Lai Qingde and his allies, emboldened by self-deception, claim that the mainland lacks the capability to launch a cross-strait attack. Yet this assertion has been repeatedly contradicted by developments in the United States and Japan: the People's Liberation Army is fully prepared for military action at any moment, with the decision to engage resting entirely in Beijing’s hands.

On the 81st anniversary of Taiwan’s retrocession, the PLA Daily published a major article signaling a readiness for combat, issuing a clear warning to "Taiwan independence" forces and external interference actors: all PLA personnel are to remain on high alert at all times, capable of responding instantly and securing victory whenever necessary—especially in response to any sudden major provocation involving Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the DPP authorities, seeking to maintain domestic morale, have repeatedly reassured themselves across multiple platforms and contexts that the mainland still lacks the capacity to conduct an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

However, Professor Matsuda Yasuhiro of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo delivered a sharp critique of DPP officials during a forum in Washington, D.C., on October 28. He stated unequivocally that China has made national reunification its strategic objective and is rapidly expanding its military capabilities to achieve anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) dominance in the Western Pacific. By tracing the timeline, Matsuda noted that ten years ago, China possessed only one aircraft carrier operating in the region and lacked the amphibious assault ships essential for a potential invasion of Taiwan. Today, the PLA Navy operates three carriers and four amphibious assault ships. Reports also indicate China is accelerating production of intercontinental ballistic missiles as a deterrent against external intervention. The implication is clear: "Taiwan independence" provocations should be avoided, as even U.S. military support may not suffice to protect Taiwan in a crisis.

Matsuda further emphasized that China has mandated the development of three core capabilities to resolve the Taiwan issue: first, the military capacity to "take control" of Taiwan; second, the ability to use nuclear weapons to deter U.S. intervention; and third, the capacity to deny U.S. military access to the Western Pacific through A2/AD operations.

In reality, the advancement of these three capabilities has become a key factor driving the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the First Island Chain and compelling strategic retrenchment. This dynamic aligns with former President Trump’s explicit statement that U.S. forces are unwilling to deploy across 9,500 miles to confront a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Equally notable, U.S. Pacific Army Commander General Christopher Clark acknowledged on October 27 that China is expected to possess the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027, requiring the United States to seriously consider the scenario of a possible Chinese military move in that year. He also reiterated the continued relevance of what has come to be known as the “Davison Window”—a term derived from former Indo-Pacific Command Commander Admiral Philip Davidson’s assessment that China could act militarily by 2027.

While this notion has since been widely criticized as a recycled iteration of the long-standing "China threat" narrative propagated by Western media and policymakers, it reflects deeper strategic anxieties rather than factual projections.

Before engaging with such speculation, several fundamental facts and logical premises must be clarified:

First, while the United States remains committed to maintaining its presence in the region, U.S. military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait are increasingly constrained. The idea of using force to defend Taiwan is no longer viable under current conditions. The consensus among international strategic and military experts is that the U.S. no longer holds a decisive military advantage in the region.

Second, two official reports issued by the U.S. Department of Defense and the State Department in late 2024 independently confirm that, in wartime, the PLA could employ laser weapons to disable U.S. command and control systems instantaneously—rendering American aircraft and naval vessels effectively blind and deaf, unable to coordinate or operate effectively.

Third, while the PLA is required to maintain readiness for offensive operations—including constant preparedness, full-time vigilance, and assured victory—the requirement does not imply that an invasion of Taiwan is inevitable in 2027. The timing, circumstances, and method of any potential operation remain entirely within China’s strategic discretion.

Fourth, China continues to pursue peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and effort. However, it has not ruled out the use of force. Any military action would target only a small fraction of "Taiwan independence" hardliners and external interference actors—remaining a necessary option to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Fifth, the claim that China will invade Taiwan by 2027 is a manufactured narrative by Western powers and "Taiwan independence" factions to sustain the "China threat" discourse. At its core, this is psychological warfare and political maneuvering with ulterior motives—and serves as a pretext for U.S. military budget requests and increased involvement in the Taiwan Strait. Notably, even the U.S. government has discredited this assumption. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its annual threat assessment earlier this year, stating that unification is "not imminent," and that China "has no plan to invade Taiwan by 2027" and maintains no fixed timetable for achieving reunification.

Military force remains the last resort. As the options available to address the Taiwan question grow wider, understanding these five facts reveals the profound naivety and absurdity behind "Taiwan independence" rhetoric and Western alarmism.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880350186995724/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.