[Author: Jiang Yuzhou, Observer Network]
Iran over the past ten days has been the center of global public opinion.
Firstly, a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency showed that Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium has increased significantly over the past four months, enough to make nearly 10 nuclear bombs.
Then, Israel used this as an excuse to launch an unprovoked attack on a sovereign country on June 12, causing massive damage to Iranian military facilities and the death of key figures.
Within less than ten days, after multiple statements from Trump that fluctuated left and right, he suddenly bombed Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 and urged Iran to quickly return to the negotiating table that he had personally overturned. At the same time, a large number of American naval and air forces were also moving towards the Middle East.
Since June 13, the number and frequency of ballistic missile attacks by Iran against Israel, War Research Institute
Trump announced the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities on a social platform, ending with emphasizing "it is now time for peace"...... So far, although the conflict between Iran and Israel has not reached the scale of previous wars in the Middle East, as the first regional power confrontation after the Iraq war in the Middle East, there are many breakthroughs in existing international rules. Moreover, all parties involved lack control over the overall situation, which may lead the conflict to an unknown direction.
Whether it is military confrontation or political tug-of-war, this conflict will enter a normalized state
Before the outbreak of the Iran-Israel conflict, the US intelligence agencies and embassies repeatedly sent signals that Israel was about to take action. Until June 10, they were still arranging the evacuation of US embassy personnel in Israel and Iraq. Regardless of subjective motives (which will be discussed later), objectively, it played the role of "leaking questions".
Iran's response was clearly in line with the US "leak". The Supreme Council of the Iranian Passive Defense Organization, chaired by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, had already held a meeting on May 20 to coordinate the defense of key infrastructure. Iran's most advanced air defense systems were redeployed near nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow by the end of May. Iranian generals also visited various key locations in June to inspect the preparation of air defense work.
Under such preparations, Iran still suffered heavy losses, which can be considered as a series of failures in military equipment, combat systems, and internal governance.
But Iran is a major power in the Middle East. After experiencing short-term chaos, it quickly regained its rhythm. By June 22, when the United States bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran had already dragged the conflict into a stalemate through continuous counterattacks.
This stalemate first manifested as a stable military standoff. Whether it was Israeli aircraft attacking Iran or Iranian missiles and drones attacking Israeli cities, the patterns have become relatively fixed. Israeli attacks mainly aim to strike Iran's military and economic potential, kill high-value targets, and incite unrest within Iran, with more emphasis on precise strikes using intelligence and technology. Furthermore, relying on stronger military strength, at least currently, Israel has already gained air superiority over western Iran.
However, Israel's powerful military has its shortcomings. It lacks the means to launch direct large-scale ground attacks and strategic bombing on Iran, and also lacks the ability to strike targets hidden in mountainous and deep pits in Iran. When Iran recovered, it also grasped its own war rhythm and began to retaliate against Israel's core government departments, oil refineries, power stations, and commercial centers. Although the accuracy is much worse than Israel's, just like the retaliation in October last year, it not only tested the limited endurance of Israel's air defense but also severely disrupted the social life order of Israel. For a geographically small country with limited strategic depth, this interference has an additional amplifying effect.
More seriously, Iran may currently be polishing its "city attack" rhythm. After June 15, the number and frequency of Iran's missile launches and attacks showed a downward trend. Israel once believed that its damage effect was outstanding and publicly announced that two-thirds of Iran's ballistic missile launchers had been destroyed. However, after June 20, Iran suddenly increased the intensity of the attack, especially after the US attacked Iran's nuclear facilities, immediately launching several batches of dozens of missiles, demonstrating its potential for sustained warfare.
Since June 13, the number and frequency of ballistic missile attacks by Iran against Israel, War Research Institute
As of June 19, the Israeli Defense Forces emphasized that their air raids had "significantly weakened" Iran's ability to launch ballistic missiles, but were subsequently "faced with a counterattack", indicating that Iran's countermeasures and rhythm design were becoming more mature.
From a political perspective, the positions of the parties involved in the conflict and their interests have become increasingly irreconcilable, pushing the conflict toward long-termization.
As the direct instigator of the conflict and its allies, Israel and the United States have always had a clear position on Iran's nuclear issue, demanding that Iran completely abandon uranium enrichment, whether for military or civilian purposes. Iran emphasizes that peaceful use of nuclear energy is its legitimate right. If the US and Israel demand "zero uranium enrichment", then "there is no need to continue negotiations".
The two sides have been going back and forth on this issue, even coming up with a new proposal that Iran would stop uranium enrichment for three years and "gain trust from the United States", and then resume civilian uranium enrichment under strict supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency and relevant countries. This is a step back to reach the other side's bottom line, and it's a small adjustment of the toes.
So the question is, having spent decades observing America's performance on nuclear talks, does Iran choose to stick to its own position or trust America again, which one is actually foolish?
Of course, it hasn't come to Iran's final decision yet. With the release of the IAEA report, Israel's bombs followed closely.
History leaves a concrete interpretation here. The senior advisor of Iran's Supreme Leader, who was responsible for the Iranian nuclear committee, Shamhani, was seen as a key figure who had been guiding the negotiations. He was once believed to have died in the bombing, but on June 21, he updated his social media account and issued the following statement:
"It is my fate to survive injured, so I am still here and remain the reason for the enemy's hatred...... For Iran, I am willing to sacrifice a hundred times. For the enemy, fighting a country full of hope will end in ashes."
Compared to the United States, Israel's demands are more blatant. After the United States bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, it at least did some surface work, informing Iran immediately: as long as they do not retaliate, the United States' attacks will stop here. However, Israel explicitly stated that in addition to nuclear facilities, Iran's ballistic missiles should also be destroyed. Before achieving these two goals, Israel is not interested in a ceasefire.
Furthermore, the United States has repeatedly stated that it does not seek regime change in Iran. In contrast, Israel directly puts "regime change" on its lips constantly. From the beginning of the attack, Netanyahu claimed to promote regime change in Iran, saying things like "a lamp has been lit - take it towards freedom" and "I believe your day of liberation is approaching." At this point, he has led Israel to become a guiding light for countless people in the Middle East, and the conflict itself is one that he must maintain to sustain his corrupt government.
Israel is not only speaking, but also acting. Since June 15, one of the main focuses of the Israeli air raids has shifted from assassinating key figures to striking Iran's strong departments, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), the Basij militia organization, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provincial units. The Israeli Defense Minister Katz has repeatedly stated that such attacks are intended to disrupt the stability of the Iranian regime.
Some articles regard the United States' attack on Iran's nuclear facilities as opening the "Pandora's box," but openly attacking the government officials and security management departments of a sovereign country is another way of opening the box. It can be foreseen that Israel, having tasted such sweet results, will not stop easily, and this will be one of the reasons for the normalization of this war.
It is interesting that the European countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Iran and have frequently mediated the Iranian nuclear issue have also made new moves in their mediation this time.
Known as the "E3 group", Germany, the United Kingdom, and France currently propose a framework to persuade Iran to reduce or even stop uranium enrichment activities. In addition, they have added two more points: limiting the development of ballistic missiles and stopping support for foreign proxy forces. As an exchange, they proposed a so-called "parallel negotiation track". Initially, without the participation of the United States, the E3 and Iran could reach a new agreement that is more strictly inspected than the previous Iran nuclear agreement, and then jointly work on the United States. Based on this, consider Iran's ballistic missile plan appropriately and allow Tehran to retain a certain level of civilian uranium enrichment capability.
This is a peculiar scene in this round of Iranian nuclear negotiations, where the mediator dares to ask the party being mediated to put forward more conditions to the other party in the negotiations. No matter how you look at it, it seems like taking advantage of the situation and trying to get something extra. Moreover, history has fully proven that these countries cannot be the master of the United States and Israel, and the credibility of the "parallel negotiation track" is as doubtful as the self-proclamation of "I am the First Emperor of Qin" on the Internet today.
Foreign ministers of Germany, France, and the UK and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy recently met inside and outside Japan, followed by nuclear issue negotiations with the Iranian foreign minister. The iron bars in the picture resemble a stroke of genius.
What is more strange is Iran's current government's reaction - Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced as early as mid-April that these three countries had lost their effectiveness on the nuclear issue due to their wrong policies. But even so, Iran can still hold talks with them.
This article specially places Shamhani and Araghchi's statements in the context, reflecting the division and differences between the two factions in Iran during this stormy period.
Perhaps, Iran is facing a total war that spans across internal and external parties, covering politics, economy, military, and social governance. The dice have been thrown, and it is destined to be irreversible.
Iran's determination and capabilities will determine the direction of the long-termization, and the role of determination is higher than capability
For the current Iran, facing such a huge challenge, to fight a protracted war, at least needs to achieve the following points simultaneously:
First, maintain its own sustainable maintenance and replenishment capability of military equipment. Including the recovery of launch vehicles, as well as the production and replenishment capability of missiles and drones. As mentioned above, from the recent attack rhythm, Iran should still maintain a considerable amount of equipment reserves and combat potential. Western media once spread that Iran's missile production lines were severely damaged in October last year, but according to the data provided by various parties including Iran and Israel in recent times, Iran's ballistic missile production capacity before the war on June 12 may have reached 200-300 per month.
Iran's missile salvo. Given the current air superiority of Israel, how to maintain such a scene in a long-term standoff is also a major issue for Iran.
Whether these data are true can be verified by the future battle situation. But one thing is certain, Iran's strategic sense has been greatly improved in the battle. Just a day after the Trump administration announced on June 19 that it would decide within the next two weeks whether to strike Iran, a general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said in an interview that Iran had moved its uranium enrichment materials to safe locations to prevent them from being struck and destroyed. This is consistent with Iran's attitude after the nuclear facility was attacked.
Even Hezbollah, Houthis, and Hamas can maintain their production and replenishment capabilities of missiles, rockets, and drones under extremely harsh conditions. Iran, with its vast territory and complex terrain, has more and better conditions when sensitivity increases.
Given Iran's geopolitical environment and its significance in this region, once it proves that it has both the ability and will to resist, there will be no shortage of opportunities in the desert. What Afghanistan could do, Iran can do better. Of course, the premise is to have such "ability and will", especially "will" for Iran.
This leads to the second point, the stability of Iran's internal situation, which includes the political situation and people's livelihood. The two factions fighting in the previous text is not just a matter of ideological rigidity, but also involves the interests of small cliques. Although it seems that Iran is currently vigorously cracking down on internal spies, such a large-scale leakage and assassination is unimaginable without involvement of high-level leaders. This is similar to Musk's "Department of Government Efficiency" reform in that if we can't hit the "tigers", we can assume that only catching middle and lower-level internal spies is nothing more than psychological massage.
The people's livelihood part is also a hidden concern. Iran's economy has been under sanctions for over a decade due to the nuclear issue, with its GDP remaining around 400 billion dollars for a long time, accompanied by persistent energy and material shortages, and street protests have become commonplace, posing an increasing threat to the stability of the regime.
Just last May, traders in the iron market in Tehran went on strike. Recently, there have been a series of small protests in various parts of Iran due to repeated power outages. Although Iran's economy has shown resilience under long-term sanctions, there have been precedents where protests over rising living costs have evolved into anti-government movements. This time, combined with the war environment, adds more tests.
In 2019, protests in Iran triggered by rising oil and gas prices resulted in a police officer being shot dead during the protest. During the first five years of sanctions, price increases in different daily necessities could trigger large-scale protests. Although the scale has decreased in recent years, sporadic movements continue to occur.
Whether from an economic or military perspective, merely defending passively is not only passive, but also exacerbates internal conflicts and weakens the ability to resist for a long time. From Iran's perspective, the most effective response is to advance the front line, develop national and sectarian armed forces that can sustain themselves, and expand its fire projection points.
Last year, when the Bashar regime in Syria had not yet collapsed and the "Resistance Arc" structure was still intact, some factions in Iran often complained about the high cost of maintaining this resistance alliance. This year, however, gives an answer to the question of which model is more costly.
Currently, the situation around Iran is not completely hostile. The Houthis, known as the "slipper army", have managed to confront the US carrier battle group in the Red Sea and eventually secured a truce recognized by the US without constraints on their attacks against Israel. Shiite militias in Iraq have also survived multiple cycles and are not "blood vessels" that rely solely on Iran's support. They have also expressed willingness to assist Iran under different conditions. The US also predicts that if the US joins Israel's air strikes, the Houthis "almost certainly" will resume attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.
On the other hand, Iran's sectarian armed allies have also encountered considerable difficulties. For example, in recent months, the Lebanese government has intensified its control over Hezbollah, restricting its reconstruction of military forces. Specific measures include replacing its employees at Beirut Airport, strengthening checks on flights and passengers at the airport, dismantling Hezbollah's positions in southern Lebanon, and seizing or destroying its weapons stockpiles. The Prime Minister of Lebanon has also repeatedly called on Hezbollah to "put up with the country" and not drag the whole country into war.
Iraqi Shiite militias have also faced similar issues. With elections approaching in November, they are hesitant to get involved in the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel, especially because the Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, who gained fame for his fights with the US after the Iraq war, does not advocate getting involved in the conflict. His statement is similar to the Lebanese government - "Iraq doesn't need a new war."
It's easy to discard, but hard to build. After Iran continuously sacrifices its allies' interests, it will require more resources to rebuild trust and coordination, and even show more determined attitudes. The lessons for Iran are not shallow!
Additionally, Iran has two well-known cards: blockading the Strait of Hormuz and attacking US bases. Two days after the war broke out, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated media announced that the Iranian navy intercepted a British warship in the Oman Sea and forced it to change course. After the nuclear facilities were attacked, the Iranian parliament quickly expressed support for closing the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, Iran has repeatedly stated that it will attack US bases in the Middle East after being attacked and interfere with international shipping. Even after the nuclear facilities were attacked, it emphasized that every American citizen and military personnel in the region is a "legitimate target".
However, these two cards have problems to varying degrees. Taking the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as an example, regardless of whether the Iranian navy and air force can maintain the blockade for a long time, and the pressure from extraregional countries. Even if it can be achieved, it would mean that the oil-producing countries in the Gulf would suffer collateral damage. Since the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, they are building more geostrategic coordination, and after this attack, they are valuable supporters of Iran, making the strait blockade a delicate situation.
As for attacking US bases, Iran's rhetoric reveals its indecisiveness. The special relationship between the US and Israel, the exchange of intelligence, the provision of ammunition, until now the US personally launched an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, all constitute an infringement on Iran from any angle. But where is Iran's promised retaliation?
Therefore, as a mirror, it can also be seen that even when the war burned at home and many key figures were killed, Iran still has an undecided heart towards the US.
History has a mirror image. After the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, Trump posted on social media: retaliating against the US will face a much stronger response. And in the following periods, he repeatedly published messages in all caps, threatening Iran.
Actually, this "you don't dare to retaliate after I hit you" and the all-caps tweets are a leftover trick from the trade war in February. When you really retaliate, let's see how he will act?
Iran lacks not a model, but determination, the courage to bear sacrifices. Players are never talked into, nor are they traded for, they are all fought for.
Trump's strategic disorder will cause the US to lose more leverage in this long-term struggle
Compared to Israel's opportunistic behavior and aggressive attitude, or Iran's hesitation and uncertainty, the unpredictable Trump is the most consistent in the Iran nuclear issue: both provoking contradictions and staying out of it.
On one hand, Trump has always held hostility towards Iran, proposing to disarm Iran's military, bankrupt its finances, and even change its regime during his first term. He even planned to provoke a Middle East proxy war against Iran. Until his campaign for the second presidential term, he was still talking about how he made Iran "bankrupt" and reiterated his intention to tighten sanctions against Iran.
On the other hand, Trump has always adhered to a principle that when engaging with a country between Iraq and Afghanistan, he firmly refuses to wage war against it. The Trump administration assured its regional allies that it would not join the war against Iran unless Iran targeted American citizens.
During Trump's first term, his strategy was to constantly escalate tensions between the Gulf states and Iran through topics such as the Iranian nuclear issue, the Syrian civil war, and the Yemeni civil war, guiding the former to purchase weapons from the US. He also used limited force, such as the assassination of Iranian General Soleimani. This assassination, combined with previous US withdrawal from the deal, ultimately led Iran to announce that it would no longer comply with the 2016 Iran nuclear agreement.
However, Trump also followed the principles of the MAGA movement, which stated "not to waste money and blood on foreign lands anymore," and repeatedly paused the crisis when Pompeo and Bolton created a tense atmosphere. That's why some people think that Trump wants a war against Iran in the Middle East, but it must be a proxy war where the US doesn't directly get involved.
Trump 2.0 continued this style. Trump had already continuously attacked Iran during the campaign, and it was his stance of "zero uranium enrichment" that led the Iran nuclear negotiations to be unable to break through. Additionally, Trump advocated increasing weapons supply and defense cooperation with Israel, greatly stimulating Israel's military adventurism.
The familiar "self-talk" style of Trump had already been evident before this crisis. On May 15, while visiting the Middle East, Trump suddenly stated that the US and Iran were "very close" to reaching a nuclear agreement, and Iran "sort of" agreed to the US's demands. Despite Iran repeatedly stating that it had not received any new proposals from the US regarding resolving the decades-long nuclear dispute, and clearly stating that it would never compromise on the issue of uranium enrichment on its territory.
After the outbreak of the conflict, Trump's statements experienced multiple rounds of fluctuation:
On June 13, he both said that Iran still had "a second chance" and called for a quick negotiation, while threatening that if it couldn't reach a nuclear agreement with the US, a "more brutal" attack would follow.
On June 17, he claimed that Iran "wanted to reach an agreement," but "it was too late," and posted on social media implying Iran's "unconditional surrender".
On June 19, he proposed the idea of deciding within the next two weeks whether to strike Iran, leading some to believe that a glimmer of peace had appeared. Others, based on the movement of US military forces, especially the large number of refueling planes flying across the Atlantic and the alarm bells ringing, believed that an attack on Iran might start at any time.
With the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities on June 22, Trump once again stated that he did not seek regime change in Iran and urged it to return to the negotiating table to accept the US's harsh conditions for "peace".
Some people believe that Trump's back-and-forth, especially his "peaceful high notes" that show differences with Israel, is a double act, strategically deceiving Iran. I believe it is the "wave-particle duality" of the US on the Iran nuclear issue, with both strategic deception and significant differences with Israel, which will ultimately result in an impractical US plan.
Regarding the aspect of strategic deception, whether it is the intelligence sharing before Israel's attack on Iran, the Pentagon detonating an外卖 before the attack, or the troop movements carried out by the US during this conflict, including Trump's planning to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, are clear evidence. Many teachers have analyzed related topics, and here I won't elaborate further.
But merely emphasizing strategic deception cannot explain why the US repeatedly "leaked" information to Iran about Israel's upcoming attack, nor can it explain why Trump immediately shouted "now is the time for peace" after dropping bombs on Iran. But as long as it is clear that Trump does not want to be dragged into the quagmire of the Iran-Israel conflict, these problems will be resolved effortlessly.
But this actually sets the stage for the US to be in a difficult position and eventually fail in the Iran issue, mainly for the following reasons:
First, in the military aspect, Trump's fantasy of "attacking but not attacking heavily" is operationally impossible. Once the conflict initiated by Israel starts, Iran will inevitably continue to attack Israel. And when the US intervenes in bombing Iran, Iran's basic reflex would be to increase its attacks on Israel. The US and its allies have been messing around in the Red Sea for almost a year, but failed to eliminate the Houthi's ability to launch ballistic missiles targeting Israel. How much less likely is it for Iran? This will lead to either a "big fight" involving ground operations, or Israel continues to be bombed. Either way, it will turn into a big pressure on Trump.
Second, in the political aspect, Trump lacks empathy for other countries in diplomatic negotiations, and thus will constantly face the backlash of his own failure and decreasing prestige. The Iran nuclear issue is a typical case. Trump set a rigid condition of "zero uranium enrichment", trying to deprive other countries of their legitimate right to use nuclear energy under the banner of non-proliferation. For Iran, this is not just a technical negotiation issue, but also involves national dignity and the legitimacy of the regime. Moreover, Trump's already notorious credit record will lead to Iran's hardened negotiation stance. Trump claims not to seek "regime change" in Iran, but the current Iranian regime cannot risk its own authority to reach the agreement he hopes for.
Third, in the US-Israel relationship, Trump also cannot control Israel, which will constantly lead to the loss of control of the situation. Netanyahu's government, in order to maintain long-term rule, has the motivation to constantly maintain regional conflicts and yearns for the US to get involved, providing a comprehensive "umbrella" for itself. In recent years, the US government's plans for Middle East peace talks have been repeatedly sabotaged by Israel, which is a clear example.
The US intervening in the conflict with Iran is controversial among Trump's MAGA base, but it's hard to avoid the fact that Israel took the initiative to "cook the rice". Israel also doesn't hesitate to express its differences with the US, clearly stating that the purpose of its war is to overthrow the current Iranian regime. It can be imagined that even if Iran's nuclear facilities are completely destroyed, Israel will still put forward other excessive demands, from "zero uranium enrichment" to "zero missiles" is not impossible, and the charge is endless. This will drag the US into an unpredictable orbit.
Compared to Obama and Biden, Trump and Israel appear more friendly on the surface, but there are still constant struggles behind the scenes. Israel has repeatedly ignored Trump's relevant proposals, and in the conflict with the Houthis, Trump didn't feel any psychological burden about running away first.
History presents an interesting mirror image. 35 years ago, when Saddam annexed Kuwait, the US had the moral high ground and planned a multinational force. At that time, Iraq continually attacked Israel with Scud missiles, giving Israel sufficient reasons for retaliation. However, old Bush was worried that Israel's participation in the war would disrupt the united front of Arab countries against Iraq's invasion, so he resolutely suppressed any plans for Israel to retaliate.
Now, Iran has been targeted by Mossad's killing of experts, killing leaders, and bombing embassies, yet it has never made any significant counterattacks, becoming a subject of ridicule on the internet. The current city attacks are only a reactive response to Israel's continuous bombing. Yet, despite being a fellow Republican, Trump, whose MAGA base is still controversial, can only follow Israel step by step, initiating an attack on Iran.
Behind the US's aggressive posture is the continuous decline of its geopolitical maneuvering ability. This decline is a reflection of the weakening of comprehensive national strength and also a prelude to the deep restructuring of the existing international order.
The glaring light reflected on the wide B-2 bomber's body is actually the sunset of an empire......
The most despicable thing is that the hegemon, in its declining days, uses such a careless manner and uncontrollable warfare to push the global non-proliferation system into an even more unpredictable abyss.
Just before Trump attacked Iran, Fox News released a set of polling data showing that most voters no longer approve of Trump's work performance, with the gap between the two sides widening by 8 percentage points. In the economic field, the number of people opposing his policies has reached 58%, especially on inflation, the ratio of disapproval to approval is 64% and 34%, respectively.
Keep in mind, it was only less than ten months ago that this was the area where Trump greatly led Harris.
Because of this, Trump also categorized Fox as one of the "worst" and "fake news" and declared on behalf of MAGA voters that everyone doesn't like Fox. At this point, it had been less than half a year since he took office.
At this time, we are not just watching from the sidelines. Let me say a blunt but reasonable sentence: even if Trump destroys Iran completely, it will have limited benefits for his domestic base. Voters will only think this is his duty. The US grassroots care most about employment, income, and prices, which cannot be improved at all by the倾泻 of bullets and shells.
Therefore, it will inevitably force Trump to demonstrate his erratic toughness on "higher value goals." Perhaps the easing period after the London talks will not be too long……
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