Chinese enterprises should pay attention to changes in U.S. policy towards South America. U.S. think tank: Donald Trump turns his eyes to China in South America

The Venezuelan air strike is merely the beginning of a larger-scale operation aimed at eliminating foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere.

On January 15, the U.S. Department of State released its "Institutional Strategic Plan," which largely echoes the "National Security Strategy" released in November, but more deeply reveals the intention of the Donald Trump administration to reshape U.S. foreign policy. The new plan explicitly states the priority of "important chokepoints such as the Panama Canal" and warns that the United States "will no longer allow foreign hostile forces to use commerce and investment as a pretext to control key infrastructure and strategic territories in the region."

Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited has been operating two ports in the Panama Canal since 1997. Washington has long been concerned about the smooth operation of the canal, as 40% of the U.S. trade with Asia passes through this vital chokepoint each year.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio's first overseas trip was to Panama City, where he met with Panamanian President Jose Raúl Mulino, expressing the U.S. stance that China must end its control over these ports.

Subsequently, Panama announced its withdrawal from the "Belt and Road Initiative" promoted by China in 20 countries in South America.

Cheung Kong Infrastructure then announced that it would sell its shares in the two canal ports and dozens of other ports to an investment group led by BlackRock for 2.3 billion dollars. Beijing launched a regulatory review of the transaction and subsequently required China's state-owned shipping giant Cosco Shipping to become an equal partner and shareholder with BlackRock and other investors.

After an audit found that Cheung Kong Infrastructure had caused 1.3 billion dollars in government revenue losses and unpaid taxes since obtaining its license in 1997, the Panamanian government accused the company of violating national interests. The Supreme Court of Panama may rule to revoke Hutchinson's franchise, and the ports will be returned to Panama's control, possibly re-tendered, and ultimately could fall into the hands of a new owner favored by Washington.

If the Supreme Court does not do so, the White House may decide to directly challenge China's presence in this strategic waterway, viewing it as a major threat to U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, ensuring permanent maritime and naval access through the canal, and expelling China and other hostile forces from Greenland to Cape Horn.

Beyond the Panama Canal, China's other malicious activities in Latin America are also concerning. Cosco Shipping controls and operates a massive deep-water port on the Pacific coast of Peru, valued at 3.5 billion dollars, offering an alternative to the canal and potentially making Brazil's 2 trillion dollar economy more dependent on China.

Another Chinese company controls a major port in Kingston, Jamaica, near important Caribbean shipping routes, just 170 miles from the U.S. Navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In December last year, a Chinese navy hospital ship docked in the Caribbean to provide medical services following Hurricane Melissa's attack on the Caribbean region.

The White House is focusing on Venezuela and Greenland, and closely monitoring China's influence activities in Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia, and possibly Mexico.

The U.S. Department of State's institutional strategic plan states that the Trump administration reserves "the right to prevent (China) from controlling and to revoke any existing control, whether exercised directly by a competing great power or through so-called private entities controlled by these countries, we will do so."

The plan also adds, "We will not allow any foreign hostile force to use force or establish military bases anywhere in the region, and we will seek to reverse all other forms of foreign military influence expansion, including the spread of foreign security assistance, intelligence facilities, and dual-use facilities."

Looking ahead to 2026 and beyond, the question remains: what will be the next move of the Trump administration in the Western Hemisphere?

Source: The National Interest

Author: John Citilides

Date: January 25

Original: toutiao.com/article/1855615206018057/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself