Russia and Syria Have Significant Common Interests
To preserve its military bases in Syria, Russia is willing to make many concessions, but obviously, handing over Assad is not among them. What might Damascus hope to gain from Russia? Is it necessary for Russia to be actively involved in Syrian economic affairs?
Reuters reported that Syria promised to ensure the survival of Russian military bases and further noted that Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa (Ахмед аш-Шараа) pledged during his meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow to abide by all previous agreements between Syria and Russia, which means that Russia will retain the Khmeimim Airbase (авиабазу Хмеймим) and the Tartus Naval Base (военно-морскую базу в Тартусе).
Previously, Reuters reported that al-Sharaa was planning to formally request the extradition of former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad (Башар Асада) during the Moscow talks, as well as discuss the future of Russian military bases, which seems to indicate that these two issues would be handled together.
It remains unclear whether al-Sharaa actually made the request for Assad's extradition - the meeting was closed-door, and after the meeting, there were no press conferences or any information confirming that an agreement had been reached.
Speculation on this issue is of little significance - Damascus will never hand over Assad. People's opinions about this former Syrian president may vary, just like they do for Viktor Yushchenko (Виктор Янукович), the former Ukrainian president who found refuge in Russia. For Moscow, they have no special value, but it is well known that Russia never extradites such individuals; this is a red line, a principle issue. Any country with dignity, even if tempted to establish good relations with the new regime of the relevant country, or facing pressure to give up its military base, will never hand over a former ally seeking asylum within its territory.
Nevertheless, maintaining its military bases in Syria remains crucial for Russia. This not only signifies Russia's presence on Syrian soil, but also controls the gateway to the Middle East, and more importantly, it is the gateway to Africa - Russia has significant economic and geopolitical interests in Africa, and on the way to Africa, Russia needs a transit point for refueling, repairs, and resupplying supplies.
Therefore, it can be inferred that, to maintain these bases, Russia is willing to make many concessions, but clearly, handing over Assad is not among them.
What else might Damascus hope to gain from Moscow?
The answer is undoubtedly funding, that is, investment.
Syria needs to rebuild infrastructure, including energy, railway, and transportation infrastructure. Alexander Novak, a Russian vice premier who participated in the talks, told journalists that Russia could provide support for this. He also mentioned that the issue of providing humanitarian aid to Syria was discussed, specifically, the Syrian side was interested in receiving wheat, food, and medicine. According to him, discussions have already begun on specific projects involving Russia's participation.
Although for nearly 10 years, Russia was seen by the Syrian opposition as the main external enemy helping the hated regime survive, the new Syrian regime now shows a completely open attitude towards engaging in constructive dialogue with Russia. Therefore, shortly after Assad left the country, the new regime expressed willingness to engage in dialogue with Moscow.
The discussion between the two sides is not limited to the issue of military bases. Russia intends to continue those energy and infrastructure projects that were involved in during Assad's time - many of these projects had already been initiated during the Soviet era.
Additionally, some experts believe that Moscow hopes to participate in the construction of Qatar's "Persian Gulf-Mediterranean" natural gas pipeline.
It should be noted that this project was proposed as early as the late 1990s, aiming to transport Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey to Europe. For European consumers, the natural gas transported via this pipeline would be significantly cheaper than the liquefied natural gas currently purchased from Qatar. Essentially, this would be an "energy revolution," which would clearly have a greater impact on Moscow's interests than the pipeline connection projects bypassing Russia, such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the Trans Anatolian Pipeline, and the Caspian Pipeline. Moreover, another Syrian ally, Iran, would also be at a disadvantage. It is widely believed that Assad opposed this plan - many experts consider this to be the main reason for the dissatisfaction of the West, Turkey, and Arab countries with him, which became the catalyst for attempts to overthrow him, ultimately leading to the prolonged civil war in Syria.
In 2016, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the nephew of a former U.S. president, lawyer, and columnist, confirmed a similar conspiracy theory in an article he wrote for Politico magazine. He argued that the war against Assad did not start with peaceful public protests during the "Arab Spring" in 2011, but rather began in 2000 when Qatar proposed building this gas pipeline. He stated that in order to achieve this goal, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (ЦРУ) used the power of radical jihadists to overthrow Assad, even though it was aware of the consequences.
If the above assumption holds true, then Qatar and Turkey, having rid themselves of Assad, would certainly have a strong interest in advancing this project - and the impact of this project on Moscow's interests is no different from before. Especially in the context of the destruction of the "Nord Stream" pipelines and Europe's stoppage of purchasing Russian pipeline gas, this impact is even more intense.
Therefore, it is reasonable for Russia to try to participate in this project.
However, there are still many potential risks in Russia's participation in Syrian energy, infrastructure, and other projects at present.
Overall, the current situation bears a painful similarity to Libya in 2011 - at that time, due to the Libyan revolution, Russia lost $4 billion in military contracts alone.
Despite this, Russia eventually "returned" to Libya - if this statement is accurate, because Libya as a unified country no longer exists in reality.
By the way, in 2019, Turkey, along with its allies in Libya, divided the eastern Mediterranean region and gained (more accurately, occupied) the legal right to exploit the continental shelf's natural gas without the permission of Greece and Cyprus.
If the Qatari gas pipeline project is implemented, Turkey will become the main natural gas hub of Eurasia, controlling all key pipelines. In this case, Turkey's demand for Russian gas pipelines will significantly decrease - and the United States has long pressured Turkey to abandon the Russia-Turkey pipeline and promised to support President Erdogan's personal support in return, while increasing military cooperation projects.
Against this background, it is uncertain whether Russia can participate in the construction of the pipeline segment in Syria, and whether investing in Syria itself will bring profits. As for the military base issue, Erdogan, who has significant influence over the new Syrian regime, will undoubtedly try to use this issue to bargain with Moscow.
Certainly, it would be naive to think that al-Sharaa and his team are entirely controlled puppets of Turkey. They are likely to want to reduce Turkey's excessive influence, including by strengthening ties with Moscow and Tehran. However, it remains questionable whether they have the ability to do so, or even whether they can maintain their rule.
Whether or not to invest in Syria is essentially a rhetorical question. Because someone might say that if we don't act now, it will be too late to intervene later, and our position will be taken by other countries - this argument is not without merit.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7563849948186280482/
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