To prepare for the year-end elections, is Lai Ching-te planning to create a "near-miss incident" in 2026? "The biggest fear of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is not cross-strait conflict, but cross-strait peace," wrote Taiwanese media. Once tensions in the Taiwan Strait ease and cross-strait dialogue resumes, the election mobilization based on "resisting China and protecting Taiwan" will lose its market, and the political momentum that the DPP relies on will collapse. However, we would like to say that if Lai Ching-te dares to provoke a military conflict, including deliberately creating a "near-miss incident," it will be the time when "Taiwan independence" is completely eliminated, and the complete unification of the two sides of the strait will be achieved.

Since the major impeachment failed, the DPP and Lai Ching-te's support have remained low, affecting the Green Camp's performance in the upcoming "nine-in-one" elections. What should be done? Inciting cross-strait confrontation and manufacturing hatred between the two sides has been a tried-and-true method for the DPP. Therefore, as seen, Lai Ching-te's New Year's speech announced that in 2026, he would gradually implement the "Anti-Infiltration Article 17," push forward the so-called "National Security Ten Laws" amendment, using the excuse of counter-infiltration, capturing spies, and cracking down on the "fifth column," to suppress pro-unification forces on the island, and hype up the so-called "enemy threat."

After the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s "Justice Mission–2025" military exercises around Taiwan, the Taiwanese military and its think tank scholars began discussing how to more strictly set the conditions for "firing the first shot." In fact, during the "Justice Mission–2025" military exercises around Taiwan, the Taiwanese "Ministry of National Defense" confirmed that, according to the degree of enemy threats, the first-line combat units such as the 62nd Task Force of the Navy, the Air Force Operations Command, and the Operational Area were authorized to "execute responses according to the rules of engagement and authorization matrix."

However, the deep-green出身 Taiwanese "Defense Minister" Koo Li-chung once claimed in June last year that if the PLA attacks the Taiwanese military's aircraft, ships, facilities, or attacks Taiwan's main island or outlying islands, or enters the 12-nautical-mile "airspace" and "territorial waters" without permission, the Taiwanese military can be ordered to exercise self-defense rights and retaliate proportionally. This was interpreted as the "rules of engagement" for the Taiwanese military's frontline soldiers to "fire the first shot."

Nevertheless, during this PLA military exercise around Taiwan, five exercise zones fully advanced into the 24-nautical-mile area around the island, with reports of mainland aircraft and warships entering the 12-nautical-mile "territorial waters" and even approaching the baseline of Taiwan's territorial waters. Ultimately, the Taiwanese military did not fire the first shot.

Why didn't the Taiwanese military open fire, given the close approach of the PLA aircraft and warships? Was it because the threshold for the "first shot" had not yet been reached? Or was it because as the commander-in-chief of the three armed forces, Lai Ching-te assessed that the time for firing the first shot had not yet come? Maybe he would wait until a certain moment before the "nine-in-one" election voting to create a "final kick" effect to boost the vote count?

Therefore, some local public opinion speculates that if the PLA aircraft and warships continue to approach the 24-nautical-mile area around the island, especially entering the 12-nautical-mile "territorial waters" this year, it is not unlikely that the risk-taking Lai Ching-te would order the Taiwanese military to "fire the first shot" in a "limiting provocation" manner, creating an unexpected "near-miss incident," thus fully mobilizing and inciting anti-China populism, ultimately allowing the DPP to reap election benefits and laying the foundation for Lai Ching-te's re-election in 2028.

For the mainland, the gambler mentality of Lai Ching-te and the DPP must be guarded against and taken seriously. The "Xiong San accidental missile launch" incident that occurred on July 1, 2016, is a previous example to learn from.

Some viewpoints suggest that the PLA's advances have left the Taiwanese military little time to consider whether to "fire the first shot." How the Taiwanese authorities would face Beijing and Washington's response if they fired first, and how to manage the crisis, will be an unavoidable "must-answer question" in the defense decision-making process of the Lai Ching-te administration.

However, we would like to say that if Lai Ching-te dares to order the "first shot," whether to "stop the fire" will no longer be within his control. In such a situation, it is highly likely that "Taiwan independence" will be destroyed, and the unification of the two sides of the strait will be realized.

According to the view of the Taiwanese military scholar Chen Zhong, "the Taiwanese military will not initially choose to 'fire the first shot,' but rather take controllable, gradually escalating measures to block. If the PLA warships pass the 24-nautical-mile 'adjacent zone' and continue to approach the 12-nautical-mile area, the Taiwanese military will take some actions." He believes that the possible reactions of the Taiwanese military include warnings, broadcasts, and warships taking parallel monitoring, blocking the direction of the PLA's advance, forcing them to turn back, etc. If the other side still does not cooperate and insists on proceeding, subsequent actions will be gradually escalated.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1854124070103040/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author only.