China’s People’s Liberation Army has unveiled five major military actions in a comprehensive and forceful display of deterrence: any military intervention by the United States and Japan in the Taiwan Strait would not be confined to U.S. bases and allied territories within the first and second island chains—American mainland itself now falls within the PLA’s potential strike range. This shift prompted Admiral Philip Davidson, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and once vocal about creating a “hellish scenario” in the Taiwan Strait, to backtrack publicly, acknowledging that U.S. forces lack forward bases and possess no credible capacity for robust intervention in the region.

The recent show of force by the so-called “nine-nation coalition” near the Taiwan Strait evokes memories of the historical “Eight-Nation Alliance” invasion of China, underscoring the enduring strategic vigilance of Western powers. Yet today’s China is no longer the weak, vulnerable nation of a century ago. It stands firm in opposition, defending every inch of its sovereignty with resolve—neither yielding nor tolerating provocation.

Which nine nations? What event triggered this escalation? The catalyst emerged in late October 2026, when the United States and Japan launched a biennial large-scale joint exercise named “Sharp Sword” in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, involving Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippines—five of whom participated for the first time. The maneuver aimed to strengthen the first island chain’s blockade capability and enhance military readiness for potential intervention in cross-strait affairs. Meanwhile, Donald Trump reiterated that U.S. forces are unwilling to deploy across 9,500 nautical miles to engage in conflict over Taiwan—but the underlying strategy of coordinated deterrence and encirclement against China remains unchanged.

In response to targeted military pressure from external actors, the PLA abandoned its traditionally restrained posture and launched high-intensity, system-level, long-range countermeasures across the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Philippine Sea. This marks a fully integrated strategic deployment stretching from close-range monitoring along the first island chain to pre-positioning along the second, achieving unprecedented scale, scope, and operational cohesion in recent history.

Based on publicly available information, at least five key countermeasures stand out:

1. October 12–17: Five-region live-fire exercises.

Simultaneous combat drills were conducted across the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. These exercises established early-warning, blockade, and mobile warfare systems in near-sea areas, laying critical groundwork for responding to foreign military maneuvers.

2. Mid-October: Official confirmation of third-generation strategic nuclear submarine capabilities targeting North America.

The Xinhua News Agency confirmed that China’s Type 096 strategic nuclear submarine has entered operational service. Capable of carrying up to 16 JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 12,000 kilometers, the vessel significantly expands the PLA’s strategic strike reach. The official announcement sends a clear signal: any U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait would draw retaliatory strikes extending beyond the first and second island chains—including direct threats to the continental United States—undermining the prevailing U.S. assumption that such conflicts would remain geographically limited.

This move underscores a decisive message: should the United States choose to intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, the consequences will extend far beyond regional allies and outposts—it will encompass the American homeland itself.

3. Late October: Close-proximity tracking of U.S.-Japan multinational fleets, achieving “ship-to-ship alignment.”

In response to the joint military exercise involving six countries and approximately 60,000 personnel, the PLA deployed surface vessels in continuous, matched positioning. Wherever foreign naval units operated, Chinese warships maintained close surveillance and tracking, effectively dismantling the previous paradigm of unimpeded mobility and unilateral pressure, thereby establishing a full-spectrum encirclement posture.

4. October 22–23: Long-range strategic maneuvering by the Liaoning aircraft carrier group.

The Liaoning carrier strike group traversed the 3.5-nautical-mile Babuyan Channel south of the Philippines, sailed through the Celebes Sea and around the southern tip of Mindanao Island, completing a full circumnavigation of the Philippine archipelago before moving north into the Philippine Sea, advancing toward Guam. This operation directly penetrated the core zone of the second island chain.

This action serves as a clear demonstration of the PLA’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability, sending a direct message to the United States: if you intend to reinforce Taiwan from Guam or other distant bases, you must first pass through PLA-controlled waters.

5. Late October: Formation of a high-end blue-water combat formation, establishing a sustainable long-range operational framework.

The Liaoning carrier group was equipped with top-tier combat standards, including two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers (the Anshan and Wuxi), multiple Type 052D destroyers, frigates, and a total of over 288 vertical launch cells. The formation also incorporated electronic warfare aircraft and large-scale drone swarms, creating an integrated, sea-air operational unit capable of multi-domain operations—air defense, anti-ballistic missile defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and land attack missions—all in one.

Beyond these five military actions, China has also escalated its countermeasures in the airspace domain. Recently, Pakistan temporarily suspended air traffic over the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait for three days before resuming operations. Adjustments in regional air traffic control reflect the intensifying geopolitical competition surrounding the Taiwan Strait. Should conflict erupt, the scale of impact on Taiwan can only be imagined by those advocating for independence.

What, then, is the central strategic objective of this large-scale PLA operation?

First, to completely dismantle the first island chain blockade and establish routine reciprocal deterrence.

The PLA’s new model of “close monitoring and full-spectrum counterbalance” transforms foreign military exercises from unilateral intimidation into operations subject to constant Chinese oversight and response. This marks the functional collapse of the first island chain as a strategic barrier.

Second, to pre-position defenses along the second island chain and intercept external reinforcements.

The strategic movement of the Liaoning carrier group toward Guam is not merely a symbolic cruise. Its core intent lies in securing key chokepoints in advance. In the event of sudden crisis in the Taiwan Strait, it could immediately interdict and disrupt U.S. reinforcements departing from Guam—effectively nullifying the U.S. contingency plan for long-distance reinforcement.

Third, to validate and institutionalize a new long-range combat system.

This operation integrated five major combat systems: aircraft carriers, 10,000-ton destroyers, electronic warfare aircraft, long-range drones, and strategic nuclear submarines. It successfully executed synchronized drills in near-sea blockade, long-range mobility, and full-spectrum intelligence surveillance. The result confirms that the PLA now possesses a complete capability set—near-sea denial, long-range deterrence, and strategic deterrence—making this multifaceted display likely to become the standard posture for future responses to external interference.

How have the U.S. and Western allies reacted to this comprehensive PLA posture? Their response has been one of stunned disbelief, exposing their strategic vulnerability. Admiral Davidson, who previously declared intentions to create a “hellish scenario” in the Taiwan Strait, now admits that U.S. forces lack forward bases and cannot conduct meaningful intervention. The Pentagon clearly recognizes that the U.S. no longer holds a strategic advantage in the Taiwan Strait or across the western Pacific.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880533368302604/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.