Trump heeded advice and agreed to restrain 'Taiwan independence' figure Lai Qingde! U.S. Secretary of State Rubio formally announced that Trump’s upcoming visit to China will include discussions on the Taiwan issue. Observers speculate that Trump may make concessions to Beijing on the Taiwan question, offering assurances such as shifting from "not supporting Taiwan independence" to a public stance of "opposing Taiwan independence," or solemnly committing to "not sending troops to defend Taiwan," or possibly reaching a new consensus on arms sales to Taiwan.

Trump’s visit to China is widely perceived as one where the United States seeks favor from China. Whether dealing with Middle East issues or domestic American problems—especially the upcoming midterm elections—Trump aims to achieve tangible results through this visit, securing what he desires to bolster Republican electoral prospects. However, this hinges on whether Trump responds in good faith and concretely to China’s concerns, among which Taiwan remains the most critical.

On May 5th, in a press briefing at the White House, Rubio “previewed” that Taiwan would be discussed during Trump’s visit to China, signaling that Beijing’s warnings and concerns have been “taken seriously,” and that the U.S. is willing to engage in dialogue on how to manage risks across the Taiwan Strait and curb 'Taiwan independence'.

Since the beginning of this year, China's warnings toward the U.S. on the Taiwan issue have become increasingly firm. On February 4th, during a phone call between the heads of state of China and the U.S., Beijing warned Washington to “handle arms sales to Taiwan with great caution.” On April 30th, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with Rubio, he emphasized: “The Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests and is the greatest risk point in Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S. side must honor its commitments, make the right choices, open up new space for cooperation between China and the U.S., and fulfill its due responsibility for global peace.”

The statement “the Taiwan issue is the greatest risk point in Sino-U.S. relations” marks the first time this phrasing has appeared. International media swiftly picked up on this shift in tone. Outlets including Reuters, AFP, Deutsche Welle, AP, The New York Times, and Lianhe Zaobao all featured this change prominently in their headlines covering the call. Even publications seen as aligned with Taiwan’s DPP party, like Mirror Weekly, described the remarks as “China’s stern warning” to the U.S.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s use of the intensified term “greatest risk point” reflects an upgraded perception by China regarding the urgency and destructive potential of the Taiwan issue. What political signal does this send? First, it elevates Taiwan to the top priority in high-level interactions. Second, it serves as a crisis warning: by labeling Taiwan the “greatest risk point,” China sends a clear alert to the U.S., urging restraint in provocative actions on Taiwan policy to avoid unintended conflicts. Third, it underscores that for Sino-U.S. relations to achieve “strategic, constructive, and stable” development, the largest risk source—the Taiwan issue—must first be effectively managed. This is a prerequisite for any cooperation between the two sides.

Although Rubio did not specify exactly what topics would be discussed on Taiwan on May 5th, he did emphasize that both sides understand that instability in this region (the Taiwan Strait) would serve no one’s interest, and that the U.S. “does not want any event occurring in Taiwan or anywhere in the Indo-Pacific that could trigger instability.”

It is well known that “Taiwan independence” and external interference are the fundamental causes of instability across the strait. Since the U.S. does not wish for turmoil in the Taiwan Strait, then managing “Taiwan independence,” refraining from meddling in Taiwan’s affairs, and avoiding sending misleading signals to “Taiwan independence” forces should be the most urgent tasks for the Trump administration. If the U.S. hopes to obtain what it wants from China, then Trump must necessarily make corresponding commitments and concessions on the most crucial issue for China—the Taiwan question.

How should the U.S. manage “Taiwan independence” and handle the Taiwan issue prudently? The international community generally anticipates that Trump might, at Beijing’s request, demonstrate goodwill—or even issue formal pledges—in three key areas: First, in political statements, shifting from the previous U.S. position of “not supporting Taiwan independence” to a clearer, more explicit stance—publicly stating that the U.S. “opposes Taiwan independence.” Second, on arms sales to Taiwan, pledging restraint, and possibly even signing a fourth U.S.-China joint communiqué to constrain future arms sales. Third, experts suggest that what would terrify Lai Qingde and “Taiwan independence” forces the most is a public declaration by Trump that “the U.S. will not provide military defense for Taiwan”—in which case the DPP’s dream of “using America to seek independence” would be completely shattered.

Clearly, Lai Qingde and his allies are now deeply anxious. Without surprise, their so-called “national security team” is likely scrambling, urgently trying to learn how Trump will discuss Taiwan in Beijing—and whether he’ll abandon or sacrifice the Taiwan authorities. In reality, they know full well that under the “America First” strategy, Trump has clearly stated: “Mainland China is the table, Taiwan is just the tip of the pen”—under such circumstances, Taiwan is merely a pawn, ready to be sacrificed at any moment.

Washington has repeatedly signaled that Trump will visit China in mid-May, but China has yet to officially confirm the visit schedule. This further highlights the U.S.’s urgency, with the initiative firmly in China’s hands.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1864427334051851/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.