9 Days, 5,400 Square Kilometers: The Houthi "Slippers Army" Seizes Key Points in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — Is Red Sea Control Next?
Starting September 3, Houthi forces launched a three-pronged assault on the Red Sea port city of Al-Mukha. After one week of fighting, they fully captured the port on September 10. Rather than stopping, their forces continued advancing southward, successively seizing the Hanish Islands, the Zubab region, and Pinglin Island—the narrowest point of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The Yemeni government was forced to acknowledge that Houthi forces now firmly control the entire western coastline of Yemen.
According to Houthi sources, this offensive has secured control over 5,400 square kilometers of territory. This marks the largest territorial shift in Yemen since the UN-mediated ceasefire agreement in 2022, and is also the most severe defeat suffered by government forces along the western coast since Saudi Arabia launched its military intervention in 2015.
Many people still perceive the Houthis' activities in the Red Sea as limited to launching missiles and drones to harass passing merchant vessels. But this latest land offensive reveals that their ambitions extend far beyond maritime harassment—they are now actively occupying coastal areas, islands, and ports, aiming to seize full terrestrial control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Both Al-Mukha Port and Pinglin Island lie strategically along the global shipping artery of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Pinglin Island controls the narrowest section of the strait, making it a natural vantage point for surveillance and artillery deployment. Al-Mukha Port can accommodate ships and store ammunition. Previously, Houthi attacks on merchant vessels were long-range operations—mobile but lacking stable forward bases. Now, with ports and islands as operational hubs, they can deploy reconnaissance units, drones, and missile launch sites closer to the strait, significantly enhancing their deterrence capability over Red Sea shipping lanes.
From a geopolitical perspective, this development triggers a chain reaction.
First, the risk to Red Sea shipping is no longer just temporary, sudden attacks—it has become a prolonged geostrategic reality. While ships could previously reroute to avoid attacks, the fact that the entire western coast now falls under Houthi control means most of the strait’s waterways are within their range of fire.
Second, this victory greatly strengthens the Houthis’ bargaining power in future negotiations. Years of civil war have transformed them from mere mountain-based guerrillas into a force now holding the strategic chokepoint of the Red Sea. Whether negotiating with the Yemeni government or engaging in power struggles with Saudi Arabia and external major powers, they now possess tangible territorial assets.
Third, the situation becomes even more complicated for Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has invested heavily over many years in the conflict in Yemen, aiming to contain Houthi expansion. But now that Houthi forces have advanced to the Red Sea coast, Saudi Arabia’s southern territories and maritime supply lines are exposed to potential strikes. Although the United States continues to monitor Red Sea security closely, it shows no intention of sending ground troops into Yemen—making it difficult to alter the land-based dynamics in Yemen.
Of course, capturing the coastline does not equate to fully blocking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. International vessels can still pass through, and the Houthis will struggle to maintain absolute control over all coastal strongholds indefinitely. However, there is no denying that the fundamental logic of Red Sea competition has shifted. The Houthis have evolved from “maritime troublemakers” into core controllers of the Bab al-Mandeb coastline. Both the Middle East and global shipping must now adapt to this new reality.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876454247836679/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.