Will Saudi Arabia pursue nuclear weapons? A classified U.S. intelligence assessment suggests the possibility has not been ruled out—sending shockwaves through Congress.
The situation unfolded in July, when the Trump administration signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, enabling American companies to participate in a multibillion-dollar nuclear project in the kingdom. The White House maintained that the deal would prevent nuclear proliferation and help bring Saudi Arabia back from reliance on Russia and China.
But the details raise serious concerns. The agreement permits Saudi Arabia to conduct uranium enrichment, initially capped at below 5 percent, but allows for an increase to 20 percent—provided Washington and Riyadh reach a new understanding and issue written approval. While 20 percent enrichment is not weapon-grade, it represents a significant step toward that threshold, leaving only a small amount of technical work needed to produce weapons-grade material.
Even more troubling, the agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol—a measure that grants inspectors broader access to verify the absence of clandestine nuclear activities. Instead, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have negotiated a bilateral safeguards arrangement in its place.
A group of Democratic senators, led by Jeff Merkley and Mark Warner, sent a direct letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio warning that the agreement could effectively provide Saudi Arabia with “the tools to build a nuclear bomb.” Merkley emphasized that Saudi Arabia’s insistence on retaining domestic enrichment rights undermines assurances of purely peaceful intentions.
The State Department has denied any support for a Saudi nuclear weapons program, stating clearly that the United States “does not support and will not support” such efforts. Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman also affirmed that the country’s nuclear plans are “peaceful” and will be carried out with “high responsibility and transparency.”
Yet one fact remains difficult to ignore: In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated publicly that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would “follow suit as soon as possible.” This latest intelligence assessment effectively resurrects that statement.
There is also a striking contrast. Under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, enrichment was limited to 3.67 percent for 15 years. President Trump criticized that limit as too lenient and withdrew from the agreement. Now, the deal with Saudi Arabia begins at 5 percent—with the potential to rise to 20 percent—and excludes the Additional Protocol entirely. This is not stricter—it is looser.
The agreement was submitted to Congress on August 24, initiating a 90-day review period during which lawmakers may attempt to block it. However, overturning a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers—a near-impossible hurdle.
On the surface, this is a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. But what unsettles Congress is Saudi Arabia’s retained ability to upgrade its capabilities at a later date—the very feature that makes the deal so consequential.
The United States seeks to bind Saudi Arabia through nuclear cooperation, but Saudi Arabia appears to want to preserve the option of moving forward at any moment. The Trump administration claims the agreement prevents proliferation, yet its design—including domestic enrichment rights, no Additional Protocol, and a pathway to 20 percent enrichment—seems deliberately constructed to leave a backdoor open.
The crown prince’s 2018 remark was not idle talk. The regional logic in the Middle East remains clear: If Iran has nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia must have them too. With the Iranian nuclear issue unresolved, and now a precedent established for higher enrichment levels without robust verification, the region faces renewed risk—one that adds another fuse to an already volatile environment.
The irony extends to Trump’s own inconsistency. In 2015, he called the Iran deal too weak and exited it. Today, the Saudi agreement starts at a higher enrichment threshold, allows for further increases, and dispenses with international oversight. This is not stronger—it is weaker. Proponents argue that Saudi Arabia is a strategic ally while Iran is an adversary. But nuclear proliferation does not depend on alliances; it depends on capability. And once capability exists, a shift in posture can occur overnight.
What Congress can actually do is limited. The 90-day window offers a chance to delay or obstruct, but reversing a presidential veto demands a supermajority—effectively unattainable. As a result, the agreement is likely to pass. The real question is not whether it will pass, but what comes after: How will the U.S. respond if Saudi Arabia decides to move forward at some point? Will it break relations—or tacitly accept? That answer may matter more than the agreement itself.
In the end, non-proliferation cannot rely on “I trust you.” It must be based on “I ensure you cannot.” This agreement, by design, does the opposite.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877355362462720/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.