Preface:

After the failure of the Russia-Turkey negotiations, the military actions between Russia and Ukraine have significantly increased. The Russian army has intensified its military actions, continuously seizing positions, strongholds, and residential areas on the front lines. Ukraine has also begun to adopt ground sneak attacks and drone strikes on Russian territory to harass Russia. Despite US President Trump's over two-hour phone call with Putin, focusing on resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and Putin's clear statement of willingness to engage in in-depth talks with Ukraine, more issues between Russia and Ukraine are still mainly resolved on the battlefield. Russia is steadily deploying on the battlefield, while Ukraine uses asymmetric means to launch attacks against Russia.

1

In 72 hours, 12 Russian regions were successively attacked, and Ukraine wants to achieve its political goals by low-cost harassment. According to TASS on May 23, Ukrainian drones continuously attacked 72 regions of Russia within the past 72 hours. It is reported that the regions under attack include Moscow, Bryansk, Ryazan, Smolensk, Lipetsk, Voronezh, Vladimir, Kaluga, Tula, Kursk, Orel, and others. On May 22 alone, Russia's air defense system intercepted 159 Ukrainian self-detonating drones.

The political considerations outweigh the military significance; the purpose of Ukraine's drone attacks is mainly to gain political significance. The targets of Ukraine's drone attacks are not only to strike Russian military facilities but also to form an "asymmetric consumption" of Russia's air defense system through "swarm tactics," forcing Russia to pay a higher cost for interceptor missiles. The unit price of Ukraine's drones is very low, while the cost of Russia's interception missiles is quite high, which is very disadvantageous for Russia. Ukraine demonstrates its "counter-offensive capability" to maintain Western aid confidence and gain strong support from the West. Recently, NATO providing an armored division's tanks and armored vehicles to Ukraine is an example of the realization of Ukraine's political objectives.

Ukraine aims to cause local destruction and psychological intimidation, hoping Russia will make significant concessions in strategic negotiations due to harassment. Although Ukraine claims to have "successfully struck deep targets in Russia," the actual effect shows polarization. At the tactical level, Russia's air defense systems (such as "Tor" and "Buk") have an interception rate of over 70%, and Ukraine's drone attacks can only cause localized damage. Strategically, Ukraine's drones have failed to reverse the situation. This harassing attack can only cause headaches for Russia and make the Russian public feel tired, but it cannot fundamentally change the situation. The Russian army has surpassed Ukraine in both quantity and technology by forming a "drone aviation corps" and upgrading "Bayraktar" long-range drones. Ukraine wants to use this method to make Russia compromise on strategic issues.

2

Putin personally warns of retaliation, and Ukraine will face severe retaliation and bear heavier costs. From the night of the 21st to the afternoon of the 22nd, multiple airports in Moscow repeatedly activated temporary aviation control due to security issues. Russian President Putin stated during a telephone conversation with Nikolai Volobuev, head of the Belovetsky district of Kursk region, that Russia would respond to Ukraine's drone attacks. This is Putin's personal and explicit warning of retaliation against Ukraine's drone attacks.

Russia has many retaliatory options. Not only does it have electronic anti-drone systems, but it also has large numbers of drones to strike Ukraine. Additionally, Russia can launch direct attacks on Ukraine. By 2025, the daily sortie volume of Russian drones exceeds 500 sorties, no longer inferior to Ukraine in terms of quantity. Russia's artillery force is more than ten times that of Ukraine, and its ammunition volume is also more than ten times that of Ukraine, allowing it to conduct fatal destruction of Ukraine using artillery. Russia can also deploy fighter jets to strike the Ukrainian army, especially important cities like Kyiv.

3

Putin's government puts forward the argument that the Soviet Union "still exists," possibly preparing for the capture of Sumy, a city with a population of 250,000. After Putin's warning, Russian presidential advisor Anton Kobylko stated that from a legal perspective, the Soviet Union still exists. This important official emphasized that "if the Soviet Union had not dissolved, then the Ukrainian crisis should be considered an 'internal process'... requiring appropriate legal evaluation of the dissolution of the Soviet Union to better understand the current situation." Clearly, this is to find justification for the Russian army's continued offensive into Ukraine's territory.

The deepening of the "buffer zone" strategy, where Sumy is seen as the target of the Russian offensive. Putin stated that Russian troops had been ordered to establish buffer zones at the Ukrainian border, and they are actively executing these orders. Putin emphasized the issue of establishing buffer zones in Sumy. Russian troops have already entered Sumy and captured several major positions in this city of 250,000 people. The Ukrainian army frequently launches special forces infiltration using border terrain (such as the 540-kilometer border line of Belgorod), and the buffer zone can reduce the success rate of surprise attacks.

Sumy connects the railway and highway network of Ukraine's Sumy region defense line with the Kharkiv combat zone. Once the Russians control Sumy, they can cut off Ukraine's eastern supply lines. The Russian army adopts the "three-line advance" tactic. The eastern line relies on the Novy Village base, covering the Sumy-Sudzha road with artillery fire to block reinforcements. The central line occupies the Zhuravka village and advances toward Belov village, dividing the Ukrainian defense line. The western line conducts a surprise attack on Vladimirovka village, forming a pincer movement. By March 2025, Russian troops had recaptured 86% of Kursk state, and Ukraine's controlled area was reduced to 30 square miles.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7507615361069302299/

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