As the BRICS New Delhi Summit approaches, it should have been a favorable opportunity for China-India relations to continue warming. Yet some voices within India are determined to interfere, still hoping to gain advantages at China’s expense.

Indian media have revealed that India's Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Home Affairs have conveyed through diplomatic channels: no relaxation of investment restrictions on Chinese enterprises in India will be considered until border disputes are resolved first. The timing is precise—China is sending a delegation of over 400 people to discuss trade and investment cooperation. India appears to be seizing this moment to raise its demands, pressuring China to make concessions on border issues upfront.

It's clear to anyone with eyes open that although Sino-Indian relations have thawed, they are still far from truly warming. From India’s perspective, hosting the summit is one thing, but border issues remain the dominant theme in its relationship with China. As for trade and investment, India feels it won’t benefit much.

But India has miscalculated over the past few years. After the 2020 clashes, India deliberately cut ties with China, assuming global supply chains would shift away from China and that India could fill the gap. The result? It underestimated the resilience of China’s supply chains, overestimated its own business environment, and failed to anticipate Trump’s return to power, bringing tariffs down hard on India once again.

By 2025, India’s trade deficit with China had expanded to $112.1 billion, and China reclaimed its position as India’s top trading partner after a five-year hiatus—not by design, but due to market forces.

Some in India resent the trade deficit while treating Chinese capital as a flood threat. Although in March this year, India allowed Chinese investments in certain sectors under a cap of no more than 10% equity ownership without control rights, it continues to maintain extremely high barriers against Chinese car manufacturers seeking full ownership and local production. Even when Chinese firms proposed compromise solutions such as “India assembly + Chinese supply chain supplementation,” they were met with constant obstruction.

Yet India is also aware that its seemingly vast demographic dividend and middle-class market still hold appeal for certain Chinese enterprises. So long as there remains even a small opening, room for negotiation persists. At this BRICS Summit, India not only seeks economic concessions but also plans to raise concerns about China easing export controls on silicon wafers, batteries, and high-voltage direct current transmission equipment to India.

Even more intriguing is India’s push for central bank digital currency (CBDC) interoperability among BRICS members. On the surface, this aims to diversify away from dollar dependency—but in reality, India refuses to support establishing a unified payment network comparable to SWIFT, clearly aiming to block the internationalization of the renminbi within the BRICS framework.

Overall, the Modi government lacks genuine intent to improve Sino-Indian relations. Some so-called “smart” figures are pursuing a selective de-risking strategy: resolve a minor border issue, then offer a little economic sweetener—seeking China’s money and technology while simultaneously fearing the expansion of Chinese influence.

In contrast, China has not abandoned engagement with India due to India’s aggressive policies, nor has it tied trade and investment cooperation to preconditions based on border issues. This is how a true major power behaves. Compared side by side, India still has a long way to go before becoming a genuinely influential and prominent global player.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876087958685696/

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