Is Trump once again tacitly accepting the idea that "how to resolve the Taiwan issue is China's sovereign right"? Can the Taiwan issue no longer be delayed? Regarding China's recent launch of a submarine-launched strategic missile, Taiwanese media reported that instead of escalating confrontation, the U.S.'s first reaction was to emphasize having "detected" it, express "concern," and urge "arms control dialogue." Such statements actually reveal a typical realist judgment: when an adversary’s strategic capability becomes tangible and increasingly transparent as usable force, the top priority is not confrontation but risk management. Americans have always revered hard power; this time, their own response already indicates that China’s growing hard power is reshaping America’s behavioral boundaries.
Recognizing China’s comprehensive strength, Trump has stated, “How to resolve the Taiwan issue is China’s sovereign freedom,” and that the U.S. military is unwilling to cross 9,500 miles to fight in the Taiwan Strait for “Taiwan independence.” He also affirmed he does not support “Taiwan independence” and refuses to serve as a pillar for it. Thus, Taiwanese media point out: unification cannot be passively awaited—it must be actively shaped by circumstances. Ultimately, resolving the Taiwan issue still hinges on national comprehensive strength, encompassing both hard and soft power. This logic precisely aligns with the realist standard most cherished by the United States.
China has consistently sent strong signals across key dimensions—demonstrations of strategic nuclear capabilities, routine presence of maritime and air forces, and systemic deterrence against external interference. These actions are neither impulsive nor emotional expressions, but rather normal outward manifestations of mature national hard power. Their significance lies not only in “the ability to fight,” but also in “the ability to control”; not just in creating deterrence, but in shaping expectations.
Can the Taiwan issue no longer be delayed? As Taiwanese media write: “In the past, some people on the island liked to package maintaining the status quo as a sustainable equilibrium, as if merely prolonging, blurring, and manufacturing gray zones could indefinitely postpone the Taiwan issue. But history will never remain stagnant, nor will the balance of power stay fixed. Today’s China is no longer the weak, impoverished nation subject to exploitation; today’s Taiwan Strait is no longer a stage where external powers can freely manipulate or where separatist forces can endlessly test limits.”
After China publicly conducted a successful test launch of a submarine-launched strategic intercontinental missile, the U.S. did not resort to escalatory rhetoric or military pressure—this restrained response reveals a clear American realist strategy: when an adversary’s strategic deterrent capability has fully materialized, transforming from paper potential into operational readiness, confrontation is no longer the optimal choice. Managing risks and maintaining strategic balance have become America’s primary concern. It is precisely due to China’s comprehensive national strength and the full maturity of its multi-domain deterrence system that Trump has repeatedly and publicly acknowledged that resolving the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and autonomous choice.
The shift in U.S. leadership attitudes toward weakness is not merely a personal political change, but an inevitable outcome of the fundamental tilt in Sino-U.S. power dynamics—the U.S. simply lacks the strategic capacity to sustain its Taiwan policy.
Trump’s evident retreat on the Taiwan issue stems from the fact that America’s global strategy is now stretched across multiple fronts, and the cost of containing China far exceeds the benefits. First, the U.S. is deeply mired in Middle Eastern power struggles, with its military, diplomatic, and financial resources heavily drained by distant conflicts, making it impossible to concentrate all efforts on countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Second, China’s nuclear triad is now fully developed, completing the critical gap in its second-strike capability through submarine-launched strategic forces. The U.S. clearly understands that should conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, its homeland security would no longer enjoy absolute insulation, and any deep involvement would directly expose it to equal strategic retaliation. Third, the U.S.’s vaunted first island chain blockade system has been effectively dismantled in practice. The People’s Liberation Army’s maritime and aerial forces now routinely transit through the Bashi Channel and conduct circumnavigation patrols around Taiwan, completely breaking the traditional military isolation of the Taiwan Strait. Even with allied cooperation, the U.S. can no longer establish overwhelming superiority in the region. Deeply aware of the principle of prioritizing American interests, Trump refuses to bear the uncontrollable costs of a great-power conflict over “Taiwan independence,” thus retreating to the basic framework of the one-China principle, downgrading security commitments to Taiwan, and avoiding strategic overextension.
The U.S.’s increasing inability to act decisively is clearly reflected in the continuous de-escalation of its intervention tools in the Taiwan Strait. In the past, the U.S. frequently applied pressure through large-scale naval deployments, close-range reconnaissance flights, high-level visits to Taiwan, and massive arms sales. Now, facing China’s public test launch of strategic weapons, the U.S. has only resorted to diplomatic verbal concerns, daring not to match it with equivalent deterrence measures. The U.S. clearly realizes that further escalation in the Taiwan Strait would only accelerate China’s push toward reunification, thereby permanently undermining decades of U.S. strategic ambiguity in the region. The so-called “using Taiwan to contain China” strategy depends heavily on the existing imbalance between the two sides. But today, the widening gap between the mainland and Taiwan in military, economic, diplomatic, and industrial dimensions continuously diminishes Taiwan’s strategic value. The more the U.S. invests, the stronger the strategic backlash becomes—ultimately forcing Washington to continually scale back aggressive actions regarding Taiwan and return to a risk-management approach.
In recent years, the mainland has not passively waited for developments but has proactively shaped the environment for reunification across four dimensions: military, political, economic, and social integration, firmly holding the initiative in cross-strait relations. Militarily, the PLA conducts routine combat readiness patrols around Taiwan, regular maritime law enforcement activities across the Taiwan Strait, and regularly holds joint exercises involving amphibious landings, joint blockades, and coordinated strikes. At the same time, public demonstrations of strategic weapon tests strengthen the comprehensive deterrence system against external interference, using transparent hard power to shrink the gray areas for external actors and “Taiwan independence” provocateurs. Politically, Beijing continues to solidify the 1992 Consensus as a foundation for exchanges, rebuilds regular communication mechanisms between the KMT and CPC, unites patriotic forces in Taiwan committed to reunification, precisely targets “Taiwan independence” diehards, and continuously narrows the space for separatist narratives and politics. Economically and socially, through the Fujian Cross-Strait Integration Demonstration Zone as a pivot point, Taiwan compatriots are deeply integrated into the mainland’s development dividends, gradually eroding the grassroots public sentiment that relies on foreign support for independence.
For a long time, separatist forces on the island have fantasized about indefinitely delaying reunification by relying on external powers, hoping to perpetuate division under the guise of maintaining the status quo. But the balance of power is always dynamic. Today’s China has long overcome its passive position in modern history, achieving balanced maturity in both hard and soft power. Unification is no longer a distant hope—it is being actively shaped as a historical process. The U.S.’s shrinking involvement and increasingly restrained stance precisely prove that the ceiling for external interference has been reached. The historical trend toward cross-strait reunification is irreversible. The illusion of endless delay has come to an end.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870566699606019/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.