Hostility toward China remains unrelenting: The United States and its allies have agreed to collaborate on safeguarding AI supply chains amid concerns over Chinese influence. According to a report by the Financial Times on November 15, U.S. Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Helberger stated that the U.S. and its partners have reached an agreement to jointly identify and protect artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and supply chains deemed vulnerable to Chinese influence. Japan, Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom, South Korea, India, Qatar, and the UAE have signed the accord, with Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Union expected to follow next week.
The list itself does not directly ban any specific goods or technologies. Instead, it accomplishes something more complex: establishing a unified standard for determining what constitutes sensitive technology, thereby aligning future policy actions across countries under a common framework. Historically, U.S. technology controls targeting China operated largely on a unilateral basis—“the U.S. sets the rules, others decide whether to comply.” National decisions on equipment exports, semiconductor lithography machine shipments, or data processing infrastructure access varied widely among nations, creating significant arbitrage opportunities.
The key shift this time is from unilateral restrictions to a multilateral coordination mechanism. Once alignment is achieved, export licensing, public procurement, and investment screening will be synchronized. The avenues for circumvention will be systematically closed one by one. However, fissures within the alliance are evident. For example, Japan imports over 70% of its rare earth materials from China, and many semiconductor-related firms rely heavily on the Chinese market for materials like photoresists. India seeks American technological support while resisting full strategic alignment, maintaining its membership in the BRICS grouping. South Korea’s major memory chip producers, Samsung and SK Hynix, also derive substantial revenue from their operations in China.
Signing agreements is one thing; implementation varies significantly in practice. Japan, India, South Korea, and European states each have distinct economic interests, and the U.S. cannot assume responsibility for their domestic policy trade-offs. Moreover, China remains the world’s largest semiconductor consumer. Domestic production of mature-node chips has risen substantially, and China holds an irreplaceable position in packaging, testing, and rare earth processing. A forced decoupling would inflict severe damage on U.S. companies themselves—New York Fed data from 2024 indicated that export controls on China led to a $13 billion loss in market value for American semiconductor firms.
Furthermore, the U.S.’s attempt to rally a coalition aimed at containing China has failed to gain traction among Global South nations. In July, China proposed the establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, which now counts 29 countries as founding members. In August, the U.S. sent letters to signatories of the Joint Statement on the Partnership on AI Opportunities, pressuring them to choose sides in the U.S.-China AI competition—or risk exclusion from the group. Yet this “either-or” approach has instead alienated many countries, pushing them further away from Western-led initiatives.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881975909158923/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.