【Text by Observer Network Columnist, Mind Observation Institute】
One, the Trumpeter of "Micro-Decoupling"
On July 26, 2025, on the U.S. social media platform X, Dakota Cary, who is certified as a "China cybersecurity expert," suddenly launched a "witch hunt." He named ten internet and cybersecurity companies, including Alibaba, Baidu, AnTian, AnHeng, and GreenMiles, among others. He provided screenshots from these companies' public materials showing that they have penetration testing services in their security service categories, with red boxes highlighting: these companies are posing as guardians but are actually "weapon suppliers" for national-level hackers.
Penetration testing services are common service categories in the cybersecurity industry, which are basic services provided by cybersecurity companies to help clients identify security vulnerabilities. This service model was originally created by U.S. cybersecurity companies, and global major cybersecurity companies, including mainstream U.S. security enterprises, also provide this service, although some American companies call it "Red Team" services.
Cary is one of the most active anti-China think tank figures in the U.S. cybersecurity industry. He is employed as a part-time professor at Georgetown University and is also a non-resident researcher at the Atlantic Council. Obviously, he would not be unaware of the significance of penetration testing services, yet he confidently distorted penetration testing services into paid cyberattack services, which left his Chinese peers in disbelief.
In Cary's "charges" against Chinese company AnTian, he specifically added two points: one was that it supported the Chinese government's exposure of U.S. cyberattacks, and the second was that it was a target of intelligence interest for the U.S. intelligence agency NSA. These two points were very absurd; capturing, analyzing, and exposing cyberattack activities is the core job of security companies, which is also an embodiment of their capabilities. Saying that AnTian is a "target of NSA intelligence interest" comes from the CamberDaDa program exposed by Snowden, which involves the NSA infiltrating global operators to intercept user and security vendor emails through traffic monitoring to detect whether its attacks have been exposed. Kaspersky and 23 other global security companies are targets of this program, including AnTian.
Cary's real intention was to remove Chinese cybersecurity companies from the Microsoft Vulnerability Sharing Program (MAPP). MAPP (Microsoft Active Protections Program) is a global cybersecurity collaboration project initiated by the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), aiming to shorten the protection window for vulnerability fixes by sharing vulnerability information with certified security vendors in advance, thereby enhancing overall cybersecurity defense capabilities. Sharing vulnerability information with Chinese security companies allows Chinese security products to effectively protect Windows systems, which is a mutual benefit.
However, Cary questioned Microsoft, stating that Microsoft continued to allow these Chinese companies to join the MAPP program despite knowing that some of them had joined the Chinese National Information Security Vulnerability Database (CNNVD). He accused Microsoft of not strictly screening the qualifications and conditions of entities joining the MAPP program.
After some preheating, on August 1st, the U.S. cybersecurity company SentinelOne, where Cary works, suddenly released a report titled "When Privileged Access Falls into the Hands of 'Criminals'," falsely claiming that 19 Chinese companies participating in the Microsoft MAPP program "may leak vulnerabilities to government hackers."
Under pressure, Microsoft announced on August 20th to "limit Chinese companies from accessing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in advance through the MAPP program." The next day, Cary posted again, using a joyful tone, saying "Glad to see it" to praise Microsoft's move. From Cary's social media statements, to his organization's report, and then Microsoft's response, the decision-making interaction took less than a month. In the broader context of anti-China political correctness in the United States, Cary demonstrated his power.
Cary is an active anti-China trumpeter within the U.S. cybersecurity think tank circle. In the U.S. think tank system, there are several individuals with different professional backgrounds and long-term research on cybersecurity issues. They are not current employees of the U.S. government or military, but often work at companies with clear ties to the U.S. military or intelligence agencies, or serve as researchers in NGO research organizations. They hold significant influence and authority within the U.S. government, military, and industry systems. These people share a unified symbol of extreme anti-China political stances. They tirelessly try to smear China on cybersecurity issues, plotting strategies to suppress Chinese cybersecurity companies for the U.S. government and intelligence agencies. They form the "anti-China chorus" of U.S. cybersecurity think tanks.
Two, the 2012 Hearing: The Lead Singer Appears, the Revolving Door Opens
Cary is a star in the "anti-China chorus," but not the earliest representative. The first lead singer of the chorus is undoubtedly Richard Bejtlich, the Chief Security Officer at Mandiant.
Bejtlich is a cybersecurity expert with a distinct "revolving door" background. He served in the U.S. Air Force and was the head of real-time intrusion detection at the U.S. Air Force CERT (Cybersecurity Emergency Response Team). On March 26, 2012, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) held a hearing on "China's Cyber Capabilities and Nuclear Capabilities Development," and three U.S. experts testified about Chinese cyber activities at the hearing, with Bejtlich being one of them.
At the hearing, Bejtlich falsely claimed that "the Chinese government, especially its military, is the main perpetrator of large-scale, ongoing cyber espionage activities." This U.S. Congress hearing marked the beginning of the first decade of the U.S. officially taking China as its primary adversary in cyberspace.
The 2012 hearing was the result of a long-planned effort by the U.S. side. In this space that determines the future, the U.S. needed an adversary. Especially when the U.S. itself no longer wanted to hide the value of "cyber capabilities in military and intelligence fields," it naturally considered "reviewing China's cyber capabilities more important."
At that time, the U.S. believed it had become the "city on a hill." In 2010, the Stuxnet incident was exposed, and the U.S. intelligence community planned for years, successfully attacking Iran's uranium centrifuges through network attacks. Later, in the Middle East and China, the Flame, Gauss, and Duqu worms were discovered. International security companies like Kaspersky and Chinese security companies like AnTian released multiple technical reports confirming the homology between these attacks and Stuxnet. However, these efforts did not create international awareness or diplomatic pressure against U.S. cyber attacks due to the guidance of the U.S.-controlled international public opinion. This allowed the U.S. to criticize other countries' cybersecurity issues without any psychological pressure of "accusing the thief." The 2012 USCC hearing became an important source of suppression against China in the cyber domain. With Bejtlich's appearance and promotion, the U.S. established the initial strategy of "naming and shaming," accusing China's normal efforts to safeguard its own security, and vigorously suppressing Chinese information technology and cybersecurity companies. Its main target was Huawei, which had already led globally in digital communications.
Bejtlich submitted an annual report to Congress in November of the same year, making baseless accusations against China's cyber activities and suggesting that the U.S. Congress should conduct a thorough assessment of China's "cyber espionage" activities, impose harsher penalties on companies benefiting from "espionage," and advocate attributing cyber attacks directly to specific countries and entities.
At this point, the revolving door between the U.S. government, businesses, and finance had already started turning silently. The offering of a letter of loyalty, the target, the acquirer, and government orders were all prepared. The following February 20th, Bejtlich's company Mandiant produced the notorious APT1 report, smearing China's cybersecurity issues. The U.S. cybersecurity enterprise "graduates" FireEye quickly followed up, joining the relay of releasing technical reports to smear China, and listed on NASDAQ in September 2013 with a loss. Its first big move after listing was to acquire Mandiant in January 2014. FireEye received a $230 million contract from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) that year, and later secured more government and intelligence agency contracts. The revolving door chain was fully closed, and Commissioner Smith found a safe place.
Truman said, "Freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of enterprise. The first two freedoms are closely related to the third." This sentence revealed the essence of the American values behind oligarchic capital interests.
Three, the 2022 Hearing: The "Chorus" Makes a Collective Appearance
On February 17, 2022, ten years after the first U.S.-China cybersecurity issue hearing by the USCC, another hearing was held with the theme "China's Cyber Capabilities: Cyber Warfare, Espionage, and Impact on the U.S."
Among the expert "witnesses," four "key figures" appeared, forming the harmonies of the anti-China chorus. Their testimonies built a narrative chain to further demonize China and suppress Chinese cybersecurity companies.
At the hearing, the young Cary had become the lead singer, responsible for accusing multiple Chinese cybersecurity companies. He pointed out Chinese tech companies, universities, and the military, intelligence agencies for supporting cyber espionage activities and training hackers. Cary's testimony stated: Congress should go beyond "naming and shaming" to sanction Chinese entities. John Chen spoke at the hearing, analyzing the role of the Chinese military in information warfare, possibly targeting critical information infrastructure (such as network management or data centers, computer server farms, even undersea communication cables).
Winnona DeSombre controlled the public opinion, believing that "China used capabilities that are not allowed by international law or domestic law, gaining a significant tactical advantage over the U.S. through this asymmetric capability; Chinese cyber agencies continuously engage in economic espionage against U.S. and global companies. DeSombre specifically named two Chinese cybersecurity companies, AnTian Lab and Qihoo 360, for publicly releasing analyses of U.S. National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency cyber attack operations, stating that 'AnTian and Qihoo are the two most senior antivirus companies in China, so their release of this information may make the public more convinced.'"
Another member of the chorus, Adam Kozy, is also a revolving door-type cybersecurity expert. He was once an intelligence analyst at the FBI and, during the hearing, served as the chief intelligence analyst at CrowdStrike, responsible for the Asian cybersecurity team, particularly evaluating China's cybersecurity and governance capabilities. He outlined China's "national hackers," identifying Qianxin, Qihang, and others as "participating in strategic cyber armies."
Facing his successors, Bejtlich couldn't help but reminisce about his participation in the first hearing on Chinese cybersecurity issues in 2012. Meanwhile, the new generation of the anti-China chorus made a collective appearance at the hearing, pushing the U.S. to surpass "naming and shaming" and directly initiate "suppressing industrial entities."
Four, Rise of New Powerhouses: Letter of Loyalty and the Revolving Door
Behind the 2022 hearing, the revolving door accelerated. At the hearing, Cary, who was still a research assistant at the Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), quickly joined the Krebs Stamos Group in April. Although called a "group," it was actually a small consulting company with few personnel. Its founder was Chris Krebs, the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The following year, the Krebs Stamos Group was acquired by SentinelOne for $13.9 million. Cary naturally became a strategic advisory consultant for SentinelOne.
SentinelOne was founded in 2013 and is headquartered in Mountain View, California. Its product ActiveEDR is a behavioral AI model that records all information on each device, but its most distinctive capability is not terminal protection, but monitoring employees' every move for capitalists and bosses. SentinelOne also has a typical revolving door style; its Chief Trust Officer (CTO), Alex Stamos, was a member of the Aspen Institute's cybersecurity working group and the CISA advisory committee, and served on the advisory board of the Estonian NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. In June 2021, SentinelOne completed its initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange, raising $1.2 billion.
Evidently, developing employee behavior monitoring products cannot satisfy SentinelOne's ambitions. It hopes to emulate its predecessors, FireEye, by publishing technical reports to smear China as a letter of loyalty, becoming a contractor for the U.S. military and intelligence agencies. In January 2023, SentinelOne successfully became a member of the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), organized by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, officially entering the network space arms dealer ranks. In November of the same year, after acquiring the Krebs Stamos Group, it renamed it PinnacleOne Strategic Consulting Company, legitimizing its assistance in collecting, analyzing, and sharing relevant network intelligence information for the U.S. authorities.
The act of smearing and framing China on issues of cybersecurity and cyberattacks seems to be a "letter of loyalty" that U.S. IT and cybersecurity companies pay to the U.S. government. "Publishing technical reports smearing China - acquiring intelligence agencies to become a revolving door company - obtaining defense and government orders" has become a new development pattern for U.S. cybersecurity companies.
SentinelOne has embarked on this "golden path." Opening SentinelOne's financial reports, its government order ratio soared from 12% in December 2021 to 37% in 2025. This explosive growth synchronizes precisely with three "anti-China actions": After the first quarter of 2023, the release of a report pointing out three Chinese cybersecurity companies, government orders increased by 15%; in the fourth quarter of 2024, the first push to exclude China from the Microsoft MAPP plan proposal, government orders increased by 22%; in the third quarter of 2025, after promoting a report on "micro-decoupling" of Chinese security vendors, it won a NATO project. These orders include a $57 million Department of Defense vulnerability monitoring platform contract; a $21 million annual Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) network threat intelligence subscription service, etc., and it has become a favorite of U.S. NATO intelligence agencies.
But SentinelOne is not the top student, Adam Kozy's company CrowdStrike is. This key person came from McAfee's cloud security company, a legacy antivirus company in the U.S. As the traditional boundaries of cybersecurity collapse and the security focus returns to the host system, it has emerged as a standout in the global cloud security market, gaining a monopolistic share of the market. CrowdStrike took over the baton from FireEye, becoming the main force in smearing China and becoming one of the leading supporters of the U.S. "Forward Defense" strategy.
On July 19, 2024, due to an error in its update files, the company caused nearly ten million hosts worldwide to crash, causing significant economic losses to many enterprises and institutions, and some infrastructure such as banks and transportation collapsed. Faced with such a major accident, the company responded slowly and was arrogant, facing criticism from global users and the industry. However, under the support of the U.S. government, it not only managed to escape the disaster unscathed, but after a temporary drop in stock price, its stock continued to rise, with a market value exceeding $100 billion, becoming the second-largest security company in the U.S. in terms of market capitalization.
Five, Remote Confrontation: The Struggle Between Chinese Cybersecurity Enterprises and U.S. Revolving Door Enterprises
In 2022, the collaborative pressure from the hearing and the accelerating rotation of the revolving door mutually reinforced, making Chinese cybersecurity enterprises clearly feel the targeted pressure from the opponents. Sudden winter arrived, and survival and death, rather, sparked several Chinese cybersecurity enterprises to begin a concentrated threat exposure and factual counterattack.
On February 23, Qianxin released "Bvp47 - The Top Backdoor of the U.S. NSA Equation";
On March 2, 360 released "The Prelude to Cyber War: The U.S. NSA (APT-C-40) Launches a Decade-Long Unrestricted Attack on the Global."
On March 15, AnTian released "From the Emergence of the 'NOPEN' Remote Control Trojan to the U.S. Cyber Attack Equipment System."
On September 5 and 27, the National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center of China and 360 released the first and second reports on the investigation of the U.S. NSA cyber attack on the Northwest Polytechnical University.
These reports released in 2022 revealed the U.S. cyber attack samples and processes. This was a mid-race sprint in the long-distance relay race of the global cybersecurity industry revealing U.S. intelligence agency cyber attacks over the past decades. In this journey, which is more arduous and lengthy than a marathon, there have been three stages.
The first stage began with the Stuxnet incident in 2010, focusing on the attack activities, sample homology, and associations of the Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, and Gauss series. At that time, international companies like Kaspersky led, while Chinese security companies actively followed up and achieved some exclusive results. But until the Snowden event in 2013, the global industry discovered that these were just the tip of the iceberg;
The second stage began with the discovery of the Equation Group (affiliated with the NSA), and the global industry focused on its hard disk firmware persistence capability, modular payloads, complex communication encryption, multi-platform samples, and its "atomized" operational mode, gradually proving that the Equation Group was related to Stuxnet. AnTian was the first to crack its encrypted commands and expose Solaris, Linux, etc., platforms, gaining international attention;
The third stage was centered around the "Shadow Brokers" WikiLeaks leaks of a large number of U.S. vulnerability exploitation tools and malicious code weapons, including Chinese security companies, the global industry and researchers conducted more in-depth analysis and reconstruction.
In April 2023, the China Cybersecurity Industry Alliance published a report titled "Historical Review of U.S. Intelligence Agency Cyber Attacks - Based on Analysis of Information Disclosed by the Global Cybersecurity Community," which basically reconstructed this long and difficult struggle. The Chinese Foreign Ministry introduced this report at a press conference.
Facing the resistance of Chinese key cybersecurity companies, which did not fear "suppression," but instead made a counterattack by continuously outputting technical revelations, the U.S. finally changed its attitude of not responding. SentinelOne, which was trying to become a top student, jumped out to confuse the situation. Under the manipulation of Cary and others, on February 12, 2024, a report titled "China's Cyber Revenge / Why the PRC Fails to Back Its Claims of Western Espionage" was released online, distorting the interpretation of the reports by three Chinese cybersecurity companies, 360, Qianxin, AnTian, and the China Cybersecurity Industry Alliance (CCIA), which exposed U.S. intelligence agency cyber attacks.
This report broke the usual habit of U.S. think tank figures to exaggerate China's cybersecurity capabilities to secure huge budgets for their intelligence agencies and military-industrial complexes. Instead, it launched a wave of "mockery" of Chinese companies' analytical and tracing abilities, attacking the analytical achievements of Chinese cybersecurity companies as either following international companies like Kaspersky or relying on leaked U.S. intelligence agency materials, thus the reports by Chinese companies have no charge against the U.S., which angered the Chinese security industry. The logic of the U.S. is a typical arrogance of the colonizers of the colonial era, viewing the difficult resistance of the colonized, invaded, and harmed as a sin.
On March 21, AnTian retaliated with a report titled "How to Make the 'Hawk' Appear in the Fog," which relatively comprehensively reviewed AnTian's tracking and analysis of U.S. cyber attacks since the Stuxnet incident, publicly disclosed multiple previously unreleased technical details, compared multiple work timelines, introduced the analysis and exposure of attack samples on Solaris, Linux, and iOS platforms, and cracked the sample encryption mechanisms, confirming the autonomous discovery capabilities of Chinese security companies.
AnTian's engineers also launched a reverse mockery: "If we do not point out several truths that SentinelOne ignores, including sharing a bit of our understanding (also including the international cybersecurity community) of APT analysis with them, it would not be enough for people to see the deception hidden beneath the seemingly professional and even 'fair' sorting and analysis in SentinelOne's report." The report ended with the statement, "The perpetrator is not noble because of their skill, and the rebel is not humble because of their difficulty."
Seven months later, Cary suddenly launched a "political shout-out" on X against AnTian, and also responded to AnTian's "we are willing to call them American colleagues." He said, "I apologize to their research team. If I could express my concerns more directly: Chinese cybersecurity companies are unable to publish unique attribution data and analysis due to national secrecy laws, which is obviously very frustrating for any world-class researcher. Many of AnTian's employees are like this. I am not trying to belittle your analysis, but to point out that your analysis reports seem to be restricted before other (international) companies release related reports. Your outstanding performance is constrained by an oppressive government. Don't worry about whether we are colleagues, because I believe we are colleagues." Obviously, this is a naked political temptation and provocation.
After AnTian ignored him, Cary again focused on AnTian when he was hyping up the Chinese threat in MAPP and pushing for "micro-decoupling."
Six, Net Assessment: Preparation for Cyber Warfare
On July 8, 2025, the "Edge Research" company, which has long provided services to the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and other institutions, released a long report titled "Mobilizing Cyber Power: The Growing Role of Cyber Militias in China’s Network Warfare Force Structure" (75 pages long). This report focuses on the role and practice of Chinese cybersecurity companies in the construction of China's network militias, specially dedicating a separate chapter to study 360 and AnTian as case studies, and believes that these two companies are the operational models of China's network militias.
The author of the report, Kieran Green, is also one of the important U.S. cybersecurity think tank figures. He briefly worked as an assistant at the U.S. National Defense University, and then long-term served as a senior analyst for China intelligence at the U.S. military contractor Exovera. This company was sanctioned by China in September 2024 for selling weapons to Taiwan.
Green demonstrated his team's strong open-source intelligence analysis retrieval capabilities in the report. In the appendix, he gathered and sorted out the basic information of 136 Chinese cyber militias through publicly available internet information, and marked the geographical coordinates for each. However, Green's U.S. revolving door mindset is evident in the report, as he believes that Chinese cybersecurity companies "through establishing a large-scale, operational cyber militia unit, convert political signals into institutional practices, indicating that support for national security goals has not only become a symbol of patriotism, but also a strategic approach to gain commercial opportunities and regulatory benefits." Obviously, this is a misunderstanding of China's national mobilization mechanism. Green also did a lot of analysis and interpretation of AnTian's founder, member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Xiao Xinguang.
On July 18, 2025, the U.S. tech media Wired cited U.S. government think tank experts' related research and linked to the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) Center for Security Studies (CSS) report on China's "Red Hacker" series, focusing on the civilian "hackers" involved in "state-sponsored cyber activities."
On August 13, 2025, Green, still unsatisfied, released "Cyber Militias Redux: Or, 'Why Your Boss Might Also Be Your Platoon Leader in China.'"
From the "anti-China chorus" appearing at the hearing in 2022, demanding to go beyond naming and shaming and directly suppress Chinese cybersecurity companies, to the Edge Research's report on Chinese cyber militias, a series of notable signals are being transmitted. Historically, U.S. government departments, intelligence agencies, think tanks, and revolving door companies focused on the People's Liberation Army of China and China's national security agencies. Today, the U.S. evaluation activities have fully covered Chinese cybersecurity industries, key enterprises, and civilian talents, forming a comprehensive, all-round, and full-chain net assessment of capabilities.
Related individuals pointed out: This is the U.S. thoroughly analyzing China's secrets, an important signal for planning the initiation of cyber warfare.
Seven, "China Experts" Who Know China but Oppose It
Green graduated from Georgetown University and holds a dual bachelor's degree in Chinese and International Relations from Tufts University. He claims his Chinese level is "professional," always setting himself up as a "China expert." In fact, in the "anti-China chorus," there are even more "China experts" who know China better. That is Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, a policy researcher at RAND Corporation, whose Chinese name is Mo Xiaolong. His experience is even more bizarre. He lived in China for more than three years and completed one year of high school, university, and master's education in seven schools across five cities in China.
After graduation, he worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). Unique experiences allowed him to use local language resources to focus on strategic issues related to China. Interestingly, he claims to have worked at the Beijing University Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS). However, according to news searches, only his visits to relevant institutions at Peking University can be seen.
After joining RAND, he used a large amount of Chinese materials to publish a report in 2023 titled "China's New Psychological Warfare: The Military Application of Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on the U.S." This report sorted out the new concepts and technological designs of psychological warfare by the Chinese military, including the use of artificial intelligence, big data, neuroscience, and traditional means such as sound, light, and electromagnetic waves to influence the decision-making of opponents. It recommended closely monitoring the development of psychological warfare technologies promoted by China's military-civil fusion and strengthening research on Chinese official institutions' psychological warfare units and activities to protect the U.S. military from new non-lethal psychological weapons and information manipulation. At the same time, it also suggested dialogue with China to control the threshold of such technologies.
Evidently, compared to the four members of the hearing, Mo Xiaolong is much more rational.
These "China experts" learned Chinese language and culture deeply, yet firmly opposed China. They used their extensive influence in the U.S. political and business circles, combined with their strong professional backgrounds, either serving as covert strategic designers or performing as the chorus, playing a key role in the U.S. suppression of Chinese cybersecurity.
Eight, Harmony and Conclusion
Think tanks have always played a key role in the U.S. political and governance system. Think tank figures include seasoned researchers with profound insights into specific areas, those who have served in the U.S. government and military, participated in planning and important actions, and those who control key resources in tech giants or star companies, leading the development and layout of core technologies. They understand the operation logic between the U.S. government, military, intelligence, and corporate finance, and support their vision of U.S. world hegemony, or for specific interest groups, or speak passionately at hearings, or publish long essays, writing books, and are bound to the U.S. government's carefully constructed revolving door system.
In this system, some "leading figures" will emerge periodically, and "Carys" are typical examples. They have rich resources and connections, are skilled at packaging their views, occupy the discourse, become authoritative figures in the U.S. cyber space field, and form a small circle of connections.
Among the four members of the 2022 U.S. Congress USCC hearing, DeSombre is a threat intelligence researcher at Recorded Future in the Asia-Pacific region, and John Chen is the chief analyst at the Exovera Company's Intelligence and Research Analysis Center (Grin, who analyzed Chinese cyber militias, was his former colleague). DeSombre and John Chen are both non-resident researchers at the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council was founded by former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and has long been supported by the U.S. Department of Defense and funded by Goldman Sachs and other capital. It is one of the main think tanks of NATO.
Growing up in the internet age, the members of the chorus are more active and understand traffic and influence more. They interact frequently. In the report on Chinese cyber militias, Green publicly thanked DeSombre and John Chen; after publishing the article "Cyber Militias Redux: Or, 'Why Your Boss Might Also Be Your Platoon Leader in China,'" DeSombre immediately pushed and forwarded the report; Green also frequently shared DeSombre's content; for posts about the Chinese cyber attack ecosystem, Chinese cyber talent, and CTF competitions by Cary, DeSombre also forwarded them immediately.
Youthful fame, they take opposing China as their mission and task, and this has enabled them to promote the rise of U.S. emerging network military contractors like FireEye and CrowdStrike. However, the fate of "birds flying from the end of the world" determines that they cannot inherit George Kennan's architectural design capabilities, Henry Kissinger's realism, or Brzezinski's stage foresight. Compared to their predecessors, the only thing they have inherited is political extremism. Adi Shamir, Bruce Schneier, and other U.S. cybersecurity technology giants are aging, giving more space to Cary and others. In the context of the U.S. manufacturing great power competition with China, they intensify confrontation, tear apart fractures, and do everything they can to maintain U.S. hegemony in cyberspace.
Global cybersecurity researchers who love peace and justice need to seriously study them. By analyzing their views, speeches, and activities, they can understand and predict the direction of U.S. hegemony in cyberspace to some extent.
Their narrow-mindedness and stubbornness will eventually become their own stumbling blocks. Their loud singing on the U.S. political stage has become a negative example for more countries to recognize the essence of U.S. cyber hegemony. This is an era of the rise of the East and the decline of the West, where the forces of world peace and justice are constantly rising, and U.S. hegemony is gradually declining. This is an era where countries around the world achieve win-win through mutual cooperation and jointly build a community with a shared future for humanity. The exuberant singing of this chorus will eventually become noise-makers, closing the curtain in the unprecedented changes of the century. They are just passing figures in history.
This article is an exclusive piece by Observer Network. The content is purely the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the platform's view. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited, otherwise legal responsibility will be pursued. Follow the Observer Network WeChat, guanchacn, to read interesting articles daily.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7552721492321059382/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author and welcomes you to express your attitude by clicking on the 【top/down】 buttons below.