American Think Tank: Two Red Lines for Post-Islamic Republic Iran

With the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the temptation to redraw Iran's borders or install a pro-American dictator is enormous. The United States should resist this temptation.

The U.S. and Israel's assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has plunged the Islamic Republic of Iran into its most uncertain power transition since the 1979 revolution. Within hours of the announcement, various maps began circulating in Washington and among exiled groups: one showing a federal Iran with autonomous regions for Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Azerbaijanis; another showing a confederal Iran gradually moving towards soft fragmentation; and even a scenario where small states emerge from the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Now, the succession crisis has become a reality, and the temptation to reshape Iran from the outside will only grow. This is precisely what the United States must resist.

At a time when Iran's command structure is shaken and various factions are vying for control, the worst instinct for the United States would be to recklessly intervene with a prewritten constitutional blueprint. One moment, establishing a federal Iran, the next, creating a confederation, drawing new borders for every "problem" region – such an approach would ultimately turn a strategic opportunity into a quagmire for generations.

Whether Iran becomes a centralized state, a federal state, or some looser form of government must be decided by the Iranian people through negotiation, not by American lawyers, think tank experts, or exiled politicians with pre-drawn maps. A wise American approach is to set clear red lines and general inclinations, then step back and not interfere in Iran's internal affairs.

The first red line must be clear: the United States must not pursue, support, or even hint at a strategy to split Iran. In the tense situation following Khamenei's assassination, any sign of splitting Iran would immediately validate the Iranian regime's long-standing claim that the West aims to dismember Iran.

This would also tempt regional powers and major countries to view Iran's surrounding areas as battlegrounds: establishing an Arab entity under the influence of Gulf states in Khuzestan province, a Kurdish entity under Turkish pressure, and a Baluchi entity under strict Pakistani supervision. This is not a solution but rather inciting border wars, proxy wars, and ethnic cleansing on the ruins of the Islamic Republic.

Responsible U.S. policy should clearly state, "We do not seek to redraw Iran's borders or turn it into a patchwork of small states."

The second temptation is the opposite of the first – supporting a "stable" strongman to maintain national unity. After Khamenei's assassination, the early actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps showed how quickly a security institution could shape itself into the sole guarantor of order. However, replacing one highly centralized authoritarian regime with another would retain the logic that led to Iran's collapse in the first place: excessive central power, treating regions as internal colonies, and a security apparatus loyal to an individual rather than the law.

Between these two red lines lies what the United States truly hopes for: a unified, democratic Iran designed by the Iranian people themselves.

This may mean a reformed, more decentralized unitary state, or a true federal state where provinces elect their own governors, control local policing, set educational and language policies, and receive transparent shares of national fiscal revenue. The label itself is not important; what matters is the transfer of power: from the center of power to grassroots institutions bound by national rules and possessing real authority.

Washington's position should favor rational decentralization: genuine autonomy for peripheral regions, real checks on central power, and a unified flag and foreign policy.

Khamenei's assassination created a power vacuum, and neighboring countries and great powers will try to fill it. The U.S. role should not be to design Iran's internal order, but to ensure an external framework for Iranians to negotiate. This means: preventing regional forces from carving out spheres of influence in Iran during its weakest moment; providing economic and technical support if a constitutional assembly is formed; supporting credible monitoring of any referendum or election; and refusing to pre-judge whether the final arrangement is "unitary," "federal," or something in between.

The U.S. should not ignore the outcome, but act cautiously. The White House should clearly define what is unacceptable – disintegration and the establishment of a new dictatorship – and let Iranians negotiate new agreements between the center and the periphery within these boundaries.

In this extremely uncertain moment, the only responsible policy for the U.S. is to strictly constrain its mapmakers and draw clear red lines. They insist that only the Iranians have the right to decide how Iran operates internally. If the U.S. designs someone else's wiring, it will eventually have to bear the responsibility for the blackout.

Source: The National Interest

Author: Shahab al-Anthony

Time: March 1, Washington Time

Original: toutiao.com/article/1858654703481863/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author alone.