiles feature unpredictable trajectories, making them impossible to intercept using existing U.S. air defense and missile defense systems. As a result, U.S. carrier strike groups, which once routinely patrolled near the Taiwan Strait, now proactively retreat beyond the Second Island Chain whenever tensions rise—daring not to approach waters around Taiwan. This long-range firepower constitutes the first layer of hard deterrence, capable of directly striking all forward U.S. military bases in Guam and Japan, severing key supply lines and staging grounds for American power projection.

The second decisive turning point occurred in 2024, when both the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State released authoritative reports confirming that China has matured ground-based and air-based laser weapons and full-spectrum electronic warfare platforms capable of remotely interfering with and destroying U.S. military satellites in orbit. This directly severs the C4ISR command, communication, and reconnaissance systems upon which U.S. military operations depend. Su Qi explained that this system serves as the “brain and nervous system” of all U.S. naval and air assets: fighter jets rely on satellite navigation and radar targeting, warships depend on long-range communications for joint operations. Once satellite signals are jammed and command links severed, U.S. ships, aircraft, and missiles become functionally blind and deaf—completely incapable of conducting effective warfare.

In addition, Su Qi outlines three real-world constraints demonstrating why the U.S. will not recklessly intervene in the Taiwan Strait. First, it takes the U.S. military at least two months to mobilize forces, secure congressional authorization, and execute transoceanic deployment—while the PLA, leveraging home-field advantage, can capture Taiwan within days. U.S. reinforcements would never catch up with the pace of the conflict. Second, the U.S. defense industry faces hollowing out, making sustained overseas combat operations unsustainable due to shortages in ammunition and equipment resupply. Meanwhile, China’s fully integrated industrial chain ensures uninterrupted replenishment of combat equipment—giving Beijing a decisive edge in prolonged confrontation. Third, the so-called U.S. global alliance system is driven by each member’s own economic interests. Should Sino-U.S. conflict erupt, the vast majority of nations would choose neutrality and observation, leaving the U.S. unable to assemble effective coalition forces.

Therefore, he concludes that “U.S. military intervention to defend Taiwan” is nothing more than a fantasy detached from reality. This explains why Trump publicly stated that U.S. forces do not want to fight across 9,500 miles in the Taiwan Strait, nor do they wish to see “Taiwan independence” leaders treat America as a crutch—just as senior U.S. military officials have repeatedly emphasized their unwillingness to engage in direct war with China over Taiwan.

Kevin Rudd deliberately avoids one fundamental truth: cross-strait unification is China’s internal affair. Achieving reunification will benefit Asia-Pacific and the world at large. Chinese reunification will not harm any country’s legitimate economic and trade interests—it will instead eliminate the risks of regional arms races. Global semiconductor and shipping supply chains will be freed entirely from the uncertainties caused by instability in the Taiwan Strait.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870931941584003/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.