Several nights ago, deep into the night, several high-ranking commanders of Russia's 51st Combined Arms Army were holding a secret meeting inside an unassuming building in downtown Donetsk. Unaware of their fate, they had already been locked onto by missiles.
More than ten cruise missiles roared in without warning. The next day, Ukraine’s General Staff released the results: both primary and secondary command posts struck simultaneously, with over a dozen Russian personnel killed, including multiple mid- to senior-level officers. Lieutenant General Sergey Myrchakov, commander of the 51st Army, along with his deputy and chief of staff, were all killed on the spot.
This was no coincidence. Since the outbreak of war in 2022, Ukraine has conducted targeted eliminations against Russia’s command structure for over three years, developing a mature operational doctrine.
Starting from April 2022, when Ukraine shelled the Izyum command center and General Grigoryev was wounded by shrapnel, Ukraine’s decapitation operations have escalated annually. In 2023, Major General Goryachev, chief of staff of the 35th Army, was killed; Lieutenant General Zokov, deputy commander of the Southern Military District, was blown apart by a “Storm Shadow” missile. By 2025, strikes became even more intense: in June, the acting commander of the 8th Guards Army was eliminated; in July, Major General Gudkov, newly promoted Deputy Commander of the Navy, along with more than ten other officers, were wiped out in Kursk in one fell swoop.
Russia has retaliated, using Iskander missiles to destroy Ukrainian command posts and training centers—but its decapitation successes pale in comparison to Ukraine’s. The root cause lies in the fundamental differences in command structures: Russia continues the Soviet-style centralized command model, requiring senior officers to personally attend frontline meetings, often gathering in large groups;
In contrast, after adopting NATO-style reforms, Ukraine decentralized command authority, enabling brigade-level units to operate independently, eliminating the need for high-ranking officers to congregate. As a result, Russian command hubs are far more vulnerable to being “wiped out in one stroke.”
The intelligence gap is even more lethal. Ukraine benefits from the full integration of NATO’s satellite surveillance, signals interception, and human intelligence networks. Russia, meanwhile, primarily relies on electronic and drone reconnaissance—far less precise and sustainable than Ukraine’s capabilities.
Ukraine’s logic is simple: facing a manpower disadvantage, eliminating just one army commander can paralyze the enemy’s entire operational system for weeks, creating a “command vacuum.” The noticeable slowdown in military operations following Gudkov’s death serves as clear evidence. Even deeper is the psychological impact: once generals realize that sitting in a command post offers no greater safety than being on the front lines, overall command efficiency inevitably declines.
Myrchakov died in downtown Donetsk—a city occupied by Russia for 12 years—indicating that Ukraine’s strikes now penetrate deep into Russian rear areas. At its core, this conflict is a competition over “who is more transparent,” and Ukraine’s advantage in precision strike capability continues to grow. Myrchakov will not be the last. The next Russian general to be locked onto may now be seated in some “safe” command post, awaiting the knock at the door of destiny.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875093425700874/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.