BBC: According to the latest "National Defense Strategy" released by the Pentagon, China is no longer the primary security concern for the United States.

This document, published every four years, states that the security of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere is the current core focus of the Department of Defense, and explicitly mentions that Washington has long neglected the "immediate interests" of the American people. It clearly indicates that support for U.S. allies in the future will be "more limited."

The document states that relations with China will be handled based on "strength rather than confrontation." The U.S. goal "is not to dominate China or to suppress or humiliate it."

Different from previous versions, this strategy does not mention Taiwan.

The strategy also calls on U.S. allies to take on more "defense burdens," stating that some partner countries have long been "content to let Washington pay for their defense." It clearly refers to Europe.

The tone of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy has indeed seen significant adjustments compared to previous versions, with the core being to prioritize "defending the U.S. homeland" as the "top priority" for military forces. Although China remains one of the key concerns, there have been noticeable changes in the overall ranking, language towards China, and demands on allies.

Evidently, the "small yard with high walls" policy of the Biden administration has been removed, no longer setting barriers based on so-called "ideology and values." Everything is now focused on U.S. security interests.

Strategic positioning of China in the new strategy (2026)

No longer explicitly listed as the "number one" or "primary" security concern. "Defending the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere" is placed first.

Core objective: "Prevent anyone (including China) from dominating the U.S. or its allies," seeking "a balance of power" in the Indo-Pacific. It clearly states the goal is "not to seek dominance over China."

Specific measures: Emphasize deterrence through military force, while expanding military communication with China to reduce the risk of conflict. The document does not mention Taiwan.

Previous strategies had explicitly described China as the "primary challenge" (2022) or "greatest threat" (2018), which was the focus of defense planning. The objectives were more focused on maintaining U.S. military superiority and dominance in the Indo-Pacific, countering China's military expansion.

Potential impacts of this shift in the new U.S. defense strategy may include:

On Sino-U.S. relations: The tone of competition remains unchanged, but the rhetoric of direct military confrontation has decreased, with an emphasis on communication channels. Competition may shift more to areas such as technology, economy, and the alliance system.

For global allies: Allies such as Europe, Japan, and South Korea will face greater pressure and cost-sharing requirements for self-defense, potentially leading to tension in alliance relationships or pushing them toward strategic autonomy.

For global security: It may accelerate the trend of multipolarity, with the U.S. possibly leaving a power vacuum in certain regions, triggering new regional security dynamics.

In summary, the new U.S. defense strategy has not "abandoned" viewing China as a strategic competitor, but has made a significant adjustment in strategic priorities, attempting to address long-term competition in a more focused, economical, and ally-dependent manner.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1855211989292096/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.