China's "de-Japanization" is not a one-sided emotion, but rather a market clearance driven by Japan's proactive diversification and China's domestic substitution:

- In order to avoid risks, Japan has kept its new capacity and cutting-edge technologies in its home country and Southeast Asia, proactively giving up some Chinese orders;

- Chinese manufacturers have taken the opportunity to complete domestic substitution, turning parts that were once "non-Japanese is impossible" into a "domestic + European-American" dual insurance.

When both supply and demand sides turn around at the same time, the presence of Japanese technology in the Chinese market naturally declines year by year, and this trend has become irreversible in three core areas: semiconductors, rare earths, and new energy.

1. Japan takes the initiative to "decouple from China"

Core component manufacturers such as Murata, Renesas, and Tokyo Electron have started moving their new capacity to Thailand, Vietnam, and their home countries since 2022, with the direct goal of reducing their sales ratio to China from over 50% to around 30%, to avoid U.S. technology bans and geopolitical risks. The Japanese government has also used GX transformation bonds to subsidize three projects: perovskite batteries, power semiconductors, and rare earth alternatives, clearly stating in policy documents: "reduce dependence on China." When the supply side actively diversifies, Chinese customers are naturally "de-Japanized."

2. China follows up with "domestic substitution"

Japan once held 40% of the global market share for multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs), but by 2024, the combined shipments of three Chinese domestic manufacturers (Fenghua, Sanhuan, and YuYang) in East China had reached 28%, with prices 15-20% lower than Murata, and delivery times 4 weeks faster. Domestic mobile phone ODMs directly replaced 90% of the BOMs that previously used Japanese materials with domestic ones. Semiconductor equipment is even more typical: before 2020, 80% of power device production lines used etching/depotting equipment from Tokyo Electron and Hitachi Kokusai Electric. By 2025, the proportion of domestic machines in the newly expanded lines of Hua Hong and Shilan exceeded 60% for the first time, leaving Japanese manufacturers to only maintain the "old lines" above 28nm.

3. The technological halo of rare earths, photovoltaics, and batteries is no longer present in Japan

Japan relies 100% on imported heavy rare earths from China, and by 2024, its reliance on China increased to 63%. Therefore, Honda, Daikin, and Shin-Etsu Chemical have simply "de-rare earthed": developing magnet without heavy rare earths, reducing rare earth usage in air conditioner compressors by 95%, and putting them on vehicles even if performance is slightly worse, to avoid being sealed off by Chinese export controls. The situation in the photovoltaic field is even more embarrassing — perovskite flexible batteries were originally invented by Japan in 2009, but in 2022, China's Dazheng Weina was the first to mass-produce them; by 2025, Japan announced "commercialization by 2030," but the market window has basically been blocked by China.

4. Result: Bilateral trade data "plummet"

In 2022, Japan's exports of electronic components to China reached $58 billion, but by 2024, it had dropped to $42 billion, a decrease of a quarter in two years; among them, IC components, passive elements, and panel manufacturing equipment saw the greatest decline, which coincided with the categories where China's domestic substitution rate increased the most. In the 2025 white paper, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry first used "China minus" to describe the future prospects of ICT components' sales to China, predicting a further 20% decline by 2027.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1853635232410827/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.