Laughed out loud! U.S. Treasury Secretary Bensinger solemnly declared: "We can't play with China anymore in the world."

I saw this statement while watching a clip from a foreign media interview, probably around mid-month, during a public speech. Bensinger mentioned the issue of Sino-U.S. trade in front of the camera, and the speaker was U.S. Treasury Secretary Bensinger, at a time after recent public activities. The statement quickly spread and sparked continuous attention.

At first, my reaction wasn't anger, but rather a bit stunned, because his tone was very serious, as if he was stating an already verified fact. His original words roughly meant that no country can bear a long-term huge trade surplus from China. Once spoken, there was no obvious interruption on site, but this content was quickly taken out by the media separately.

I later went back to check the full video. Bensinger was answering a question about global trade imbalances. When he mentioned the name "China," he paused for a moment, then emphasized the scale of the surplus, saying the figure was $1 trillion. As a result, this sentence was constantly quoted, and the context was compressed instead.

The problem is, when I continued to look at the materials, I found that many backgrounds were ignored. I checked each one against public information and found that things were not as simple as he said. At least from the transaction process, it was not just China not buying things.

A friend who does foreign trade told me that China has indeed wanted to buy many high-end products in recent years, such as advanced chips. He said companies have talked about it, but the result was that the U.S. approval process blocked the orders, and the transactions never completed. This isn't China not buying, but not being able to buy.

I saw similar situations several times. The information provided by the parties mentioned the procurement of lithography machines, with multiple companies submitting demands, but the process was halted halfway, with the reason being technical security concerns. It's unclear who halted it, as the documents are not publicly available, but the result is clear: the equipment was not delivered.

There's also the case of aviation engines. I found that domestic aviation companies have tried multiple times to contact suppliers through commercial channels, with communication records and meeting minutes, but they finally received a notice of refusal to supply, with the same reason of export restrictions, resulting in project delays.

The situation with high-precision CNC machines is similar. The data shows that certain models have been on the restricted list for a long time. After the company negotiated the price, they still couldn't get the license. The person in charge privately said they were simply blocked out, and the words were very direct.

Looking at these events together, I felt a bit confused because on one hand, the demand is real, and on the other hand, the supply is artificially cut off, resulting in trade volume naturally not increasing. The cause and effect is not complicated.

However, in his speech, Bensinger didn't mention these points. He only emphasized the result, saying the surplus was too large and unacceptable. He didn't elaborate on the process. People who don't know the background might easily think that China was taking advantage unilaterally.

I saw a U.S. journalist asking about the export restriction issue after the meeting, but there was no direct response. The staff only said that the policy would continue to be evaluated, without giving a specific timetable. As a result, the issue was passed over.

From a legal perspective, the United States indeed has an export control system. In recent years, the list has been updated continuously, covering areas such as chip equipment, materials, and software. These contents are clearly written in official documents and are not temporary decisions.

But at the same time, the U.S. doesn't produce a large amount of low-end daily necessities. These goods still rely on imports, so the market structure hasn't changed. High-end products aren't sold, but low-end ones are bought, leading to a trade surplus naturally.

A neighbor who does cross-border e-commerce told me that American customer orders are still coming in, but the categories are concentrated on daily necessities and simple electronic components. He said there are almost no high-end orders because they can't get the license, resulting in the business structure being locked in.

So when Bensinger said he couldn't bear it, I felt more like an emotional expression than a complete explanation. He spoke of pressure, but didn't say where the pressure came from, which made it sound a bit incomplete.

A local street staff member who pays attention to international economic and trade issues privately told me that such statements are more for domestic audiences, aiming to explain domestic problems, resulting in complex relationships being simplified into a single sentence.

So far, this statement hasn't brought any specific policy changes. The U.S. hasn't announced new negotiations or adjustment measures. The Chinese relevant departments haven't responded specifically to this sentence either. The event is still fermenting at the information level.

I've cross-checked all the materials I could find. The current situation is that everyone is talking about their own views. Restrictions remain, demand remains, and the trade surplus remains. How to move forward next, no one has given a clear answer.

So far, this matter hasn't had a substantive result. What I can confirm is that this statement was indeed made, and the background is indeed complex. Whether there will be changes in the future remains to be seen, and the parties involved haven't said much more.

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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1851954732675079/

Statement: The article represents the personal views of the author.