【By Observer Net Columnist Yang Zhi】

The Levada Center is currently the only independent polling institution in Russia, with its history dating back to 1987 when Gorbachev began implementing economic reforms. Due to being designated as a "foreign agent" by Russian authorities in 2016, its poll results have consistently enjoyed higher recognition in the West.

A month ago, the Levada Center released the results of a survey conducted among 1,613 respondents. This result has been called "historically significant," because the United States fell out of the list of Russia's "number one enemy country" for the first time in 13 years. Compared to 2024, the proportion of Russians who view the United States as an "enemy" dropped from 76% to 40%. This change directly stems from the shift in U.S. policy toward Russia after the White House power transition.

Whether Trump can make America great again remains unknown, but it is a fact that he has significantly improved America's image in the eyes of the Russians

It is worth noting that Germany followed the United States to the top of the "enemy country" list, at 55%, followed by the UK (49%) and Ukraine (43%). In the "most friendly countries" vote, Russians chose countries that supported Russia or at least remained neutral in the Ukraine-Russia war: 80% of respondents chose Belarus, 64% chose China, 32% chose India, and 30% chose North Korea.

The reason Germany was "crowned" as the top enemy country this time is mainly twofold: First, although the United States is still the most important country providing aid to Ukraine, Trump's attitude shift won the favor of Russians; while Germany, which had long been hiding behind Washington, suddenly appeared in the sight of Russian officials and citizens, and its insistence on supporting Ukraine became particularly prominent. Second, since Mertz became the German Chancellor, his statements about Russia have become increasingly sharp. His recent statement at the NATO meeting in The Hague - "Russia is actually attacking us" - has now become the tone of Germany's policy towards Russia.

So why did Mertz say that?

First, it is his personal unique style of expression, almost "populist": too simplified and often exaggerated, with a clear "eye-catching" tendency. The previous controversial "dirty work" statement is a typical example. Although the journalist first used this concept, he was able to fall into this "trap" because such expressions fit his own style.

Another example is the "beer coaster" (Bierdeckel) statement in 2003: At that time, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) Schröder had already won the federal election, and Mertz was pushed out by Merkel within the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and his political career was blocked. Perhaps as a last attempt, or to leave a "political legacy", he proposed a "three-tier income tax" plan, believing that this scheme was simple enough to be written on a "beer coaster".

Mertz's beer coaster

Many years later, Mertz admitted that he had "miscalculated." To ease the embarrassment, he joked: "I am proud that this随手拿来的 beer coaster has now been displayed in the Bonn German History Museum along with the mysterious and magical 'small note' that made German national goalkeeper Lehmann famous in 2006."

In fact, Mertz has never been able to shake off the political "label" of the "beer coaster," which is the price he has paid for "making shocking statements."

Secondly, Mertz's statement that Russia is actually attacking Germany refers to the so-called "hybrid warfare" that Russia is increasingly carrying out against Germany and the West, including sabotage and assassination operations, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and espionage activities, such as the destruction of Baltic data cables, drones flying over the Federal Armed Forces camps, and Russian "cyber troops" spreading false news online. Mertz emphasized that the boundary between war and peace is "fluid," and it is not necessarily only in the form of actual armed conflict.

Mertz's understanding comes from information held by German intelligence agencies, according to which Russia is conducting so-called "pinprick" operations, small-scale but systematic attacks, to test the defense capabilities of the West. As the head of the German government, Mertz believes it is his duty to remind the public that "the war has already begun."

The problem is that Germany and the West have provided large-scale weapons and intelligence to Ukraine for three years, which in the eyes of Moscow and Russians is also an "hostile and attack" act.

Finally, Mertz's warning is also due to domestic politics and strategic judgment. After all, Trump's "unreliability" and the three-year "Ukraine war" have prompted the German government to take unprecedented loans to enhance military preparedness. Facing voters, the government must explain the specific sources of "crisis perception."

Mertz's other basis is a NATO internal document: According to reports, after NATO conducted simulations based on information, it concluded that Russia will have sufficient military capability by 2029 to launch a large-scale attack on one or several NATO countries. However, this strategic judgment has been questioned by many security experts in the West.

Certainly, the deterioration of German-Russian relations is not only related to real politics, but also cannot be separated from the "ancient grudges" between the two nations: From dynasties to republics, from autocracy to democracy, the German and Russian peoples have sometimes stood shoulder to shoulder, and sometimes fought each other, walking through centuries of twists and turns.

Early historical intersections

About the Germanic and Slavic peoples, the famous 19th-century Russian historian Solovyev once described: Germans and Slavs are brother tribes. They participated in the division of Europe, initially in the form of mass migrations: Germans moved from northeast to southwest, entering the territory of the ancient Roman Empire; Slavs moved in the opposite direction, from southwest to northeast, entering the "stepchild" (meaning harsh) natural environment - this "converging movement" eventually generated the "completely different" historical fates and national personalities of the two tribes.

Solovyev believed that heaven was unfair: sending Germans to the civilized and prosperous center of Europe, while sending Russia to the sparsely populated and desolate place. He called history a cold-hearted "stepmother" - this metaphor is full of complaints about the suffering fate of Russia.

Then, what did the Germans, whom Solovyev regarded as "lucky ones," think about God's arrangement for themselves? Former German Chancellor Schmidt once used a crude expression to complain: The German nation is located in the center of Europe, which is a "terrible (geographical) environment."

Solovyev was resentful about Russia being sent to "a desolate place," but he didn't see that his own nation thereby gained a unique "strategic depth"; while Schmidt focused solely on the German nation being in a flat, almost without barriers, and a "non-place" of battle, but ignored the civilization baptism and development dividends brought by this central position early on.

Thus, countries, like people, are always "envious of the other mountain." What others envy, you may not be satisfied with.

Like the monks of Shaolin Temple who go out of the temple to roam the world with their martial arts, the Germans and Slavs also stood out through force in the struggle for supremacy in the European continent. In Solovyev's words, "Two tribes took the lead in the beginning of modern Western Christian civilization and have always maintained this advantage." Of course, they have fought each other several times, with varying degrees of success.

The earliest recorded interaction between the two sides occurred in the 9th-10th century. At that time, the concepts of "Germans" and "Russians" had not yet truly formed, nor were there clear geographical definitions. At that time, the "German" political entity was first the East Frankish Kingdom formed after 843, and then the Holy Roman Empire established in the 10th century; the "Russian" side was the Kievan Rus, which emerged in 882.

The initial exchanges mainly took place in three areas: missionary work, trade, and marriage between nobles.

"Missionary work" refers to the Christianization of the Slavic regions between the 9th and 10th centuries: Western Slavic nations, such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, were deeply influenced by the "Holy Roman Empire" (called "the First Empire" by the Germans) and Catholicism; including Russians and South Slavs in the Balkans, were assimilated by the Byzantine Empire, the Eastern Roman Empire, and its Greek Orthodox (Eastern Orthodox) religion.

Vladimir's baptism: The Christianization of Kievan Rus

Religious groups have long been effectively a commercial unit: newly won parishes are new markets. With the Christianization of the Slavic regions, bilateral trade also developed vigorously. At that time, the second largest city of Kievan Rus, Novgorod, attracted and received "winter guests" and "summer guests" including German merchants year after year. Later, the commercial and political community "Hanseatic League" formed between the Holy Roman Empire and the Teutonic Knights in the 12th-13th centuries, established many trading posts in the Russian region.

In 1231, Novgorod suffered a famine, and Germans rushed to help, bringing ships full of grain across the sea to rescue, winning great favor from the Kievan Rus. This "aiding Russia" tradition is also reflected in the unification of East and West Germany: the West German government, in order to win Gorbachev's approval for the unification of East and West Germany, not only generously accommodated the Soviet soldiers returning from East Germany, but also provided substantial "blood transfusions" to the Soviet economy on the verge of bankruptcy. Now, "aiding the Soviet Union" has become "aiding Ukraine," and you can imagine how the Russians would not resent it!

"Marriage" mainly occurred between royal families. The earliest cases are recorded, but mostly vague, lacking detailed information. It is said that the daughter of Count Leopold of the Elbe River, Oda, the daughter of Conrad I of Swabia (whose name is unknown), and the daughter of Otto I of Weimar, Gunhild, married into the Kievan Rus princely family.

Unfortunately, after the Mongols completely destroyed Kievan Rus in 1240, the East Slavic region disappeared from the Western view for a time, and the political and commercial exchanges and marital relationships between Germany and Russia came to an abrupt end. It was not until Tsar Peter the Great took power and opened the closed door to the West that the relationship between Germany and Russia had a new start.

This ambitious and vigorous tsar once traveled incognito to visit European countries, especially praising Germany and the Netherlands, and learned and copied a lot from both countries. Saint Petersburg became the capital of the Russian Empire, facing the West, and European customs gradually entered.

From a strategic perspective, he restarted noble royal marriages with Western Europe, especially with Germany, which led to the later Empress Catherine II, originally from Prussian Stettin, and the wife of the last Russian tsar Nicholas II, Alexandra (originally a princess from Hesse-Darmstadt).

After the October Revolution, many Russians feared revolution and fled to Berlin for refuge. Most of them settled in Charlottenburg, and later Berliners jokingly called the district "Charlottenburg."

Modern grievances and conflicts

During the German Empire (1871-1918), Bismarck sought to gain and attract Russia, hoping to stabilize Germany's emerging superpower status in Europe. In 1873, Emperor Wilhelm I of Germany, Tsar Alexander II of Russia, and Emperor Joseph I of Austria-Hungary formed the "Triple Alliance of Emperors."

After the expiration of the "Triple Alliance of Emperors" treaty, due to differences in opinion on the Balkan Peninsula and how to deal with Britain and France, the parties had no intention of renewing it, and this imperial alliance collapsed. It was replaced by the "Triple Alliance" of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and Germany and Russia thus became bitter enemies.

Politically speaking, royal family marriages were the foundation for maintaining peace and stability among the great powers. However, the blood relations between royal families could not overcome the interest conflicts between countries: from the "Triple Alliance of Emperors" to the "Triple Alliance," the relationship between Germany and Russia shifted from friendly to hostile. Former friends in court became enemies on the battlefield.

Austrian Jewish writer Stefan Zweig once called April 16, 1917, "a turning point for humanity": 108 years ago, on this day, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (known as Lenin) returned to Petrograd from exile in Switzerland, joining the fiery revolutionary tide.

The cover title of the German magazine "Der Spiegel": "Revolution Bought"

According to historical revelations, he was actually commissioned by Emperor Wilhelm II to return home, in order to create peace on the Eastern Front, helping Germany avoid fighting on two fronts. This history has been confirmed by the newly compiled "History of 20th Century Russia (1894-2007)."

Indeed, after the Bolsheviks seized power, they immediately negotiated with the Germans and signed the "Brest-Litovsk Treaty," ceding large territories of Russia and Ukraine to the Germans. According to the terms of the "treaty," these territories were permanently ceded. However, later changes in the balance of power between the warring parties reversed, and Germany collapsed on the front lines in the late stages of World War I, becoming a defeated country, and Russia luckily regained the territories.

In fact, the strategy of "Germany and Russia jointly resisting the West" was not only attempted by Wilhelm II, but also practiced by Hitler and Stalin more than twenty years later: On August 24, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the "Non-Aggression Pact" in Moscow. However, Hitler and Stalin's "honeymoon period" lasted only 22 months, despite the ten-year agreement.

On June 22, 1941, Germany implemented the "Operation Barbarossa" and launched a lightning attack on the Soviet Union, leading to a complete rift between Germany and Russia, parting ways. The subsequent years of Soviet-German war became one of the bloodiest wars in human history. Hitler ultimately repeated Napoleon's fate, destined to collapse from the moment he entered Russian territory.

History's "coincidences" can sometimes be surprisingly touching.

In the story of "Lenin's imperial mission," the two pairs of protagonists had some familial ties: Wilhelm II and Nicholas II were cousins, both belonging to the British Queen Victoria's large family; the other pair were hometown friends and classmates: Menshevik representative Kerensky was a fellow townsman of Bolshevik leader Lenin, both grew up in the Volga River town of Simbirsk, and his father had even served as the principal of Lenin's high school.

If there had been no discord between Emperor Wilhelm II and his cousin Nicholas II, the First World War might not have occurred; if there had been no senior Lenin overthrowing his junior Kerensky's provisional government, Russia might have taken a completely different path. Of course, history cannot be hypothetical.

After World War II, Germany was divided. During the Cold War, the confrontation between the USSR and the USA, with the two major blocs interlocking, was full of crises.

Amidst this seemingly irreconcilable international situation, a branch of olive branches reached out across the cold winds hanging on the Iron Curtain. In order to ease the tense relations between the East and West, German Chancellor Brandt began to implement the "Ostpolitik" from the late 1960s.

Why was it the West Germany that took the initiative to take this step, rather than the United States, the United Kingdom, or France?

On one hand, we can consider that because East and West Germany were at the forefront of the Cold War confrontation, any slight movement of the East and West would inevitably hit East and West Germany first. A single nation, two blocs, the West German government did not want to use its nation's cost to pay for the US-Soviet hegemony interests for a long time. On the other hand, after the bloody pages of the past, aside from the needs of real politics and the game of national interests, there was still a sense of mutual admiration between Germany and Russia.

The "Brother's Kiss" of Brezhnev and Honecker on the Berlin Wall

Drip by drip, iron rod by iron rod. Brandt's "friendship promotes change" Ostpolitik finally bore fruit. The Cold War ended, and Germany gained the historical opportunity for national reunification, while the formerly unified powerful Soviet Union disintegrated.

Now, the relationship between the two countries is no longer determined by royal family ties and family calculations, but by the personal preferences and wisdom games of the new generation of political elites and strong men. Traditional "marriage alliances" have been replaced by modern "national interests."

But upon closer inspection, we find that there is still some emotional factor at play in the relationship between the two countries: when the Ukraine crisis erupted, the White House initially pushed European allies to sanction Moscow, but the Merkel government was reluctant to take this step at first, and finally had to apply pressure, but always left a way out for Putin.

After Biden took office, he immediately started to correct Trump's "disorder," and restored the North Atlantic relationship. German Chancellor Scholz, out of "gratitude," also to keep the United States firmly tied to the Western system, abandoned the special independent approach that Germany had always taken on the Russia issue, and listened to Washington's orders. Current Chancellor Mertz, who is a Atlanticist, in order to hold onto Trump, who is re-elected but has always been hesitant about the Western alliance, increased the intensity of criticism of Russia, leading to a sharp decline in Sino-German relations.

Look at the familiar faces at the 2011 opening ceremony of the Nord Stream pipeline?

It can be said that the current Sino-German relationship is difficult to escape the influence of the United States. Germany's continued cooperation with Russia on the "Nord Stream 2" project has always been a reason for the United States to criticize Germany; the Russian government's ambiguous relationship with Germany's left-wing party and the Option Party is also an important reason why the German establishment government cannot reconcile with Moscow. At the same time, both Sino-German countries cannot ignore the opposition and vigilance of Poland and the Baltic states, which are members of the EU and NATO, towards Russia.

The glory and misfortune of the Russian Germans

In Germany, there is a well-known concept called "Russian Germans" (Russlanddeutsche). It refers to the German-speaking residents in Russia, the Soviet Union, and its former Russian Empire.

Out of historical responsibility and national obligation, of course also because of the demand for labor, the unified Germany promulgated the "Repatriation Plan," and gradually brought back those who wanted to return. According to statistics in 2024, these people, known as "late returnees," i.e., those who applied and were approved to return to Germany after 1993, totaled 2.7 million.

Now, these people have become a "special" group in Germany: they have German blood, mixed looks, and speak German with a heavy Russian accent. They yearn for Germany, the "new homeland," and receive various benefits from the German government (naturalization, employment, land acquisition, etc.), but due to long-term "detachment" and different growth backgrounds, many of them do not feel at home after returning.

Russia is a multi-ethnic country, and the proportion of Germans is not very large (about 0.5%), mainly distributed in a few major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the Volga, Black Sea coast, Siberia, Altai, Omsk, the "exclave" Kaliningrad, and other areas. According to the population statistics of 1897, the number of Germans and Germans at that time was approximately 1 million; before World War I, the number was the highest, with 2.4 million; after 1914, due to migration, war, revolution, deportation, and discrimination, the number of Germans declined significantly.

Since the 15th century, Russian dukes and later emperors hoped to enhance their economic and military strength, but suffered from a lack of professional talents, so they began to recruit from Western Europe.

Empress Catherine II's 1763 "Invitation to Immigrants"

Peter the Great further promoted large-scale modernization, and he especially appreciated the talents of Germany and the Netherlands. One of his successors, Empress Catherine the Great, issued the "Invitation to Immigrants" (Einladungsmanifest) in 1763, after which thousands of Germans poured into the vast Russian territory to settle down.

There are several main reasons for the Germans migrating to Russia to settle down:

·定向招募 by Russian rulers. Russian dukes and emperors introduced Western experts systematically to promote national economic, technological, and military modernization, especially favoring doctors, teachers, craftsmen, and gunpowder manufacturers.

· Superior working and living conditions. Invited experts usually enjoy special privileges, including economic subsidies, tax exemptions, religious freedom, and partial conscription exemptions (this policy was particularly prominent in the 18th century, but there were earlier precedents).

· Scarce competition and high demand. At that time, technical talents in Russia were scarce, and German professionals could obtain superior career prospects and social status.

· Political and economic environment in Germany. The motivation of German immigrants also includes economic difficulties, political turmoil, and religious conflicts in their homeland (these factors were particularly significant in the late 18th century).

· Career opportunities and pioneering spirit. Serving the Russian court or cities can not only achieve career advancement, accumulate new experience, but also play a key role in the emerging country.

Throughout the past centuries, many outstanding figures have emerged among the "Russian Germans," such as:

Foreign Minister of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War, Lambsdorff, the "Nazi spiritual leader" Luxembourg sentenced to death by the Nuremberg Court, the "Red spy" Sorge active in China and Japan, the "contemporary top spy" Abel, the chairman of the management board of the state-owned enterprise "Gazprom," Miller, the Russian general Tottleben who became famous for building a solid fortress defense works in Sevastopol during the Crimean War in the 19th century, and Tamm, who discovered the "Cherenkov radiation" and participated in the invention of the "Tokamak" magnetic ring machine and won the Nobel Prize in Physics...

General Sorge, who was awarded the "Hero of the Soviet Union" title

The "Russian Germans" once experienced glory and were looked up to, but they also had quite tragic experiences, especially during and after World War II.

Many Germans were accused of being "enemies of the people," charged with "colluding with Nazi Germany," leading to the loss of property and large-scale deportation and suppression. On August 28, 1941, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree abolishing the "Volga German Autonomous Republic," and all German residents were forcibly escorted, relocated, or enrolled in military-style forced labor, known as "labor army." The German communities in Crimea, the Caucasus, and southern Russia were also forcibly migrated to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Even for a long time after the war, Russian Germans were banned from returning to their original homes, and most of them remained in the Central Asian exile areas for a long time.

Therefore, "Russian Germans" are both a bridge between the two countries and a true reflection of historical changes and national tragedies.

Conclusion

On June 11, the "Peace Group" (SPD-Friedenskreise) of the Social Democratic Party published a declaration signed by more than 100 politicians and intellectuals before the party congress in late June.

The document clearly states: "The demands of Ukraine under international law must be linked to the legitimate safety and stability interests of the entire Europe. Based on this, it is necessary to try to conduct extremely difficult dialogues and re-establish contact with Russia after the guns fall silent, discussing the establishment of a European peace and security order that is jointly undertaken and respected by all parties."

The authors claim to follow the tradition of their party's former chairman Brandt and his "Ostpolitik" during the Cold War. They believe that alarmist military rhetoric and massive military expansion plans will not bring more security to Germany or Europe, but instead cause instability and exacerbate mutual hostility between NATO and Russia.

The authors stated: "We believe that setting a percentage of GDP for military purposes (3.5% or 5%) is irrational and lacks a basis in security policy." In addition, they oppose the deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles in Germany.

This declaration is not only seen as a "ideological uprising" of the left wing within the Social Democratic Party, as well as a rejection of the current party chairman Klingbeil and the Minister of Defense Pistorius' policies, but also shows that the "Russia issue" remains a crucial "test stone" for whether Germany is divided or not.

In Germany, "knowing Russia" and "fearing Russia" are two actual phenomena.

"Knowing Russia" is a new term used to describe those who can or try to understand the motives of Russian actions in public discussions - especially in topics involving the Ukraine war. Their typical views are: Putin is demonized by his opponents, these opponents suffer from "anti-Russian phobia"; the West not only rudely rejected the hand of cooperation extended by Yeltsin and Putin, but also tried to "suppress" and isolate Russia; the West did not dialogue with Russia in an equal manner; NATO expansion is a "breach of trust" by the West; Russia is surrounded by military forces; Western policies increase the risk of "uncontrolled new East-West conflict," possibly leading to "the third and final world war"; the West should return to the 1970s' Ostpolitik and easing policies; the West should give up "value imperialism"; the West should "urge Ukraine to be restrained," etc.

Notably, this label is usually derogatory in Germany, implying that these people ignore Ukraine's legitimate interests, thereby indirectly supporting Moscow's authoritarian government and its aggressive actions. Among German parties, the Left Party, the Sara Wagenknecht Alliance, and the Options Party are considered "pro-Russia" factions, with representatives being the leaders of the latter two parties, Wagenknecht and Wiedel.

The Cossacks ravaging Poland: The Russian suppression of the 1830 Warsaw uprising

"Fear of Russia" is a long-standing historical concept in Europe, referring generally to prejudice, fear, rejection, or hatred towards Russian politics, culture, or Russians, which is the Russian version of the "Yellow Peril" theory.

The political maneuvering, social system differences, and military confrontations on the European continent in the 19th century, as well as the Soviet government's rejection of capital and ideological opposition after the "October Revolution," to varying degrees exacerbated the negative impressions of Russia that had already existed in Europe (especially Germany and France). After the Cold War, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had freed themselves from Soviet control transformed their previous "fear of Russia" experiences into "hatred of Russia," becoming a vanguard force in the Western camp against Russia.

The tragic persecution of Germans in Russia, plus the occupation and division of Germany by the Soviet Union after World War II, and the war in Ukraine burning again to their doorstep, are the fundamental reasons for the enduring "fear of Russia" sentiment among the German people. In this context, the divide between "knowing Russia" and "fearing Russia" in German society becomes increasingly irreconcilable.

Overall, "knowing Russia" is a minority in Germany, although it occasionally speaks out, it is marginalized; "fearing Russia" and "hating Russia" obviously have more social foundations. During the Ukraine war, the German government's stance towards Moscow has become increasingly firm, even when Trump wavered, it still insisted on supporting Ukraine.

Today, with the development of information and the rapid spread of communication, all of this naturally feeds back to Russia, and it is not surprising that Russians view Germany as their "main enemy."

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