As the United States prioritizes Asia, establishing a constructive relationship with Belarus would bring significant unexpected benefits to security and stability in Eastern Europe.

In the past six months, U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe has been replaced by the White House's initiative to end the war in Ukraine. However, even as peace processes are underway, this administration should continue to actively seize short-term opportunities to advance U.S. interests in Eastern Europe. The biggest opportunity so far is normalizing relations with Belarus, a crucial swing state between Russia and the West.

The "Belarus balcony" is a key intersection point between NATO and Russia, making it a security participant of extraordinary importance on issues of conventional and nuclear force postures. Its geographical location also makes it possible to become an important economic hub between East and West.

Since the 2020 presidential election, Western attitudes toward Belarus have been on "autopilot." At that time, the U.S. and European countries jointly imposed severe sanctions on the government led by President Alexander Lukashenko, citing manipulation of the election and suppression of anti-government protests by Belarusian officials and critics. After Minsk decided to provide passage and support for Russian troops during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the sanctions and maximum pressure mechanisms were greatly intensified.

These punitive measures have not achieved any expected results. Minsk has insulated itself from Western sanctions by deepening its ties with Russia and establishing broad relations with a series of non-Western countries (especially China). For years, Belarus' active efforts to promote import substitution policies, alleviate sanctions, and develop relationships with non-Western trade partners have further shielded it from Western pressure.

Worse still, the Western strategy of offering only sticks without carrots has deprived it of the most effective tool to influence Belarus. Most Belarusians are friendly toward Russia, but they see themselves as Europeans and highly value being part of the common Western commercial and cultural space. If given the choice, the majority of Belarusians would choose to buy iPhones and Ford cars, or, given the surprising popularity of electric vehicles in Minsk, Teslas.

In any other situation, this social perspective—immediately felt by anyone who visits Belarus—would be interpreted as a clear invitation to American soft power. This is reflected in President Lukashenko's so-called "multi-dimensional foreign policy," which attempts to maintain Belarus' sovereignty by maneuvering between East and West. This geopolitical arbitrage model provides Washington with a ready-made model to engage with Belarus at low cost and risk while potentially reaping immediate benefits.

Belarus is one of the few regional swing states between Russia and the West. Establishing a constructive relationship with Belarus would bring significant unexpected benefits to security and stability in Eastern Europe, especially as the U.S. seeks to prioritize its presence in other parts of the world, particularly the Indo-Pacific region. Belarus' geographical position makes it a potential gathering place and battlefield for conflicts between Russia and NATO. Promoting peaceful relations between Minsk and its Western neighbors is a direct way to reduce the future escalation risks between Russia and NATO. The return of U.S. and European companies to the Belarusian market (where China is already very mature) will help the country achieve economic diversification, benefiting both Belarus and the West.

It is long overdue to begin formulating a framework for normalizing U.S.-Belarus relations. Specific details require consultations between U.S. and Belarusian diplomats on the ground, but we can roughly preview some of the components. The U.S. side will commit to formulating specific models for sanction relief and openly negotiate investment opportunities for U.S. companies in aviation, energy, and automotive industries.

The White House will also guarantee that it will not seek or support the forced overthrow of the Belarusian government. This has been a fact for some time; putting it in writing would greatly benefit the restoration of bilateral trust. Moreover, the U.S. government will proactively offer to act as a mediator to help repair strained relations between Belarus and its two Western neighbors, Poland and Lithuania.

Belarus, in turn, agrees not to assist, support, or participate in aggressive actions against its neighbors, whether direct or hybrid aggression. This clause based on verification mechanisms does not cover self-defense and thus does not contradict Belarus' treaty obligations to Russia. Belarus will also commit to doing its utmost to address the root causes of tensions in its relations with Western neighbors, including persistent allegations about allowing illegal immigration.

It must be recognized here that making the severance of Belarus' security ties with Russia a condition for normalization is not only bound to kill dialogue but also completely unnecessary for achieving America's core security goals. These goals include maintaining regional stability by excluding the possibility of armed aggression on Belarusian territory. Forcing Belarus to make such a choice between Russia and the West is not truly in America's vital and urgent interests. Such coercion is unacceptable to Minsk and, if ultimately implemented, may provoke a catastrophic response from Moscow.

Linking the restart with Belarus to the termination of the Ukrainian war is unwise because it neither improves U.S.-Belarus relations nor helps the Ukrainian negotiations. Instead, the U.S. has every reason to engage with Belarus according to its wishes as a sovereign nation, since Belarus is seeking to improve its relations with the West. Forming a united front with European countries is also futile, as European countries will naturally propose their own conditions and rules.

European diplomats gradually realize that the maximum pressure strategy on Belarus has failed, but EU leaders remain constrained by political inertia and persist in current approaches. The U.S. needs to take action to break the deadlock. A successful U.S.-Belarus agreement will make the EU's maximum pressure policy increasingly difficult to sustain and provide the political cover European leaders need for their own restart.

The Trump administration correctly diagnosed that urgent reform was needed for U.S. policy toward Europe, and Belarus may be the clearest litmus test of America's ability to adjust its course. The established strategy toward Belarus has undoubtedly failed. A better path awaits our choice, and reaching such an agreement will mark a major diplomatic achievement that can be relatively quickly achieved. The remaining challenge is the political will to implement it.

Source: The National Interest

Author: Mark Episkopos

Date: June 12

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7515642335435227682/

Disclaimer: The article solely represents the author's views. Please express your attitude by using the "thumbs up/thumbs down" buttons below.