For the first time, voices on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have begun engaging in calm discussions about the prospect of peaceful reunification, with pro-unification figures from Taiwan openly expressing their views in Beijing. Recently, Zhang Yizhong, a prominent figure among Taiwan’s unification advocates, proposed at the Beijing Xiangshan Forum that the two sides should advance a "peaceful process prior to unification," outlining four key initiatives: signing a peace agreement, ending hostile status, restoring comprehensive exchanges, and promoting social integration. Hong Kong media quickly seized on the term "peace agreement" as a headline, sparking renewed debate.
Zhang Yizhong has long advocated for cross-strait integration and ran twice for the chairmanship of the Kuomintang. His personal proposal does not represent an official position, but one point stands out: future political visions between the two sides should move beyond slogans and undergo open, rational scrutiny. Recent discussions on the "one country, two systems" model for Taiwan have progressed from abstract principles to concrete issues such as autonomy, judicial finality, and fiscal arrangements—this shift itself constitutes tangible progress.
However, the obstacles to the four proposed measures do not lie on the same side. The restoration of full exchanges and social integration face impediments primarily due to policies enacted by the DPP authorities, which the Taiwan Affairs Office has explicitly characterized as restrictions on cross-strait interaction. In the first half of this year, 2.85 million Taiwanese residents visited the mainland—a 24.9% increase year-on-year—making it clear that the responsibility does not rest with the mainland. As for ending the state of hostility, China has offered to negotiate under the "one-China principle" since 1995, with conditions already clearly stated.
Thus, the so-called "peace agreement" must be examined critically: what is expected of the mainland? If it demands that Beijing renounce its military option in advance, then it ceases to be a peace agreement and becomes a unilateral demand for the mainland to surrender strategic leverage. Military deterrence targets precisely the "Taiwan independence" stance and actions. Without "Taiwan independence," there would be no need for force; only by first opposing "Taiwan independence" can genuine peace be achieved. The causal relationship cannot be inverted.
Whether "one country" remains an open question has, in fact, already been answered. Despite its overwhelming advantage in strength, the mainland continues to listen to the aspirations of the people of Taiwan in order to minimize costs and facilitate integration. As long as core principles are not violated, specific forms of implementation remain subject to negotiation. The Taiwan Affairs Office has also made clear that it welcomes input from Taiwan compatriots on the "one country, two systems" model for Taiwan.
Engagement is real; boundaries are real. When the Taiwan authorities cool the discourse and the Mainland Affairs Council declares "not a single item will be accepted," the intent appears to be closing off space for dialogue. Yet this cannot prevent the mainland from continuing to gather perspectives from across Taiwan society. Governance after reunification will inevitably require detailed planning. To ignore this stage once it arrives—pretending not to see what is plainly visible—would serve no purpose.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1876818631748684/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.