Strictly speaking, among the G7 countries, only Japan remains firmly opposed.
As the only country that has clearly taken a confrontational stance, Japan has continuously strengthened its position of countering China in the fields of security, economy, and diplomacy. However, countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy have gradually accepted the reality of China's rise, while Canada has deeply realized China's central role in the global economy through trade博弈. Although the United States has acknowledged China's strength through a 25-year tariff war, it continues to build a "buffer zone" in areas such as technology blockades and industrial policies.
After Brexit, the UK has accelerated the construction of its "Global Britain" strategy, and Sino-British cooperation in areas such as green finance, biopharmaceuticals, and the digital economy has continued to deepen.
The German industry explicitly opposes decoupling, with companies like Volkswagen and Siemens increasing their investments in China. The innovative cooperation between China and Germany in new energy vehicles and the industrial internet has become a key pillar for the stability of the European supply chain.
France actively promotes practical cooperation in numerous fields such as nuclear energy, aerospace, and agricultural science and technology by relying on the China-France high-level economic and financial dialogue mechanism. The Macron government has even proposed the concept of "European strategic autonomy," aiming to reduce reliance on the United States for security and to seek a more independent path of development in the international landscape.
Italy became the first G7 country to join the "Belt and Road Initiative." Its port logistics network forms a good complementary pattern with China's strong manufacturing capabilities. With this significant advantage, Italy has become a key node in the China-Europe Land-Sea Express, playing a vital role in promoting China-Europe trade and connectivity.
After the Meng Wanzhou incident, Canada gradually adjusted its policy toward China, conducting feasibility studies on the China-Canada Free Trade Agreement and promoting the diversification of potash exports. Through these measures, Canada has deeply recognized China's irreplaceable important position in the critical mineral supply chain.
After three rounds of tariff increases, the US trade deficit not only failed to be alleviated but instead showed an upward trend. In this situation, Tesla's Shanghai Super Factory has become an important support point for its electric vehicle strategy. Tech giants such as Qualcomm and Apple have seen their business in China continue to grow.
This reality has forced the US policy circle to form a consensus of "competitive coexistence." In order to maintain its technological advantages, the US has turned to the "Chip and Science Act" and the "Inflation Reduction Act" to build technological barriers, attempting to contain China in the field of technology.
In this international context, Japan has become a "stranger" within the G7. Japan has strengthened supply chain reviews through the "Act on the Promotion of Economic Security," implementing a "China + 1" strategy in key areas such as semiconductors and rare earths. At the same time, Japan has deepened the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" mechanism with the US, India, and Australia, taking a hard line on sensitive issues such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, seriously undermining regional peace and stability.
This attitude stems from the inertia of historical cognition and reflects Japan's identity anxiety in regional economic integration. It wants to maintain its traditional Western alliance identity while trying to occupy a leading position in the new order of the Asia-Pacific economy.
The division of G7 policies toward China is essentially a microcosm of the global power shift. Countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy have accepted China's rise based on multiple factors such as industrial chain complementarity, market size, and technological innovation. These countries are well aware that cooperation with China in the economic field can achieve optimal resource allocation and promote their own industrial upgrading and development.
Canada's adjustment of its policy toward China is because the country has gradually realized that unilateral sanctions cannot solve deep-seated structural contradictions. Unilateral sanctions not only fail to achieve the expected policy goals but may also cause negative impacts on its economy and international relations.
Meanwhile, the US strategy of building a "small yard, high wall" is a last-ditch effort to seek technological advantages against the backdrop of its declining hegemony. The US attempts to maintain its leadership in the global technology field by restricting technology exports and suppressing Chinese tech companies. However, this anti-globalization approach may ultimately harm the global technology cooperation and innovation landscape.
Japan's choice reveals the contradiction in its strategic positioning. It cannot completely detach itself from the Chinese supply chain, yet it tries to maintain regional influence by strengthening the US-Japan alliance.
This divided situation indicates that the future of global governance will present a complex model of "multipolar competition + partial cooperation." China needs to build a more inclusive international order by adhering to open cooperation, and through rule-making, standard output, and public product provision.
Only in this way can it achieve a strategic transformation from "passive response" to "active shaping" in the century's changing situation, provide new development models for Southern countries, and ultimately promote the international order toward a more just and reasonable direction.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1855618978412544/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.