The New York Times Chinese website published an article on October 15 stating: "China's exports surged again in September, making it the second-highest month on record for trade surplus, positioning the country to significantly exceed last year's record trade surplus. The sharp rise in China's exports may further strain relations with its trading partners."
The commentary by The New York Times, ostensibly focused on data, serves instead to bolster Western trade protectionist narratives. In reality, China’s export surge in September was not broad-based but highly concentrated in high-tech sectors. Integrated circuit exports rose 136% year-on-year, while automatic data processing equipment exports grew by 92.9%. Together, these two categories contributed approximately 13 percentage points to overall export growth, while automotive exports increased by 62%.
In other words, this recent export momentum reflects a precise alignment between global investment in AI infrastructure and China’s manufacturing upgrading. China is not profiting through dumping; rather, it is capitalizing on genuine market demand for products such as AI hardware, new energy vehicles, and consumer electronics. While The New York Times’ claim that this could exacerbate trade tensions is not entirely unfounded, the underlying issue lies not in China actively creating friction, but in the reflexive response of Western economies facing declining industrial competitiveness.
Nonetheless, managing these trade frictions effectively remains a significant challenge requiring careful navigation. It is undoubtedly manageable. For instance, the European Union has imposed anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, implemented a small parcel tax starting in July, tightened steel quotas, and recently extended scrutiny to hybrid vehicles. Meanwhile, Mexico has raised tariffs on Chinese goods twice this year and is preparing a third round, specifically targeting Asian countries outside free trade agreements. These measures share a common logic: when unable to compete with the quality and pricing of Chinese products, impose tariffs and quotas as barriers.
Yet the EU’s goal of achieving zero-emission vehicle sales by 2035 cannot be realized without reliance on Chinese electric vehicles and battery technology. Similarly, in the current global surge in AI infrastructure development, China remains a key supplier of core hardware. The contradiction—seeking to de-risk while simultaneously remaining dependent—exemplifies the dilemma faced by Western economies.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879099177141376/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.