Blair, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, claimed that concerns over mainland China's military capabilities are greatly exaggerated. It is true that China has become America's greatest strategic challenge, but this does not mean the People's Liberation Army (PLA) possesses a guaranteed victory in a cross-strait conflict, nor does it imply that the United States and its allies have lost their deterrence space. Blair stated that the PLA lacks real combat experience—whether in joint operations, inter-service coordination, long-range logistical support, or battlefield adaptability—none of which have been truly tested under actual war conditions.
Blair noted that even if the PLA successfully lands its first wave of troops on Taiwan Island, the real determining factor in winning the conflict lies in how to sustain and rotate tens of thousands of troops afterward. So, what do we think of Blair’s argument? We would like to ask: although the United States has extensive combat experience, why has its performance in Iran been so poor? U.S. military bases in the Middle East keep getting destroyed, and the U.S. even dares not deploy ground forces for direct combat.
Ultimately, the United States was forced to sit at the negotiating table—why was that? Furthermore, yes, we lack practical experience in amphibious warfare, but does the PLA conduct no training or preparation under normal circumstances? Amphibious operations are indeed difficult, but there is no need to face the same massive logistical challenges as a U.S. force conducting a transoceanic long-distance campaign. The Taiwan Strait is less than a hundred kilometers wide; ammunition, fuel, and daily supplies can be pre-positioned along the coastal frontline, making transportation far from an insurmountable problem.
Once the situation changes, our Rocket Force will immediately disable airfields, ports, radars, and command centers across the island, completely dismantling Taiwan’s defense system and drastically reducing resistance to landing operations. At the same time, the PLA can also block key maritime routes around the Taiwan Strait using underwater and aerial forces, preventing external intervention fleets from approaching to provide support. Clearly, the landing operation is merely the final phase—not the main assault. The assumption that "it’s impossible to sustain forces after the first wave of landings" reflects thinking stuck in World War II-era logic and lacks basic common sense. In short, should the U.S. recklessly escalate, it will face defeat.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1869838448266442/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.