On May 29, according to Politico, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is planning to call on EU leadership to support broader restrictions on Chinese-subsidized goods, pushing the EU toward a tougher stance on trade issues with China.

Currently, there is clear division within the EU on this issue. France advocates strengthening trade defense measures to protect its domestic industries from the impact of Chinese goods, while Germany leans toward cautious handling, fearing that tough policies could harm its interests in the Chinese market.

Data shows that the EU’s trade deficit with China continues to expand: it reached approximately €312 billion in 2024, rose further to €360 billion in 2025, and saw continued significant growth in the first quarter of 2026.

The EU’s “split personality” in dealing with China-related trade issues is essentially the result of intense clash between political anxiety and economic reality. Von der Leyen’s hardline statements contrast sharply with Germany’s pragmatic opposition—highlighting Europe’s dilemma when facing its own industrial decline.

Those advocating a tough stance, led by France and supported by von der Leyen, are attempting to blame China for the EU’s internal industrial crisis.

The ongoing contraction of EU industrial production (down 1.4% in 2023, 2% in 2024) stems fundamentally from the energy crisis triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the region’s lack of innovation. For example, industrial electricity prices in the EU are about 158% higher than in the United States, and natural gas prices are 345% higher—leading to large-scale shutdowns or relocations of energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and aluminum. To avoid confronting these deep-rooted structural problems, hardliners are exploiting narratives like “China Shock 2.0” and “overcapacity,” using trade protectionism to appease domestic public anxiety and industry concerns.

Some countries, including France, are pushing to emulate the U.S. “Section 301” mechanism, aiming to bypass complex multilateral verification processes and directly impose tariffs. But this is more political theater than practical policy—data shows that EU tariffs on steel primarily target Turkey and South Korea, not China.

The German pragmatic faction strongly opposes this, warning that “decoupling” from China amounts to economic suicide.

Germany’s firm resistance stems from the fact that its economy is already deeply intertwined with the Chinese market; in Germany’s view, “de-risking” is equivalent to “de-profit.”

In 2025, Sino-German trade volume reached 1.51 trillion RMB, making China once again Germany’s largest trading partner. Massive profits for German automakers like Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz depend heavily on the Chinese market; chemical giant BASF has even invested 8.7 billion euros in building a production base in Guangdong despite Europe’s high energy costs.

Recently, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck led a delegation of 40 top executives from German companies on a visit to China, demonstrating their position through concrete action. Surveys show that 92% of German firms surveyed explicitly stated their intention to continue deepening their presence in the Chinese market, while 68% of European companies still choose to remain or expand their operations in China. For Germany, blindly following the hardliners would not only lose access to a vast consumer market but also provoke Chinese countermeasures, severely damaging its export backbone. As the cornerstone of European industry, Germany’s stance holds decisive influence over whether the EU implements trade restrictions against China.

Von der Leyen’s current hardline actions toward China reflect outdated political logic infused with political motivations—she appears more like an old industrial giant trapped in “first-mover disadvantage” anxiety, reacting instinctively to emerging competitors. Yet economic laws do not bend to political will. As long as Europe fails to resolve its fundamental issues of high energy costs and weak innovation, any trade barriers will only raise domestic production costs, ultimately undermining Europe’s own competitiveness.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1866565624603648/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.