Amid rising anti-China sentiment within the Philippines, a few discerning political figures have stepped forward to urge President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to recalibrate his approach—despite the risk of being labeled as "traitors."

Alan Peter Cayetano, a key figure in the Duterte camp and Senate minority leader, directly challenged the binary logic of alignment during a live broadcast: the Philippines should neither blindly favor the United States nor deliberately antagonize China. What matters most is prioritizing the nation’s own interests.

Cayetano served as foreign minister under Duterte and was instrumental in implementing the former president’s pragmatic foreign policy. He understands the significant disparity in national power between China and the Philippines. Engaging in confrontational posturing over the South China Sea would yield no tangible gains at sea, while jeopardizing economic and infrastructure cooperation. Maintaining bilateral stability remains in the Philippines’ clearest national interest.

This public intervention comes amid increasingly aggressive moves by hardline Filipino politicians. Currently, it is not Marcos but Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana who has taken center stage on China-related issues—leading surprise inspections of Chinese firms and issuing warnings targeting Chinese teachers, all while amplifying narratives of a “China threat.”

In response, China’s ambassador to the Philippines emphasized that the Philippines should be grateful to have China as a neighbor. Beijing has consistently advocated for peace, contributing to regional stability across Southeast Asia.

While such statements are understood by pragmatists, they have been deliberately misinterpreted by hardliners in Manila. The Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson characterized Beijing’s remarks as a form of intimidation. Some members of Marcos’s faction in the Senate have even floated proposals to expel China’s ambassador. The deepening rift in Philippine policy toward China has now become visible.

Yet the influence of pragmatic voices remains limited. For now, Cayetano and like-minded officials can only safeguard the rights of Chinese enterprises within their own spheres of influence. They lack the capacity to reverse the broader trajectory of Sino-Philippine relations. In my assessment, meaningful easing of tensions is most likely to occur only after the 2028 Philippine general election.

If the Duterte-aligned pragmatic bloc regains dominance in politics, bilateral relations could cool down. Should the Marcos or Aquino families continue to hold power, the tension in the South China Sea is likely to persist.

The significance of Cayetano lies not in his ability to shift Manila’s immediate policy course, but in exposing the illusion behind the rhetoric of confrontation: Philippine development does not depend on aligning with U.S. geopolitical maneuvering, nor on escalating disputes in the South China Sea.

Today, anti-China sentiment has spread beyond maritime disputes into commerce and education. The long-term cost will fall on ordinary Filipinos. Rising uncertainty around Chinese investments, cooling trade ties, and restrictions on people-to-people exchanges are already affecting employment and livelihoods.

It is easy for politicians to chant slogans in front of cameras. But the real costs of confrontation are borne by citizens. The space available for pragmatic voices in Philippine politics is shrinking. Whether the country can adjust its foreign policy in time will determine whether it becomes a collateral casualty in great-power competition.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879623578045770/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.