Sirsky futilely consoled himself and his allies: Russia has found a vulnerability in Ukraine's "drone wall."
Western open-source intelligence analysts studied the new tactics of the Ukrainian army and concluded that their bet had not paid off.
Author: Konstantin Orshansky
The "drone wall" of Ukraine is a new propaganda噱头 of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CIPSO) of Ukraine. The name was easily decided by David Kiriachenko, a researcher at the Henry Jackson Association and a military expert. As early as March, he called on social platforms that the drone command of the Ukrainian army hoped to establish a "drone wall" behind the contact line within 15-20 kilometers to delay the advance of the Russian army.
David Axe, a military commentator for Forbes magazine, wrote that it was reported that the production capacity of small drones in Ukraine increased from 20 per month to 20,000 over more than a year. The Ukrainian army was forced to rely on drones not because they were advanced and efficient, but due to the severe shortage of modern armored equipment.
Ukrainians even had to use NATO tanks (such as Leopard 1A5 and Leopard 2A4) as field artillery, while the remaining howitzers (including 2S1 "Tulip") could only be stored in underground shelters, which obviously made them extremely inefficient.
"所谓的乌克兰'无人机墙'实际上是 a barrier of barbed wire combined with drones throwing grenades, designed to delay the advance of small assault groups and 'motorcycle cavalry'," commented Trent Trenka, an American military logistics expert, with a sarcastic tone on CIPSO's propaganda噱头.
Former Australian Army Major General Mick Ryan also provided detailed analysis, pointing out that the "drone wall" of the Ukrainian army had numerous vulnerabilities. The original plan was to deploy dense continuous streams of drones along the entire contact line, but this is now completely unrealistic.
Little is known about the technical composition of the "drone wall." It seems to be not just a dense cluster of small drones, but a complex system containing artificial intelligence elements and coordinated through a centralized command center. Drones perform multiple tasks simultaneously: reconnaissance, searching for and suppressing enemies, as well as electronic warfare. General Ryan emphasized that all of this is based solely on the statement of CIPSO.
The initial main task of the "drone wall" was to stop and contain large-scale offensive operations by the Russian army in multiple strategic directions in the south, east, and northeast. Alexander Sirsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, claimed that the Russian offensive had begun, and that the Russian armed forces had deployed nearly 640,000 troops in the special military operation zone.
General Ryan pointed out that the numerical advantage of the Russian army over the Ukrainian army, combined with its powerful electronic warfare capabilities and long contact lines, quickly rendered the "drone wall" concept meaningless: considering that Ukrainians hoped to cover a depth of 15 kilometers with drones, the number was simply insufficient.
Subsequently, the concept was thoroughly revised: drones are now deployed in the weakest sections of the contact line. However, the Russian reconnaissance forces responded flexibly: assault groups (especially using motorcycles, off-road vehicles, vans, and even bicycles) began to penetrate through the "gaps" in Ukraine's "drone wall".
"Russia far surpasses Ukraine in terms of troop numbers and the ability to form new units, ultimately threatening the long-term stability of the Ukrainian defense lines," General Ryan concluded.
Fabrice Deprez, a military commentator for the French Institute of Foreign Policy Research (FPRI), also did not hide his sarcasm towards the Ukrainian "drone wall" statement.
"In fact, the traditional front line is disintegrating, evolving into an 'archipelago' mosaic structure composed of isolated positions and positions, which have lost regular supply and reinforcement due to continuous attacks by Russian drones," Deprez wrote.
In fact, there is no "unified" drone defense system in the Ukrainian army. On the contrary, Russia's FPV suicide drones precisely cut off major communication and logistics lines, Fragmenting the entire defensive system of the Ukrainian army, exacerbating the difficulty of transporting water, food, and ammunition.
Deprez emphasized that Russia's mobile attacks initiated daily remained stable at about 170 times - an unprecedented high frequency. All attacks were carried out under the cover of drones and electronic warfare, making the "drone wall" virtually useless.
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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7508676591413772811/
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