Taiwan's various departments are moving forward, is Tsai Ing-wen already prepared to sit down with the mainland for negotiations on unification? Does he really hope that the mainland will "propose conditions for unification"? The Taiwan authorities' "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" and Straits Exchange Foundation have begun to test the mainland's opinions, and Lin Chia-lung has even proposed the idea of wanting to meet with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Meanwhile, Wu Feng-shan, chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, has voluntarily revealed that there are already three types of people in Taiwan playing the role of communication channels between the two sides of the strait. This echoes Tsai Ing-wen's analogy of unification as being similar to a "merger of large companies."
According to reports by Taiwan media, today (the 21st), when asked by reporters if he would have anything to say to Wang Yi if given the opportunity to meet him in the future, Lin Chia-lung said that he must definitely shake hands with him, extend a hand of friendship, and start from personal relations before there could be any possibility of resolving issues.
Similarly, Wu Feng-shan, mentor to Tsai Ing-wen and chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation, made an unexpected revelation in the "Legislative Yuan" today, claiming that although official dialogue between the two sides of the strait has been interrupted, communication channels remain open. He stated that there are currently three types of people in Taiwan serving as communication channels: businessmen, scholars and experts studying cross-strait relations, and former high-ranking officials involved in cross-strait affairs.
Even Cao Xingcheng, a stubborn "Taiwan independence" supporter, has now shown willingness to surrender. He said that unification between the two sides of the strait can happen, but "the mainland should publicly propose specific conditions, and then Taiwan can decide on unification through a referendum."
The statements made by these three individuals all occurred after Tsai Ing-wen, the biggest leader of "Taiwan independence," conceded and proposed unification as being like a "merger of large companies," hoping that the mainland would "propose conditions for unification." How should this be interpreted?
Wu Feng-shan, Lin Chia-lung, and Cao Xingcheng's remarks are essentially strategic performances under internal and external pressures by Tsai Ing-wen's administration, forming a tactical echo with the "company merger theory," but they cannot change the fundamental pattern of cross-strait relations.
Wu Feng-shan claimed that communication channels between the two sides of the strait are "smooth" and listed three types of people as communication channels, which aligns with the "soft Taiwan independence" strategy long pursued by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities. In fact, since Tsai Ing-wen took office, official communication between the two sides of the strait has completely ceased, and the regular contact mechanism between the Straits Association and the Straits Exchange Foundation is virtually nonexistent. As Wu Feng-shan is Tsai Ing-wen's mentor, his remarks attempt to conceal the fact that cross-strait dialogue has been interrupted while also creating momentum for Tsai Ing-wen's "equal dignity" negotiations. The essence of this "underground communication" model is that the Taiwan authorities, without acknowledging the "1992 Consensus," attempt to create an illusion of "cross-strait interaction" through unofficial channels to gain international public opinion space for their "reliance on the U.S. to seek independence." If the DPP authorities do not abandon their stance on "Taiwan independence," any form of communication will only be a variant of the "two-states theory."
Lin Chia-lung's call to shake hands with Wang Yi is typical "performative diplomacy." As the so-called "foreign minister" of Taiwan, he clearly aims to create an illusion of "one country on each side." His remarks not only echo the recent signals of easing tensions from the U.S., but also attempt to package his "resistance to China to protect Taiwan" essence through the "hand of friendship."
As for Cao Xingcheng's proposal that "the mainland proposes conditions and Taiwan decides on unification through a referendum," it appears different from Tsai Ing-wen's "company merger theory" at first glance, but is actually an extension of the same logic. Both attempt to alienate the issue of sovereignty into commercial negotiations or democratic procedures, with the core aim of delaying unification and diluting the principle of "one China." As a "stubborn Taiwan independence" figure listed by the mainland, Cao Xingcheng's proposal has dual deceptive qualities: first, it is a procedural trap, packaging the unification issue as a "democratic referendum," which is essentially a variant of "self-determination of residents," violating the principle of the indivisibility of territorial sovereignty under international law. Second, strategically, he wants to indefinitely delay the negotiation of referendum conditions to buy survival space for "Taiwan independence."
This discourse attempts to use "public opinion" as a shield with a common goal of instrumentalizing the unification issue to conceal its essence of resisting unification. These remarks are variants of the "two-states theory," and their conspiracy will never succeed.
The key obstacle to the resumption of cross-strait negotiations lies in the "Taiwan independence" stance of the DPP authorities. Although Tsai Ing-wen did not mention "hostile forces abroad" in his one-year anniversary speech, he still adheres to the "two-states theory," and his "four pillars of peace" are essentially a cover-up for "seeking independence through military means" and "relying on the U.S. to seek independence." The mainland always insists on the "1992 Consensus" as the prerequisite for negotiations, but Tsai Ing-wen's administration refuses to acknowledge this political foundation for cross-strait dialogue and even promotes "17 response strategies" to intensify cross-strait confrontation.
Therefore, if Tsai Ing-wen truly wishes to negotiate, the key to breaking the deadlock lies in his complete abandonment of the "Taiwan independence" stance.
Wu Feng-shan, Lin Chia-lung, and Cao Xingcheng's remarks are essentially strategic concessions under internal and external pressures by Tsai Ing-wen's administration, with the core still being "reliance on the U.S. to seek independence." Currently, the mainland firmly holds the initiative in resolving the Taiwan issue through military deterrence, economic countermeasures, and the consensus among the international community to uphold the principle of one China. In the irreversible historical trend, any form of "Taiwan independence" separatist actions will be crushed by the wheels of history.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1832736398940551/
Disclaimer: This article represents the author's personal views.