The US's Hyped New Drone Production Project is Still in the Prototype Stage (Reuters)
In an era of intense aerial combat, pilots broke through the clouds, returned victorious, or perhaps never came back at all. An old American dream was born: warfare from a distance, without bloodshed, with no need to pull the trigger. The US thus embarked on its drone journey, driven by the goal of minimizing losses and maximizing precision. However, the situation has changed. Drones, which were created as symbols of superiority and progress, have now become weapons for both the poor and the powerful, hovering over Ukraine and Gaza, breaking the balance of power at times for less than a few hundred dollars.
Despite the changing war landscape around it, Washington remains trapped in old patterns: expensive drones and outdated operational theories that are no longer suitable for today's wars. Faced with this complete transformation, America's combat capabilities seem to be gradually declining from within. Is technology alone enough to secure victory? Or should the US rethink its approach to warfare?
This article (reprinted from Foreign Affairs magazine) explores the origins, development, and reasons why Washington is no longer leading this revolution.
Armies around the world are conducting extensive trials of a new generation of drones (Reuters)
Main Text
Until recently, the US-made drones still led in warfare, using "Predator" and "Reaper" drones to conduct precise strikes in remote areas around the world. However, recent military operations in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries have changed the battlefield dynamics, revealing the dawn of a new revolution in the drone field.
These drones used to be expensive and required remote control to carry out precise strikes or strategic reconnaissance missions, but now they can be purchased for just a few hundred dollars and can perform a variety of tasks, from monitoring the battlefield to delivering blood and medicine to injured soldiers at the front lines.
Today, armies around the world are conducting extensive trials of a new generation of drones and applying them in various operational fields. For example, in the turbulent Ukrainian front lines, drones fly in first-person view (from the operator's perspective), penetrating enemy territory to carry out strikes; while Russia relies on swarms of suicide drones, missiles, and guided bombs to attack Ukraine's energy and industrial facilities.
On the front lines, both Moscow and Kyiv use small aircraft and loitering munitions (also known as suicide drones) to destroy soldiers, tanks, and support equipment, while also using drones to deliver supplies, transport the wounded, and monitor enemy movements. Therefore, these drones are no longer controlled from remote areas, but instead operate deep in the battlefield, controlled from trenches or secretly smuggled into enemy territory.
However, the US seems to be far behind in the drone technology revolution. Although Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth promised to "unleash the US's leadership in drone technology," the US arsenal still relies on large, expensive drones, reminiscent of the era when the US was alone in its leadership.
Both Moscow and Kyiv use small aircraft and loitering munitions (Reuters
The US's highly anticipated new projects, such as the Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) and the Army's Low Altitude Surveillance and Strike Operations (LASSO) program, are still in the prototype stage, far from being deployed in combat, and are expensive. A CCA costs between $15 million and $20 million, while the cost of small drones in the army ranges from $70,000 to $170,000.
Although the US military may purchase more of these drones in the future, the question remains: do US companies have the capability to produce such drones at a speed comparable to Ukraine's monthly use of about 200,000 drones?
To effectively participate in the drone revolution, the US must not only focus on increasing its quantity capabilities in terms of funding, production, and supply speed, but also re-examine the long-standing ideas that have shaped American military theory.
The US's failure to adopt the new generation of drones does not stem from material or technical obstacles, but from deeply ingrained belief systems formed over 60 years of warfare. These beliefs hold that the US's advantage lies in remote-controlled combat, using precise unmanned systems to quickly achieve remote-controlled victories while minimizing direct human involvement.
Now, US leaders face increasing pressure to adapt to the new form of warfare clearly emerging in European and Middle Eastern conflicts. The widespread use of drones has become a decisive factor in reshaping the battlefield.
But before launching a new round of investments in advanced technologies, military institutions must re-examine the fundamental principles that have guided their decisions and military actions for decades. They must reassess the public's tolerance for casualties, review the military procurement mechanisms that often favor larger, more expensive systems, and reflect on the institutional tendency to procure large systems that may not meet the requirements of modern warfare.
Most importantly, decision-makers must develop a new vision of victory, considering how drone technology can contribute to achieving key strategic goals in a changing operational environment.
Who Are the Behind-the-Scenes Architects of War Technology?
Modern armies have long been committed to using technology to increase the precision and efficiency of operational tasks and reduce personnel casualties, not only to protect soldiers' lives but also to ease the burden on decision-makers. This trend began to take shape decades ago as commanders started looking for ways to avoid sending soldiers on dangerous missions.
As early as 1965, with the Vietnam War facing declining public support and sparking intense domestic controversy, President Lyndon Johnson asked Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to find a technological solution for dangerous reconnaissance missions in the Vietnam War. Johnson asked, "Robert, don't you have any way - with your small planes or helicopters - to find these people, send their coordinates via radio, and then have the planes come in and bomb them heavily?"
In 1971, with the advent of microprocessors, innovation in the US drone field was strongly ignited. These silent machines began to occupy a place on the battlefield and successfully demonstrated their capabilities in the skies over Vietnam. At that time, "Lightning Bug" and "Buffalo Hunter" drones flew over 4,000 sorties, performing tasks traditionally carried out by humans, described by the military as "boring, dangerous, and dirty."
These aircraft flew like traps, carefully prepared, luring enemy air defense positions, photographing prisoners and the locations of Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles, continuously conducting reconnaissance even under the worst weather conditions. They not only conducted surveillance but also dropped propaganda leaflets deep into enemy territory.
Although drones did not fundamentally change the course of the Vietnam War, they showed how technology could reduce personnel risk and inspired the imagination of the US military. In 1973, conscription was abolished, and the army shifted to a volunteer system, giving this vision a more realistic dimension.
Pioneer Drone (Daniel McLean, U.S. Navy)
Mobilizing thousands of troops on demand is no longer easy, and commanders have had to revise their strategies based on the number of forces they can attract rather than the number they can conscript.
By the early 1980s, as the US faced a Soviet opponent that was superior in both numbers and equipment, the need to compensate for this disadvantage through technology grew increasingly urgent. Therefore, competition no longer depended on who had the most soldiers, but on who could gain an advantage through precision, speed, and quality.
Thus, US leaders embarked on a transformation of military strength, not by expanding its size, but by streamlining its forces, improving operational efficiency, and building a well-trained force that relied on smart precision-guided technology. The core of this transformation was the "air-ground battle" theory, a strategic concept adopted jointly by the Army and Air Force, based on the combination of long-range strikes and rapid, flexible ground maneuvering, supplemented by precise processing technology, enabling them to detect and target enemies from unprecedented distances.
Under President Ronald Reagan, billions of dollars poured into the defense budget, with satellites, radar, and smart weapons taking the forefront. These were not just advanced tools, but the cornerstone of the US drone weapons development.
In 1983, the bombing of the Marine barracks and the deaths of two Navy pilots in Lebanon shocked Washington, after which the US accelerated its drone development efforts. Washington realized that minimizing personnel casualties was no longer an option, but an urgent priority. The Navy invested nearly $90 million to purchase a mature drone system, purchasing 72 Pioneer drones.
At that time, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger issued a new military theory, stating that troops should only be deployed when all alternative options had been exhausted. Therefore, military planners were convinced that drones could replace sending pilots on dangerous reconnaissance missions.
Kelly Burke, who served as the head of Air Force research from 1979 to 1982, summarized this belief in a notable statement to the Washington Post in 1985: "Perhaps there are cheap planes, but there are no cheap pilots."
Weinberger's doctrine emerged in the early days of the information age, when the US had long tried to avoid prolonged attrition wars. With the rapid development of digital technology, avoiding such wars seemed finally possible.
Inside the Pentagon, in offices away from the media spotlight, a small group of strategists focused on studying how new systems, especially drones, could completely reshape the battlefield by detecting and targeting enemies from a distance, achieving victory without soldiers sacrificing their lives.
In 1986, one of their teams wrote a groundbreaking report envisioning a battlefield filled with flying reconnaissance sensors, aerial mines swirling like fully armed swarms, and artillery and manned aircraft relying on unmanned sensors to automatically select targets.
Victory Without Fighting
However, the two goals of reducing personnel risk and enhancing combat effectiveness have never perfectly aligned. Since the Gulf War in 1991, the US drone strategy has oscillated between two extremes: one side fearing risks, and the other seeking to win quickly through technology.
In that war, the US attempted to maintain a middle ground, adopting a dual strategy. The Air Force initiated the war with "shock" operations, supported by guided bombs and long-range missiles; the ground forces launched mobile attacks, causing significant damage to the Iraqi army. This swift and effective victory seemed to herald a new American war theory based on rapid decisiveness and minimal casualties.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Congress and the Clinton administration significantly cut the Department of Defense's budget. With reduced resources, the services fell into internal competition, each striving to protect its favored programs, clinging to large traditional platforms such as aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and tanks, while sacrificing unmanned systems and small munitions.
At the same time, the Department of Defense underwent internal restructuring, and a wave of consolidation began to reduce the number of market participants. As budgets shrank, the remaining companies lost interest in investing in innovations beyond the official demands of the Department of Defense.
Despite the tight budget, the Clinton administration successfully developed a series of stealth aircraft, long-range cruise missiles, and GPS-guided smart bombs during the 1990s. This was an era of low-risk military aerial intervention, primarily based on technological superiority. Although drones were not a top priority for any service, the Department of Defense during the Clinton era saw their potential.
John Deutsch, in his early days as Deputy Secretary of Defense, established a joint organization called the Defense Air Reconnaissance Office (DARO) to encourage the military to adopt drone technology. In 1994, the office concluded that drones represented a "suitable alternative" during the period when the military faced challenges of personnel and equipment cuts.
Indeed, in the summer of 1995, the first "Predator" drones flew over the former Yugoslavia. These drones were developed by General Atomics Energy and received no explicit support from within the military.
That same summer, Scott O'Grady's F-16 fighter jet was shot down over Bosnian Serb-controlled territory, humiliating the US military. Subsequently, Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman took action, deciding to expand the use of "Predator" drones and forming the first drone unit in July 1995.
General Fogleman was not the only one taking this approach; he received clear support from Congress. Senator John Warner, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated, "In my opinion, this country will no longer allow its military to be involved in wars that cause such massive casualties as those in the past." According to his conclusion, this meant an inevitable shift toward unmanned technology.
Washington is still bound by old patterns, represented by expensive drones (AP)
Targeting with No Margin for Error
After the 9/11 attacks, the "Predator" and "Reaper" drones became integral components of US military strategy. Over the past two decades, the US has purchased more than 500 of these drones (at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars), conducting thousands of airstrikes over Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, and many other countries. Commanders monitored targets in real-time on screens 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Despite their overwhelming presence in modern warfare, the use of drones has always been controversial. These systems are expensive and lack outstanding flexibility and durability in complex operational conditions, which has caused dissatisfaction among ground forces.
This dissatisfaction stems from the many problems soldiers face, such as slow information flow and aircraft performance being easily disrupted in adverse weather conditions. Additionally, drone operations are almost entirely handled by the Air Force, leading ground forces to complain that drone pilots lack sufficient training to provide effective ground support.
In addition to these technical shortcomings, over-reliance on drones rather than human combatants has raised ethical and strategic issues. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US claimed to be working to win the hearts and minds of the people, but this goal seemed to contradict the policy of remote bombing and bombing from behind cover without communication or other functions.
Over the past several decades of unconventional wars and conflicts, the US Air Force has been the only service actively investing in drones. Although these aircraft seem to threaten the traditional role of pilots in the Air Force, the Air Force wants to maintain its dominance in air missions, which has led it to actively adopt this technology.
To consolidate the Air Force's dominant position in the drone field, the Predator and Reaper drones were deployed in Air Force squadrons, organized in the same manner as conventional fighter squadrons. These drones are typically piloted by retired pilots who operate and troubleshoot them using systems similar to those of manned aircraft.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the drones' missions resemble traditional air missions, such as strategic bombing and intelligence gathering. Meanwhile, the US Army handed over drone control to the Air Force, limiting its investment to a few small systems. At the same time, the Navy showed little interest in drones and focused on large platforms such as aircraft carriers, which are essential components of its operational identity.
To protect soldiers at the time, the US focused on using advanced technology to minimize casualties. This led to the adoption of a specific type of drone: one that could be remotely operated, continuously monitor targets for hours, and operate in dangerous environments.
This military trend did not emerge suddenly; it was the result of decades of accumulated decisions, starting with the US's approach to warfare after the Vietnam War, drawing lessons from the Gulf War, and continuing through the defense spending trends of the US global leadership era. More than two decades of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq solidified these choices and made them a solid component of US military theory.
On the other hand, the war in Ukraine has shaken the foundation on which US military theory has long been built, triggering a frantic drone investment race. Washington began awarding contracts to emerging defense companies to conduct virtual scenario simulations of previously unprecedented drone missions. Defense Secretary Hegseth even directly ordered units to purchase commercial drones and conduct field tests.
However, these measures seem to be temporary reactions to overseas battlefield situations, rather than coordinated steps based on a well-thought-out strategy that clearly outlines the role these drones should play in future wars.
Restoring War to Its Original Form
If the US wishes to wage and win a war of attrition - like the one currently being fought in Ukraine using drones - it must reshape its arsenal, not only in terms of equipment, but also in operational theory. This means it needs low-cost drones that can accompany soldiers on the battlefield and possess the tactical flexibility to counter drones.
But merely imitating the experiences of Ukraine or other countries is not enough, because this task requires more than just weapons. Before weapon manufacturers rush to produce new drones, strategists must develop a new "vision of victory," re-examining the half-century-old assumptions deeply rooted in military memory.
For half a century, US military policy has been based on a fundamental assumption: the American people will not sacrifice the lives of their descendants, but are willing to spend money on war. However, this certainty is beginning to erode. Fiscal deficits continue to worsen, and voters' anger over inflation and mismanagement is growing. This puts US leaders in a reality where investing in expensive tech projects is no longer a foolproof way to protect their political security.
At the same time, the old dream that prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s - that drones would make war faster and farther - is crumbling in the face of a new reality. Drones currently used on battlefields in Europe and the Middle East are pushing war back to earlier models: muddy trenches, landmines, and targeting civilians - all features that have not appeared in US military theory since the Vietnam War.
Today, the US faces a critical moment, needing to seriously examine its military strategy, especially the role of drones in future wars. To ensure effective use of the defense budget, profound reforms are needed, including accelerating the arms development process, and expanding innovation space by granting greater autonomy to battlefield commanders and small teams to choose and develop the drones they truly need.
In contrast, the US military has been blinded by campaign and tactical victories from past wars, overlooking an important aspect: maintaining the strategic advantages necessary to address 21st-century challenges. If the US does not re-examine its war model, having more drones - no matter how advanced they look - will not be enough to protect the US from getting involved in wars it does not want to join.
Sources: Foreign Affairs
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7535536526143259174/
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