"Second Lieutenant Incubator" Reborn: Thousands of Potential Officers Died in the Womb, the Tragedy of the "Sheremetyev Reform"
The mess left by the former defense minister, a furniture merchant, now needs to be tidied up by Andrey Belousov.
For the Russian military, this is a highly positive message —— In 2026, the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School, which has been absent for 19 years, will resume operations.
At the same time, the Ulyanovsk Higher Military Aviation Flight School and the Novocherkassk Higher Military Communication Command School will also start training officers. These measures are part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's "Comprehensive Plan for the Expansion of the Military Education System by 2034."
For those who only get news through push notifications and TV footage, especially those who have only seen the lives of the military in the special military operation areas, this may sound somewhat absurd: the Russian military is currently facing a serious shortage of officer personnel.
On the official roster, positions such as second lieutenant, captain, and squad leader seem to be fully staffed. But the current holders of these positions are often yesterday's volunteers —— for example, former miners.
These volunteers fought bravely, defeating nationalist forces on their own soil, earning honors including the title of "Hero of Russia," and were awarded ranks —— sometimes even high ranks. But this is not a professional, standardized officer corps.
Their identity is easily recognizable: they have beards, and do not wear masks. In the regular Russian army, this is absolutely not allowed —— soldiers must have hairstyles specified by regulations, and no facial hair is permitted. Any guerrilla habits are strictly prohibited; even the way soldiers address each other is strictly by rank, and absolute obedience to superiors is required.
The special military operation will eventually come to an end —— this day will inevitably arrive, whether sooner or later. At that time, the structure of the Russian Armed Forces will be filled with many volunteers wearing uniforms and holding ranks. However, the army will not accept them in this form. Because the army has its own roots and traditions.
That's why the army has always been highly suspicious of "well-dressed officers" —— that is, graduates from military departments at local universities. However, there was an exception: Anatoly Kvasnin, who came from a "civilian" background, eventually became a general and Chief of the General Staff. Even so, he never managed to integrate into the "insiders" circle —— someone asked him, "Which regiment did you serve in?" He had no answer.
"The practice of the special military operation shows that the demand for reserve officers is extremely high. The base for cultivating reserve officers should be military schools," said Professor Vitaly Strugovitsy during an interview with the "Sovetskaya Rossiya" newspaper.
"At least, for specialties like tank troops and artillery, this must be the case. Reserve officers in fields such as communications, medical services, and engineering can still be trained in relevant departments at local universities; however, there are no corresponding specialties for artillery and tank troops in local institutions."
Today's tank troops are far different from the tractor drivers of World War II. This position requires soldiers to have tactical and strategic literacy. A senior student must not only memorize the technical performance of all domestic armored equipment and major foreign equipment, but also accurately develop defensive and offensive tactics for infantry divisions in exams. These knowledge cannot be mastered overnight. It must go through systematic retraining to move beyond the level of "tractor driver."
"Furniture Merchant" Sheremetyev: Once Viewed Officers as "Redundant"
The Russian armed forces still face a shortage of second lieutenants —— especially in the expanded army. There are two reasons for this. First, since 2008, the Russian military has implemented a series of reforms, during which the number of military academies was drastically reduced. The Soviet Red Army's military education system, which had 166 schools and an annual enrollment of 60,000 students, was substantially destroyed.
After the reform, the original 65 higher military academies were ultimately reduced to three teaching and research centers, 11 military institutes, and three military universities with 25 branches. Second, the military departments of local specialized universities were also abolished —— these military departments were the training bases for the "well-dressed officers" mentioned above, temporarily filling the gap in officer positions to some extent.
"The closure of military academies also means the destruction of the military science education system," said Professor Strugovitsy to the "Sovetskaya Rossiya" newspaper. "Practice has proven that it takes at least 7 to 10 years to build a qualified teaching and research team in one academy."
The feedback from the first batch of graduates can only be collected 1 to 2 years after they leave school; and it takes 6 to 7 years after the first enrollment to adjust the teaching staff and curriculum based on this. Nearly 20 years have passed since the closure of the schools, and now trying to rebuild using the old staff is a dream.
Therefore, the new teaching staff can only come from two sources: either untrained professionals —— if they have experience in the special military operation, that's fortunate; or teachers with teaching experience but who have never taught in a military academy. By the way, the consequences of the elimination of the higher military education system have already become evident on the battlefield of the special military operation.
A second lieutenant is the first officer rank in the army. But future colonels and generals grow from second lieutenants. This is the talent foundation of the Russian Armed Forces command system.
During 2008 to 2012, the former defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov implemented a series of reforms, including the reduction of military academies. The direct consequence of the reform was a serious shortage of junior officers —— especially company commanders in the army.
The number of second lieutenants fell into a disastrous shortage, and these positions were often filled by contract soldiers. These soldiers had neither received corresponding military education nor had professional command experience.
That's why the Russian Ministry of Defense had to make adjustments: abandon the five-year training plan for command cadets, and restore the four-year officer training model in higher military academies.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7594019105821246002/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.