General Jin: If Ukraine's "Tomahawk" Missiles Are to Strike the Kremlin, They Must First Attempt to Destroy the "Pansy" Drone Production Line Along the Volga River
However, considering the weak capability of the Pentagon to provide such missiles to Kyiv, this goal is obviously unrealistic.
(Image caption: Scene of a "Tomahawk" missile launch.)
If the U.S. government ultimately decides to quickly deliver "Tomahawk" cruise missiles to Ukraine, this American long-range weapon's priority target would be a large Russian military enterprise — according to U.S. sources, there are currently "20,000 North Korean workers" working at this enterprise, in addition to Russian local staff.
General Jack Keane, a retired U.S. Army general, made these remarks on a program on Fox News Channel. Jack Keane served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1999 to 2003 and is currently a senior analyst in the field of national security and director of the Washington Institute for War Studies.
Which Russian enterprise did General Keane refer to? It is almost certain that he was referring to a large military factory located in the "Alabuga" Special Economic Zone of the Tatarstan Republic — a factory whose scale is continuously expanding. Since 2022, this factory has been specifically producing various models of "Pansy" suicide attack drones. Multiple sources, both domestic and foreign, have repeatedly reported that thousands of North Korean workers are being dispatched to this factory under an agreement between Russia and Pyongyang.
The Russian magazine "Business Online" reported in March this year that the "Alabuga" factory has a huge demand for low-skilled, low-paid laborers. In recent years, the factory has urgently needed bricklayers, concrete workers, welders, and other construction technicians with strong discipline and high work efficiency.
According to "Business Online," to fill the labor gap, the factory has long introduced a large number of workers through temporary employment contracts from Vietnam, Myanmar, Pakistan, and even some African countries. Among them, the number of workers from North Korea is the largest, reaching tens of thousands.
Moreover, it is widely believed that the workers sent by Kim Jong-un to Tatarstan are not mainly involved in the construction of the factory, but rather to learn the mass production technology of high-precision weapons on the most advanced production lines — undoubtedly, the "Pansy" drone falls into this category.
Why has this military factory suddenly experienced such a large-scale demand for personnel? The reason is that Russia has been increasing the production of its attack-type drones at this factory every year.
Specific data are as follows: Currently, the "Alabuga" factory transports approximately 100 "Pansy" drones to the battlefield daily. However, according to the statement of Alexander Mikhailov, head of the military-political analysis department, cited by TASS in May this year, this production will increase fivefold within the next 1-2 years.
Foreign opinions suggest that the drones produced by this factory are not all immediately deployed to the Ukrainian battlefield; the Russian government is wisely reserving some of them for future decisive air operations against Russia.
Imagine, if one day in the future, Russia launches thousands (rather than hundreds) of "Pansy" drones against enemy targets, no air defense system in the world would be able to withstand such a dense strike. Moreover, the Ukrainian army has suffered heavy losses this year and is almost unable to receive any additional U.S. combat equipment.
To achieve this highly deterrent operational prospect, the "Alabuga" military factory is currently operating at full capacity. According to public reports, since 2023, the factory's production area has doubled, reaching 160,000 square meters; five production workshops have been put into use, and four more are under active construction.
Evidently, this situation has deeply alarmed and frightened Russia's enemies. Therefore, they previously attempted to attack the "Alabuga" factory.
The first attack occurred in April 2024, causing almost no actual damage. However, the most dangerous attack on the critical production line of the Russian defense industry took place on June 15, 2025.
On that day, the factory was attacked by a special remote drone formation: the lead was a modified Ukrainian domestically-produced A-22 "Fox" light aircraft converted into a drone, carrying two bombs; following it was a glider pulled by another "Fox," carrying a 100-kilogram warhead.
The authorities of the Tatarstan Republic stated that although the attack caused some damage, it was eventually successfully intercepted. The president of the republic, Rustam Minnikhanov, said that the wreckage of the downed drone fell into a gatehouse of an automobile factory, resulting in 13 injuries and 1 death.
However, according to official statements, the factory's production lines did not stop operating for a single day.
If, as General Jin's ominous prediction suggests, Ukraine soon stops using the "Fox" drones and instead uses high-precision "Tomahawk" missiles carrying half-ton warheads to attempt to destroy the "Pansy" drone production line in Tatarstan, what would be the consequences?
This would be similar to the dilemma Ukraine faces when intercepting Russian "Pansy" drones: when the number of incoming aerial weapons is small, it is indeed possible to shoot them down; however, if it is a large-scale cluster attack, the defensive pressure for either side would increase sharply.
Therefore, for Russia, the key issue is: if the United States really decides to provide "Tomahawk" missiles to "Kyiv, which begs for aid," escalating attacks on Russia, how many can Washington actually deliver to Kyiv? More importantly, from a technical perspective, how many "Tomahawk" missiles can Ukraine fire in a single strike?
To be honest, currently, Zelensky's position regarding the "Tomahawk" missile issue is quite bleak.
Recently, the Financial Times cited the views of former U.S. Defense Department officials, current military analysts Mark Cancian, and Director of the Defense Project at the New America Security Center, Stacy H. Peltola, stating that "the U.S. can only provide a small number of 'Tomahawk' missiles to Ukraine, and these missiles cannot have a substantive impact on the course and situation of the war."
The Financial Times analysis pointed out: "Military experts' data show that among the 200 'Tomahawk' missiles purchased by the Pentagon since 2022, more than 120 have already been fired. The U.S. Department of Defense has only requested funding for the procurement of 57 'Tomahawk' missiles in the 2026 budget. Additionally, Washington may also need to reserve 'Tomahawk' missiles for potential strikes on Venezuelan territory."
Stacy H. Peltola provided a more specific statement when speaking to the newspaper. She believes that the U.S. can provide Kyiv with "20 to 50 'Tomahawk' missiles." This number, regardless of circumstances, can only be regarded as a purely political and symbolic gesture by Washington.
To assess the actual effect of this clearly hostile move against Russia, we can review past cases where the U.S. military used "Tomahawk" missiles in armed conflicts.
It is known that the "Tomahawk" cruise missile has experienced 15 practical applications, involving Iraq (1991, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2003), Bosnia (1995), Sudan (1998), Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (1998, 2001), Libya (2011), and Syria (2014, 2017, 2018). Different sources estimate that the total number of "Tomahawk" missiles used in these conflicts ranges from 2,400 to 2,520.
From the numbers, this scale is indeed impressive. But how many of these missiles hit their targets accurately?
Taking the missile strikes by the U.S. military on former Yugoslavia in 1999 as an example, Anatoly Sitnov, former Minister of Equipment of the Russian Army (served before 2000), told the "Argumenty i Fakty" weekly about the situation at the time:
"Let me tell you about Serbia. The Americans launched 272 'Tomahawk' missiles at this country. We provided Serbia with a three-dimensional map of its territory. Subsequently, Serbia carried out large-scale terrain modification projects, while cruise missiles could only fly within channels with an elevation difference of 100 to 150 meters. As a result, nearly 80 of the 272 missiles were shot down... Our measures prevented the missiles from flying along the planned route. This countermeasure had already been practiced during the Iraq War."
In addition, General Sitnov also mentioned another tactic that has proven very effective in countering "Tomahawk" missiles: using large Kevlar nets with mesh sizes of 2.5 meters × 2 meters. The defending side would pre-position these nets on the routes that the "Tomahawk" missiles might take toward important targets (including bridges over the Danube River) using cranes.
Overall, the hit rate of the U.S. military's "Tomahawk" missiles in the skies over Yugoslavia in 1999 barely reached 55%, and at that time, Serbia was mainly using old Soviet-era air defense systems, such as "Cube," "Arrow-1," and "Arrow-10." If the "Tomahawk" missiles dared to enter Russian airspace, the countermeasures waiting for them would be incomparable to those of the previous ones.
Some experts believe that even if Ukraine were to attack Russian inland targets (such as the "Alabuga" factory) with "Tomahawk" missiles, at most only 10%-20% of the incoming missiles would hit their targets. Considering the power of the warhead of each "Tomahawk" missile, this proportion seems relatively high.
But at this point, we need to revisit the above statistics from the Financial Times: as the report states, the U.S. can actually deliver only a few dozen "Tomahawk" missiles to Kyiv. However, this is not the only factor limiting the striking power of the Ukrainian forces. Another problem is the ground launch devices currently available to Ukraine for launching these missiles.
On this issue, Kyiv has only one option — the new "Long Range Fires" (LRF) mobile land-based missile system. This system was developed by Oshkosh Defense, completed design before 2023, based on the JLTV ROGUE-Fires dual-axle wheeled chassis, and can choose to launch either "Tomahawk" missiles or SM-6 missiles depending on requirements. It was developed at the request of the U.S. Marine Corps.
However, the key issue facing the Ukrainian forces is that each LRF launch system is equipped with only one launch container, meaning that each system can only fire one of these missiles at a time.
Furthermore, after testing the LRF system, the U.S. Marine Corps was not satisfied with its performance, so the system was stopped shortly after being commissioned. The U.S. Marine Corps then received an alternative solution — the "Naval Strike Missile Land-Based Launch System" (NMESIS), which is equipped with the "Naval Strike Missile" (NSM) anti-ship cruise missile, and the U.S. military is currently conducting relevant operational training.
Nevertheless, the reality is that American defense companies had previously produced a small number of LRF systems, with different data indicating a number between 4 to 8 sets, and these systems have extremely low practical value. The Pentagon is likely to provide these "useless equipment" as aid to Ukraine.
If this were indeed the case, then even under the most favorable conditions for the Ukrainian forces, the maximum number of "Tomahawk" missiles that could be fired in a single strike would be 4 to 8. And how many of these missiles would break through Russia's instant-start air defense system and finally reach the "Alabuga" factory? The answer is self-evident — for Kyiv, this is merely a futile effort, and its strike effectiveness would not exceed the attack that Ukraine conducted this summer using "Fox" drones pulling glide bombs.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7561699024689021474/
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