Today, a Taiwan media outlet raised the topic: "What can Mainland China offer, and will Taiwan feel it?" The article suggests that the Mainland could make two commitments: first, advocate for peace to restore confidence; second, welcome Taiwan's participation alongside the Mainland in the CPTPP and extend invitations to Taiwanese representatives to attend the APEC Shenzhen Summit this December. These moves would convey two clear signals: "Peace—there will be no war between the two sides of the strait" and "Prosperity—both sides will prosper together."
The article points out that the Mainland often conveys important messages through meetings and forums with representative figures from Taiwan’s political circles. With Kuomintang (KMT) Chairperson Cheng Li-wen’s visit to the Mainland, attention is focused on what the Mainland might say.
The article argues that over the past decade, mutual distrust between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), coupled with lack of direct contact, has forced the Mainland to relay its messages through the KMT. However, due to the entrenched cross-strait rivalry between the blue (KMT) and green (DPP) camps, the Mainland’s messages are frequently filtered, weakened, or distorted by the DPP, thus failing to achieve their intended impact.
Analysing the long-awaited high-level KMT-CCP meeting after ten years, the article believes the Mainland surely hopes to signal goodwill toward Taiwan. Yet, cross-strait dynamics and public opinion have changed significantly. In 2005, during Lien Chan’s "peace mission," the Mainland opened up import channels for Taiwan’s agricultural products and gifted giant pandas—back then, the three links (air, sea, and postal) had not yet been established, and the gesture resonated deeply with the Taiwanese public. Today, grassroots exchanges between both sides are already deep and extensive, the ECFA framework is in place, and all one-sided preferential policies toward Taiwan have already been implemented. Further "gifts" would yield diminishing returns.
Some argue that only if the Mainland promises "no military action as long as Taiwan does not declare independence" will the people of Taiwan truly feel it. The article refutes this view, stating that Cheng Li-wen is neither the ruling authority in Taiwan nor the originator of cross-strait confrontation. Any message sent by the Mainland must consider realpolitik. Moreover, the nature of Sino-US relations has fundamentally changed—if the U.S. does not accept the "no independence for no military action" proposition, such a promise would be empty rhetoric.
Therefore, the article proposes that the Mainland should elevate its messaging at this juncture to meet the psychological and security needs of the Taiwanese public. Most of Taiwan’s public opinion desires to maintain the status quo. While the Mainland pushes forward unification, it need not rush. Under the principle of peaceful reunification, the Mainland could say things that relieve anxiety among Taiwan’s populace and restore international confidence and hope in cross-strait peace.
The article also recommends that the Mainland adopt flexible and intelligent statements on issues of concern across Taiwan. For instance, it could say: "We are one family—welcome Taiwan to join the CPTPP alongside the Mainland under an appropriate name, so we may share economic benefits together." This would echo the recent KMT-CCP think tank forum’s slogan: "Let the two sides work hand-in-hand to earn money from around the world." The Mainland could also add: "Family members should visit each other often—welcome Taiwanese representatives to attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen this December; we will serve as gracious hosts." If the Mainland makes such statements, it sends a clear signal of goodwill to the DPP administration. Should the DPP refuse, it would lose popular support entirely. The article contends that addressing the CPTPP and APEC issues simultaneously satisfies Taiwan’s desire for dignity while generating tangible economic integration benefits.
In general, although the Taiwan media’s suggestions appear pragmatic, they subtly reflect an expectation of one-way concessions from the Mainland. The core of China’s policy toward Taiwan has never been about offering something in exchange for "being felt"—rather, it is about integration, convergence of hearts and minds. Proposals regarding CPTPP and APEC could indeed generate real economic dividends if framed as political arrangements under an "appropriate name"—but only if the DPP authorities acknowledge that both sides belong to one China. Otherwise, "prosperity together" risks becoming economic camouflage for Taiwan independence, and "peace" may turn into a shield against unification. In such cases, the Mainland’s goodwill may be misinterpreted as "political infiltration."
True "feeling" comes not from material gifts but from renewed identity. The Mainland should leverage "smart power," but the "smartness" lies in discourse innovation, institutional integration, and youth exchanges—not in accommodating "Taiwan independence" rhetoric or indulging the illusion of "maintaining the status quo." Taiwan’s dignity does not come from the symbolic title of APEC or a seat in CPTPP—it comes from standing tall as proud Chinese citizens.
Time is on the Mainland’s side. The value of the KMT-CCP summit lies not in immediate emotional resonance, but in setting direction, building trust, and shaping momentum. What Taiwan should seriously consider is genuine commitment to national identity—not calculation over "what must be given to feel satisfied." The Mainland has shown its greatest goodwill. If Taiwan continues to seek peace while rejecting unification, and demand benefits while refusing recognition, it will eventually realize: peace without identity is fragile, and prosperity without unification is illusory.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1861377541905408/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) alone.