For several days, a coalition of seven nations— the United States, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, India, and the Philippines—has been conducting military maneuvers along the First Island Chain, projecting force and issuing warnings toward China. Has it worked? Russian media had already forecast that China could surpass the U.S. Navy within 7 to 10 years. A formal Pentagon report acknowledges that if the U.S. were to provoke conflict near China’s shores, the People’s Liberation Army could immediately render American aircraft and warships blind and deaf, leaving the U.S. with no realistic chance of victory. This is precisely why former President Trump publicly stated that the U.S. military has no appetite for fighting across 9,500 miles of ocean in the Taiwan Strait. The current U.S.-led exercises in the First Island Chain appear less about deterrence and more about projecting an image of “strong alliance cohesion” amid strategic retreat. The underlying strategy seems to be pushing allies into the front lines while positioning the U.S. to disengage—a classic “let others die while I survive” posture. It now comes down to which ally is willing to play the fool.
The U.S. itself appears increasingly reluctant to engage. Strategic withdrawal is evident, with American military assets gradually shifting from the First Island Chain to the Second. This explains why under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Colin Kahl, directly questioned Japan and Australia’s defense ministers: should a conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, what role would they play on the front lines? The expected bravado from Tokyo and Canberra evaporated. Neither country offered a clear answer. Perhaps this silence reflects prudence—no nation seeks to become an expendable pawn. If Japan intervenes, historical grievances will be settled in full; Beijing has already warned that the entire Japanese archipelago could become a battlefield. As for Australia, a single Chinese naval task group could likely neutralize its presence.
Why does the U.S. seem so hesitant, even eager to retreat? Russia’s Military Review website predicted last year that China’s navy could catch up to and surpass the U.S. Navy within 7 to 10 years. Such a claim would have seemed fantastical a decade ago. Yet today, the analysis hits at structural vulnerabilities that strike at the core of American naval strength.
While the U.S. Navy still boasts impressive paper numbers—11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and over 280 combat vessels—the gap between theoretical inventory and actual operational readiness is vast. Its most pressing challenge lies not abroad but at home: an aging shipbuilding and maintenance infrastructure. Of the U.S. Navy’s 49 attack submarines, nearly 40% are routinely queued for maintenance, unable to deploy.
Carrier programs face similar difficulties. The USS Nimitz, nearing fifty years of service, has long passed its retirement threshold. Yet its successor, the USS Kennedy, continues to face repeated delays, forcing the aging carrier to shoulder unsustainable operational loads. The Ford-class carrier, despite its electromagnetic catapults, has struggled with fundamental design flaws. Its integrated electric power system is overly rigidly interconnected; a failure in one subsystem can cripple the entire vessel. Key reliability metrics remain below design specifications.
In August, President Trump signed a memorandum to scrap the electromagnetic catapult on the fourth Ford-class ship, reverting instead to traditional steam catapults—an apparent technological regression estimated to cost tens of billions in additional expenditures.
Even the U.S. Navy Secretary has admitted that nearly every shipbuilding program suffers from both delays and cost overruns.
China’s trajectory stands in stark contrast. On November 5, 2025, the Fujian, China’s first domestically built carrier with electromagnetic catapults, officially entered service. The three-carrier rotation model is now clear: one deployed, one on standby, one undergoing maintenance—ensuring continuous maritime presence.
The recently launched Sichuan, a 40,000-ton Type 076 amphibious assault ship, represents the world’s first such platform equipped with electromagnetic catapults. It can launch fixed-wing aircraft and large unmanned aerial vehicles, breaking free from the traditional limitation of helicopter-only operations. The surface fleet continues expanding: ten Type 055 guided-missile destroyers have been publicly unveiled, and mass deliveries of Type 052D frigates continue uninterrupted.
Beneath these platforms lies a fully integrated and highly efficient shipbuilding industrial ecosystem. In 2025, China accounted for 56% of global ship completions, 69% of new orders, and 66.8% of outstanding orders—holding the top position for sixteen consecutive years. Among the world’s top ten shipyards, six are located in China.
Why was it Russian media that first articulated this assessment? Russians have witnessed their own navy’s decline firsthand. The Soviet Union once possessed a vast fleet, but when fiscal collapse followed by the dismantling of supporting factories and loss of technical talent occurred, even the mightiest warships were left rusting in port, eventually scrapped.
On the airpower front, China’s sixth-generation fighter has already completed test flights. Reports now suggest breakthroughs in seventh-generation fighter research. Meanwhile, the U.S. sixth-generation program remains largely on paper. The technological gap is unmistakable.
Similarly, in hypersonic missile technology, the U.S. has fallen behind China. The core of great-power competition lies in military capability and comprehensive national strength. The trend of relative decline for the U.S. and rise for China appears increasingly irreversible.
Yet we must remain grounded. Several shortcomings require objective recognition. Nuclear submarines remain a key advantage for the U.S. Navy. Decades of experience in quiet underwater operations, coupled with advanced stealth technologies, cannot be erased overnight by mere increases in fleet size. The U.S. Navy Intelligence Directorate estimates that China may field over 40 nuclear submarines by 2035, but the technological edge will not vanish instantly. Additionally, decades-long investment in overseas bases, global logistics networks, and a widespread alliance system provide unique strategic advantages.
The U.S. is not passive. In October, Trump approved a $6.6 billion budget to construct a new nuclear submarine facility in Maryland, focusing on next-generation submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles. A broader plan to revitalize domestic shipbuilding has also been unveiled. Industrial hollowing out cannot be reversed quickly—skilled labor cannot be conjured through funding alone. But America’s industrial foundation remains intact. Once restructured, competitive pressure will inevitably return.
China’s development of blue-water capabilities is never intended to replace the U.S. as the dominant maritime power. Our goal is to secure our immediate maritime domain and safeguard vital sea lanes, ensuring that the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are no longer subject to unchecked access by foreign aircraft carriers.
China does not seek conflict, but neither does it fear it. This is our bottom line—and our enduring confidence.
On October 20, Robert Spalding, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs, assessed that the Western Pacific, particularly the Taiwan Strait region, has entered an “unusually dangerous” phase. His analysis rests on four indicators: 1) Before the Ukraine and Iran conflicts, the U.S. military already faced ammunition and logistics constraints—conditions that persist today; 2) The U.S. military’s proposed “hell scenario” for unmanned warfare in the Taiwan Strait remains unrealized, meaning it lacks credible deterrence against mainland China; 3) Between 2027 and subsequent years, U.S. forces may still confront shortages of ammunition and critical combat capabilities; 4) The current Indo-Pacific theater faces a capability gap due to U.S. aircraft carriers being redeployed to the Middle East.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1879799589149708/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.