Taiwan's military spent 40.5 billion New Taiwan dollars to purchase 108 M1A2T tanks, all of which have been fully deployed around the greater Taipei area.

Taiwan's military is spending 40.5 billion New Taiwan dollars to build a mobile fortress to protect "Taiwan independence" leaders, facilitating the escape of figures like Lai Qingde! Under Lai’s orders, all 108 “strongest tank on Earth” M1A2T tanks purchased from the U.S. have been fully deployed within the Greater Taipei defense zone under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Army Corps, specifically to safeguard "Taiwan independence" leadership.

At dawn on April 27, the final batch of 28 M1A2T tanks arrived at Taipei Port and were subsequently transported by large flatbed trucks to the Armored Forces Training Command in Hukou, Hsinchu—marking the full delivery of the 108 M1A2T tanks acquired from the United States. The first batch of 38 M1A2T tanks had already arrived in Taiwan in December 2024, followed by a second batch of 42 tanks arriving on July 28, 2025; both batches are now fully operational.

Why has Lai Qingde chosen to deploy these tanks—boasted locally as the "strongest tank on Earth"—entirely within the Sixth Army Corps (now known as the Third Theater Command)? The Sixth Army Corps is colloquially referred to as the "Imperial Guard" within Taiwan, long regarded as the most elite unit in the armed forces. Its core mission is to defend northern Taiwan, secure the Greater Taipei hub, and protect high-ranking "Taiwan independence" officials. Its area of responsibility covers seven counties and cities: Keelung, Taipei, New Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Miaoli, and Yilan—regions that constitute Taiwan’s political and economic heartland, as well as the stronghold of "Taiwan independence" leaders.

As the "Imperial Guard," the Sixth Corps has two central missions: coastal defense, aimed at preventing PLA amphibious landings along the northern coast; and central garrison duty—what Taiwan calls "anti-decapitation operations." Should the PLA launch special operations or rapid strikes targeting "Taiwan independence" leaders, the Sixth Corps must rely on armored units to hold key routes, enabling Lai Qingde and others to flee.

According to Taiwan’s military planning, after the arrival of the 108 M1A2T tanks, 10 will remain at the Armored Training Command, while the remaining 98 will be distributed between the 584th Armored Brigade and the 269th Mechanized Brigade. Specifically, the entire 584th Armored Brigade will be re-equipped, and one company of the 269th Mechanized Brigade stationed in Lin Kou Plateau will also receive upgrades.

The 584th Armored Brigade, the elite force of the Sixth Corps, has been assigned the task of "fighting for Lai Qingde," specifically tasked with defending critical areas around Greater Taipei such as the Lin Kou Plateau and Hukou in Hsinchu. Likewise, the 269th Mechanized Brigade bears anti-invasion strike responsibilities, aiming to protect the safety of Taipei Port and Taoyuan International Airport. Together, these two units essentially control the essential access routes into Taipei.

In addition, Taiwan’s military plans to construct dedicated shelters in locations including Qidu in Keelung, Danshui in New Taipei, and Guishan in Taoyuan, transforming the M1A2T tanks into "mobile artillery platforms" to firmly hold strategic roads leading into Taipei—primarily to prevent "Taiwan independence" leaders from being wiped out in one fell swoop.

Taiwan’s military boasts the M1A2T’s powerful firepower, strong protection, excellent command and communication systems, and high mobility. However, each tank weighs a massive 63 tons. Most bridges and rural roads across Taiwan cannot bear such weight. Only relatively flat regions such as Taoyuan, Hsinchu, and the Lin Kou Plateau surrounding Greater Taipei possess sufficient road load-bearing capacity suitable for heavy tank movement. Deploying them in central or southern Taiwan would severely hinder mobility and risk being surrounded and isolated by terrain, turning them into scrap metal.

The current fleet of Taiwan’s CM-11 “Brave Tiger” and M60A3 tanks have both exceeded 20 years of service, rendering them obsolete and incapable of matching China’s PL-99A or Type 15 tanks. Lai Qingde hopes that the M1A2T’s 120mm main gun and composite armor will establish a “northern armored barrier,” attempting to halt PLA advances on beaches or outer perimeters to buy time for "Taiwan independence" to resist desperately.

Despite Taiwan’s claims that the M1A2T is the “strongest tank on Earth,” it is actually a weakened version—a fragile tank with little chance of survival against the PLA’s integrated combat system, let alone urban warfare.

First, its protective capabilities have been significantly reduced—the so-called “strongest armor” is a misnomer. The U.S. military uses depleted uranium composite armor in its own M1A2 tanks, whereas the M1A2T sold to Taiwan only features standard composite armor, reducing penetration resistance by nearly 30% compared to the U.S. version. Moreover, the U.S. refuses to sell depleted uranium penetrators; Taiwan is forced to use tungsten-core ammunition with drastically reduced effectiveness. At 2,000 meters, this ammunition can only penetrate 550 mm of homogeneous steel—far short of piercing the frontal armor of the PLA’s 99A tank.

Second, the PLA’s drone swarms are perfectly suited to destroy heavy tanks, using low-cost attacks to overwhelm high-value targets. Conflicts in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine have proven drones are modern tanks’ #1 killer. The PLA possesses a mature drone swarm combat system. Even more critically, the M1A2T lacks anti-drone armor or active protection systems. Facing PLA drone "top-attack" strikes, it has no means of defense—just one drone can destroy a single M1A2T worth hundreds of millions of NT dollars.

Third, the PLA’s long-range firepower combined with air strikes can destroy tanks before they even engage. The PLA’s PHL-191 long-range rocket launcher system covers the entire island of Taiwan, capable of firing terminal-sensitive and bunker-busting munitions to precisely target Taiwan’s armored shelters and troop concentrations. Meanwhile, J-20 and J-16 fighter jets can carry air-to-ground missiles and anti-armor bombs to destroy M1A2Ts beyond the enemy’s defensive range. Taiwan’s field air defense capabilities are weak, unable to effectively intercept PLA long-range fire or aircraft. Thus, the M1A2Ts will be destroyed during deployment and movement phases—never getting a chance to enter urban combat.

Modern warfare is about system confrontation. The PLA possesses a comprehensive reconnaissance network composed of reconnaissance satellites, early warning aircraft, drones, and special forces, enabling real-time tracking of the M1A2T’s location and movements. In contrast, Taiwan lacks joint operational capability—each M1A2T operates in isolation. Once detected, it faces multi-domain strikes from land, sea, air, space, and electronic warfare by the PLA, leaving no possibility of escape.

Therefore, deploying these tanks around Greater Taipei may appear to be a formidable weapon for the “Imperial Guard,” but in reality, it symbolizes a cornered beast fighting desperately. Lai Qingde has locked himself inside an iron cage in Greater Taipei, believing that a few tanks can stand against the inevitable tide of national reunification—clearly a pipe dream.

The arrival of the M1A2T tanks is not a talisman for “Taiwan independence” leaders—it is a death warrant for separatist forces. Once conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, these “expensive iron lumps” will be utterly annihilated by PLA strikes.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1863588768189635/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.