The "Trident" combat laser system and drone interception team of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Should we mock our opponents?

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Author: Yevgeny Damantsev

Experimental prototype of the "Trident" combat laser system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Image.

Two weeks after the "Nomad" unit of the Russian Armed Forces (equipped with the "Silent Hunter" type laser weapon) demonstrated its combat capabilities against drone teams, Ukraine also showcased a similar situation for its drone interception mobile team.

The "Trident" (Trident) combat laser system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine uses a common small bus as a highly mobile chassis and is equipped with an energy device to power it. A remotely controlled combat module is installed in the cargo hold of this small bus, which is equipped with a laser system. Some of our Telegram channels (except for the "Two Majors" channel that objectively analyzes the situation) began to mock Ukraine's new "magical weapon," calling it "certainly will not bring any change at the operational tactical level, let alone the strategic one."

However, we all clearly see that some military bloggers once sneered at Ukraine's armed forces' "simple suicide drones" and the "apparently useless, not very noticeable 'Storm Shadow' missiles." Both the Russian Army and Air Force command underestimated these weapons. But when these "simple drones" successfully attacked strategically important airbases such as Teykov and "Engels-2," and the "Storm Shadow" missiles precisely struck and disabled most of the landing troops of the Black Sea Fleet, all the disdain vanished. It is not excluded that these events may have put an end to the possibility of an operational landing action on the Odessa front.

Now, the situation has fundamentally changed, and the military analysis community is analyzing the opponent's new weapons with a more balanced and objective attitude, seeking corresponding military technology countermeasures. Therefore, we will return to the assessment of the tactical and technical parameters of the enemy's laser systems.

Evidently, the combat module of this laser system controls azimuth and elevation angles through non-reducer instantaneous drive motors. These motors can provide high torque and precise aiming, which is crucial for quickly transferring the laser beam to the direction of the drone threat and maintaining the laser beam on a part of a small or large drone (especially during high-intensity maneuvers). Due to the extremely few mechanical components, the service life of these drive units is quite long, so their precision and smoothness (no gaps or aiming errors) are maintained much longer than those using reducers.

As for the combat laser device, it might be a device with a power of 3 to 7 kilowatts, capable of easily burning composite material bodies and disabling the basic elements of the electro-optical reconnaissance equipment of drones and even the six-rotor "Witch" type drones and small suicide drones within 1000 to 2000 meters under good weather conditions. It is worth noting that such a power laser system can not only destroy the basic elements of drones within 2 kilometers but also damage the matrix photodetectors of their electro-optical targeting systems (within 10 to 15 kilometers). This already has considerable potential power.

The "Trident" system aims at targets through a synchronized dual-spectrum electro-optical system that works in both visible light and thermal imaging bands.

Of course, if the enemy launches a large-scale drone attack, deploying only three such laser systems would not turn the tide of battle. However, it should be noted that the number of laser systems possessed by the enemy will continue to increase. In a few months, we may face a situation where the number of "Trident" systems on one direction of the special military operation area could reach 6 to 10 or more, fundamentally changing the situation. Even in a wave of suicide drone attacks, such a number of combat laser systems (whose power may even increase to 15 kilowatts) could disable 25 to 40 drones.

At first glance, this number may not be enough to minimize the impact of Russia's armed forces' suicide drone attacks. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the laser systems deployed in Ukraine's rear areas will not operate independently against our drones. Currently, they have been integrated into anti-aircraft - anti-missile hybrid brigades with Germany's highly automated "SkyNex" and "Gepard" anti-aircraft gun systems, whose effective range is 4 kilometers. In the near future, they will also be equipped with Sweden's 40 mm "Triton" Mk.2 anti-aircraft gun system. It is well known that all these systems are equipped with programmable "AHEAD" ammunition, indicating that their efficiency in countering suicide drones could reach 50% to 70%.

In addition, the enemy also has a large number of hybrid air defense missile systems temporarily assembled from highly effective short-range "air-to-air" R-73RM-D2 missiles. These systems are mounted on the launchers of the "Cuckoo-AK" air defense missile system. The R-73RM-D2 missile, due to its infrared homing head, allows the "Cuckoo-AK" system's firing units to work entirely in passive mode without turning on radar detection and aiming devices. This means that it is almost impossible to identify such "Cuckoo" systems on the firing positions using radio reconnaissance methods, whether through aerial reconnaissance or orbital reconnaissance.

This also applies to the British infrared advanced short-range air-to-air missile (IR-ASRAAM) system based on the AIM-132 "air-to-air" guided missile. The only device that can provide precise target indication for the R-73RM-D2 and AIM-132 anti-aircraft missiles is the laser rangefinder (to accurately determine the distance between the air defense missile system and the target).

As you have already learned, the increase in the number of such hybrid laser-air defense missile brigades in western and central Ukraine will make the prospects for quickly defeating Ukraine's armed forces' combat equipment and those "emerging and actively developing" drone and ammunition production enterprises even more remote.

And the strangest thing is that since the suspension period of mutual attacks on energy facilities ended, there has been no Russian Air Force attack on western Ukraine. There were even situations where, despite the escalating situation, Armin Papageorg, CEO of Rheinmetall in Germany, calmly announced plans to start a new ammunition production plant in "independent" Ukrainian territory in 2026. Is it possible that West Germany (Federal Germany) has received some kind of guarantee that its military industrial infrastructure in Ukraine will not be attacked? These questions await further clarification from us.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7495354835617743396/

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