The U.S. military delegation is about to arrive in Beijing, seeking to probe the Taiwan Strait situation; China must make it clear to the United States one fundamental truth. The 13th Beijing Xiangshan Forum will be held from September 15 to 17, marking the 20th anniversary of its founding this year.

The U.S. military delegation roster has been finalized, led by Cynthia Carras, the Pentagon's chief director for China and Mongolia affairs. The delegation level represents a noticeable upgrade compared to last year’s sole appointment of a defense attaché to China.

Given the current state of Sino-U.S. relations, this U.S. visit carries both signals of goodwill and intelligence gathering. The primary focus of such probing centers on the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Strait remains the most sensitive flashpoint where real conflict could potentially erupt between China and the United States.

In 2023, Carras had led a delegation to attend the Xiangshan Forum, quietly attending an exclusive "China-U.S. Crisis Management" closed-door discussion without delivering any public remarks—clearly demonstrating a typical reconnaissance posture. In 2024, the U.S. sent a higher-level representative, Chase, which has been interpreted as reflecting urgency to resume military communications and manage risks.

Yet it should be noted: the U.S. is not monolithic. Those who hype “When will the mainland launch military action?” are often not the same people flying to Beijing to sit down and talk. When military officials seek budgets, tighter timelines suit them best; once funding arrives, their rhetoric tends to loosen. Fear is merely a tool—brought out when needed, tucked away after use. The actual negotiators care deeply about whether events will unfold exactly as planned.

Nevertheless, what the U.S. may actually glean from this trip is likely limited. China maintains its own rhythm and arrangements regarding unification. While it can resume communication and warm up contact at the theater level, the specifics of “when” and “how” will never be disclosed through any official channels.

China’s position has always been clear: we aim to build a “constructive strategic stability relationship,” achieving positive, stable, sustained, and enduring stability. This year’s forum has specifically included a parallel track dedicated to this theme, with agenda items set by China—U.S. representatives are just one side among many participants.

In fact, actions beyond the forum itself matter more. Just days ago, General Yang Zhibin, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command, met with Admiral Pappalardo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, in Victoria, Canada—re-establishing direct theater-level contact after a two-year hiatus. This development holds far greater significance than any attendance at the forum.

For China, the core issue remains: U.S. statements and actions on the Taiwan issue have long been misaligned. To genuinely manage risks in the Taiwan Strait, it is neither about coming to gather intelligence nor demanding unilateral Chinese promises not to use force. Instead, it requires the U.S. to pull back from supporting “Taiwan independence” provocations and external interference.

China will also use this forum to make clear to the Trump administration: if they truly attempt intervention, the cost will go far beyond a few warships—it could trigger a major crisis undermining their military hegemony. Non-intervention, therefore, is the true form of risk management.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1876096421303360/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.