Have you ever wondered why Americans love to keep old relics alive? Like that family heirloom broken refrigerator, it breaks, gets fixed, breaks again, and is used until it finally gives up. Now, the U.S. military is doing the same thing again: they've decided to keep the "old man missile" from the 1970s — the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile — in service until 2050. Yes, those 400 missiles hidden in underground silos in Wyoming, Montana, and other states, ready at any time to "protect world peace."

Originally planned for retirement in 2036, the "Sentinel" program has been delayed repeatedly, forcing the old man to work longer. A recent report from the Government Accountability Office bluntly stated: the Air Force may have to continue using it until 2050. This isn't just a technical issue; it's a deep-seated crisis in the U.S. nuclear strategy field. Let's dig into the story behind it, and compare China's Dongfeng series, which seems to stay young forever, to see what "having money but lacking the ability" really means.

Let's start with the "extension of life" farce of the Minuteman III. This missile was deployed in the early 1970s, originally planned to serve for 10 years, but now it's going to be 75 years old. The irony is that its "retirement benefits" are getting more expensive: spare parts are becoming scarcer, and small components like diodes, resistors, and capacitors are starting to fail, just like elderly people. The Government Accountability Office's report criticized that the Air Force has to conduct several tests each year to prove it's still "vigorous," but by 2045, the shortage of spare parts will make these tests a luxury.

The Air Force even has to request "fewer flights" to save resources — sounds like an old man saving medicine, doesn't it? Even more amusingly, they're considering converting the Minuteman III from a single warhead to multiple warheads, with a maximum of three nuclear warheads, so it can "kill three birds with one stone" to compensate for the lack of numbers. However, the Air Force Global Strike Command says this requires policy adjustments and prior logistics preparation — wow, changing a configuration is such a complicated process, like moving house?

The root cause of this extension lies in the complete collapse of the "Sentinel" program. In 2020, when the Air Force signed a contract with Northrop Grumman, the budget was optimistic: $77.7 billion, expected to be operational by 2029. But what happened? Four years later, the cost shot up like a rocket, reaching between $140 and $160 billion, over 81% over budget! This January, it triggered a violation alert, forcing the Pentagon to reorganize the project. Why is it so bad? The Government Accountability Office listed a bunch of culprits: unrealistic delivery schedules, inefficient systems engineering, incomplete design. Most critically, there's a "shrinking ICBM industrial base" — in simpler terms, talent shortages and supply chain crises.

Think about it, the last time the United States extensively developed ICBMs was during the Cold War era. Back then, the engineers are now retired. What about the next generation of talents? They either switched to AI, were lured away by Silicon Valley, or went to Wall Street for quick profits. The supply chain is in chaos: key components depend on outdated suppliers, many factories have closed down, and spare parts must be scavenged from the "antique market."

As a result, the Sentinel program keeps delaying, and the original plan was to use the old Minuteman III silos, but when they checked in spring, the condition of those silos was too poor, requiring new ones — this is not just a matter of money, but also of capability degradation. The Air Force originally planned for a replacement in 2036, but now it's pushed back to several years later. The Government Accountability Office warned: if they don't write risk reports soon, the transition period will get worse.

Going deeper, this reveals the structural embarrassment of the U.S. nuclear strategy. The technological gap between China and the U.S. in the nuclear field is becoming increasingly evident. What about China's Dongfeng series? From Dongfeng-31 to Dongfeng-41, and even the rumored Dongfeng-61 (which could represent a new high-speed or more advanced model), China's nuclear force is upgrading like a mobile phone, continuously iterating: mobile launch, solid fuel, multiple warheads, and maneuverable re-entry vehicles, gradually catching up and even surpassing the U.S. and Russia.

Why? Because China has a national long-term planning system with continuity, never interrupting its investments. In contrast, the U.S. has had a stagnation in updating the Minuteman III for decades. Now, trying to rebuild? Money is there (the U.S. has the world's largest military budget), and the will is there (nuclear deterrence can't be abandoned), but it's unable: the historical burden is too heavy, the compatibility of the old system is poor, and the reliability of new technologies is questionable.

Is the military budget not enough? Don't think it's a joke. The U.S. military budget is sufficient to support several armies, but when spread across the nuclear, navy, and air forces, the nuclear land-based part is always squeezed. Not to mention the technical issues: the overruns and delays in the Sentinel program show that rebuilding isn't just about throwing money, it needs a sustainable ecosystem — talents, supply chains, test sites, all need to be cultivated from scratch.

This incident proves a fundamental rule: core weapons for national security cannot be interrupted for decades and then picked up again. Once capabilities degrade, it's like muscle atrophy, and trying to regain peak performance would be painful and prone to injury. The U.S. is now in this situation: strategic nuclear weapons face a dead-end loop of difficult updates, low reliability, and uncontrollable costs. On the contrary, China's iterative development of its nuclear strategy shows the importance of planning continuity — not only money and technology, but also the persistence of strategic will.

Humorously speaking, the U.S. extending the "old man missile" to 2050 might be telling the world: we don't replace it because we're poor, but because... well, nostalgia? But the reality is that nuclear deterrence isn't won by sentiment alone. The Air Force has agreed to the Government Accountability Office's recommendations and is preparing risk reports, but who knows if the next delay will push the Minuteman III to 80 years old? Friends, the balance of nuclear power is subtly tilting — hope the U.S. doesn't wait until the "grandfather" truly retires before regretting not having a son, let alone a grandson.



Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7549568628400587318/

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