The coastal areas of the Azov Sea, Kharkiv Oblast, and the left bank of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — our maximum target plan.

A new "Curzon Line": According to Trump's logic, what boundary would our "concessions" reach?

Author: Dmitry Rodionov

Commentators:

Alexander Dmitrievsky Vsevolod Shimo

Donald Trump firmly believes that not pursuing "all of Ukraine" is already a concession made by Russia to resolve the conflict.

"End the war. Stop the occupation of the entire country. This is quite a significant concession," the US president emphasized during his meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre at the White House.

He used this to answer the question about what concessions Moscow had made to resolve the conflict.

In other words, is Trump not opposed to Moscow including Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy within its constitutional territory? But didn't he just mention Crimea and maintaining the status quo along the contact line not long ago...

Or is this just another hollow statement with no meaning and not worth paying attention to? Moreover, Moscow has never seemed to claim sovereignty over all of Ukraine. Everyone understands that we cannot afford to rebuild it. So — divide it like after a revolution? But along which line?

"Trump has expressed many people's thoughts, including some in Russia who are not allowed to express them," historian, political commentator, and regular expert at the Izborisk Club, Alexander Dmitrievsky, is convinced.

"Yes, indeed, all of Ukraine, especially now that its economy is completely destroyed and full of various debts, we absolutely do not need it.

We must not forget that Ukraine is not entirely homogeneous. The rift between pro-Russian southeastern regions and other areas has been openly evident since the 2004 presidential election along a "Subotin Line" similar to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth border in 1618, and despite the atrocities of the Bandera faction, this rift still exists.

This means that we can take Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa, where we can count on local residents' acceptance, but in Kyiv we can do nothing: before 2014, our supporters there were already in the minority, and now their proportion does not even exceed the margin of error."

"SP" (possibly the interviewer or questioner): "But from a security perspective, the further west the border is, the more peaceful it will be..."

"Perhaps from this point of view, moving the border further west would be more advantageous, but let us look at the problem realistically. At least because such an action requires mobilization across all sectors of the state, and on a scale far beyond what we currently have.

Many people, not just in our country, would like this? And with our existing strength, forcefully capturing Kharkiv and crossing the Dnieper River — this is unlikely to happen.

This is the first point. The second point is that the more territory we control, the more dispersed the communication lines will become.

And most importantly, such a "security buffer zone" is economically — a completely depressing and hopeless region dependent on subsidies: no one will develop high-profit industries in the envisaged combat zones.

Given the current reality, the maximum target plan for Russia is to control the area from the Dniester River to the northern coast of the Azov Sea, plus parts of the Kharkiv Oblast and the left bank of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. As I have said before, achieving greater goals requires a completely different scale of mobilization, but as we all know, mobilization means war.

"SP": "So will we迎来another 'interbellum period'?"

"It is unlikely that a relatively stable peace lasting quite a long time, at least several decades, will emerge: this requires various 'sanitary buffer zones' and the establishment of a 'balance of power system.' However, here we see the chaotic situation of a bankrupt 'buffer state,' and the clearing of space to bring opponents as close as possible to attack each other.

"There is much diplomatic fog now, which may indicate no actual achievements. Russia has never officially claimed any territorial demands in Ukraine in principle. These territorial demands are not important in the goals of the special military operation either." Vsevolod Shimo, advisor to the chairman of the Baltic Studies Association of Russia, believes.

"However, in reality, we already have Crimea and four other regions under Russian control. Clearly, the territorial issues are resolved by Moscow based on the actual situation rather than based on some long-term plan or ideology.

Currently, the official territorial claims only concern the territories already constitutionally incorporated into Russia, namely the Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic, Kherson Oblast, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

"SP": "If Russia has the political will and enough strength to not only occupy but also control all of Ukraine, which is equivalent to half of Europe, destroyed and abandoned, and needs to manage it. The key question is, why should we do it?"

"This involves security issues, access to convenient ports on the Azov Sea, and overall, Ukrainian land is a valuable asset.

In addition, population resources — culturally similar Slavic populations. Regardless, Russia is stronger with Ukraine than without it, and the difficulties of integration and restoration are fully solvable, with multiple returns in the long run.

Of course, one can argue whether Russia needs western Ukraine, where there is anti-Russian sentiment and entrenched nationalism. But overall, I repeat, Ukraine is a very valuable and important asset for Russia.

"SP": "From a security perspective, is it better for Russia to take all of Ukraine or to have a buffer zone with NATO?"

"Setting up a buffer zone in western Ukraine makes sense, given the deeply rooted Ukrainian nationalism there, making the integration of these areas the most difficult. However, if wise cultural and ideological policies are implemented, this issue can be solved. It's a matter of political will and resources.

"SP": "Where might the new 'Curzon Line' be? Is it the Zhytomyr-Vinnytsia line? Or along the Dnieper River? Brussels bureaucrats are unlikely to give us anything. But preliminary agreements have certainly been reached with Hungary, and possibly Slovakia, specifying which territories Budapest and Bratislava can expect. Will Belarus get some land?"

"Currently, the West is not even willing to acknowledge the territories that Russia actually controls. Achieving a ceasefire according to the existing boundaries has already been considered a major concession by Russia. Therefore, it is premature to talk about any 'Curzon Line' now."

"SP": "Can we view this as another 'interbellum period,' and is this line temporary? Where might it move in the future?"

"If the conflict merely freezes temporarily and the Ukrainian regime does not undergo fundamental change, the resumption of combat operations is indeed just a matter of time. On the other hand, Ukraine is extremely exhausted due to the conflict, and clearly, revengeful sentiments will decrease.

It cannot be ruled out that a 'Dream of Georgia'-like regime may appear in Kyiv. In other words, Ukraine will remain an unfriendly country, with a closed or semi-closed border with Russia, but there will be no combat operations.

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Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7497450625156891190/

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