[By GuanchaNet Columnist General Eugene]
Since November 2024, the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has lasted for nearly half a year. In January 2025, the US, China, and Russia jointly pressured Rwanda to cease fire at the United Nations, and in February, the African Union also began to pressure and coordinate troop deployment.
Until March 19, a Wall Street Journal report revealed that DRC President Felix Tshisekedi had written to U.S. President Trump last month, hoping to sign a security agreement with the United States. Tshisekedi proposed in his letter that if the U.S. could help the DRC defeat the anti-government armed group "M23 Movement," he would be willing to provide the U.S. with critical mineral resources. This letter seems to have an intention of relying on selling national interests to exchange for territorial integrity, which is well matched with the contemporary U.S.-Ukraine mining agreement.
However, to this day, the U.S. government has not responded to this clearly profitable request. The situation in Central Africa seems to be continuously moving toward instability and appears to be worsening.
So, what has caused the chaos in the DRC, and what are the entangled interests of all parties?
Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi Video Screenshot
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and Non-Interference in Internal Affairs - the Reverse Side
In current diplomatic exchanges between foreign officials, the two most commonly used phrases are "respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country" and "non-interference in internal affairs." To us Chinese, these words are undoubtedly fair and upright, consistent with the principles we uphold in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. However, for many third-world countries that are not as fortunate as us, these phrases are somewhat similar to the condescending clichés of white supremacy, mere formalities.
This phrase acknowledges so-called national territories based on the United Nations Charter, which were redefined as power zones when the anti-fascist war was victorious in 1945. At that time, most of the world's countries or regions were still colonies or semi-colonies of the great powers. It wasn't until the 1950s that, with the rise of various national liberation movements around the world, some of the oppressed managed to reclaim their freedom from white colonialists. However, the new independent nations and territories recognized by the international community remain fundamentally Western colonial-era provinces, and even the ethnic divisions above them are not derived from cultural heritage and objective facts but solely rely on the guns and preferences of the colonizers. This is why the borders of most African countries today still resemble those drawn by the great powers when they divided the land among themselves.
But unchanging national boundaries do not mean there are no conflicts between countries or within them. These newly independent nations inherit not only the colonial-era territories but also, to some extent, the "divide and rule" policies of the internal colonizers—intentionally divided ethnic groups and artificially created ethnic conflicts.
As these nations stumbled through development over the past half-century, some gradually healed internal and external divisions, and some enlightened individuals even began to promote cross-border and ethnic unity. But other nations that did not develop well faced the continuous accumulation of存量 problems and the escalation of contradictions. Conflicts arising from ethnic issues and territorial sovereignty naturally became frequent occurrences. The current conflict between Rwanda and the DRC is a concrete manifestation of this issue.
Congolese soldiers deployed outside Goma, Al Jazeera
Ethnicity and the Sword - Past Grievances
The Tutsi and Hutu are two ethnic groups artificially manufactured by Belgian colonialists in Belgian Congo and incited to view each other as enemies. Pre-existing ethnic hatred forms the foundation of identity politics in Central Africa. Under such large-scale ethnic divisions, numerous tribes under each ethnicity and their layered conflicts resemble a wooden tower built with countless chopsticks, where pulling one can trigger a chain reaction.
On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying then Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down, and Hutu extremists blamed the Tutsi, using this as a pretext to launch a comprehensive massacre against the Tutsi. Within just three months, Hutu militia, trained and armed by France, slaughtered nearly a million Tutsis in this country of eight million people. With the support of French-provided command systems, their killing efficiency far exceeded that of Nazi Germany and Japanese militarists during World War II.
Armed personnel from neighboring countries also entered Rwanda to loot. During this period, both the Western world and African countries ignored the situation. On the fourth day of the massacre, when tens of thousands of bodies lay exposed in the wild, the UN Security Council merely decided to retain 260 peacekeepers in Rwanda symbolically, whose duties were simply to mediate a ceasefire or prevent the Tutsi massacres at contact lines.
At the 2004 UN hearing on the Rwandan genocide, it was confirmed that three weeks before the massacre began, a UN informant had sent a crucial message to General Dallaire, commander of the Rwandan peacekeeping force: Hutu militias were receiving organized genocidal training from a European country, and related attacks were likely to begin after the president returned home. However, the UN consistently demanded that the Tutsi strictly adhere to the so-called Arusha Peace Agreement and refrain from armed resistance, threatening to take action otherwise.
Many third-world countries or traditional "Southern countries" also turned a blind eye to the continued killings under the banner of "non-interference in internal affairs," with some diplomats even suspected of attending celebratory banquets held by the Hutu government.
It wasn't until nearly a month into the Rwandan genocide, when tens of thousands of corpses blocked rivers, that the UN and African countries decided to increase the number of UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda to 5,500 and began coordinating with neighboring countries to seal borders and control losses.
Even so, the killings continued. UN pressure did not stop the Hutu government from halting its slaughter of its own citizens (this is largely consistent with the UN's actions regarding the current Israeli-Palestinian issue), and even humanitarian supplies delivered to local governments by the UN were used as tools to lure and kill Tutsis. It wasn't until July 1994, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front, mainly composed of Tutsis, and Uganda's army counterattacked into the capital Kigali, overthrowing the Hutu government, that this horrifying massacre finally stopped.
July 1994, Rwandan children who lost their parents in a refugee camp in Goma; the occurrence of the Rwandan genocide is often seen as a major failure of the UN's work. UN Photo/John Isaac
This does not mean that the perpetrators received due justice. Although the eight main instigators were punished to varying degrees, the main executors and their families—about 2 million Hutus—safely reached neighboring countries under French protection, perfectly avoiding trial and justice. Some even obtained relief supplies from the UN as "Rwandan genocide survivors," and some military and political figures became honored guests in neighboring countries by virtue of their ruthless killings and plundered wealth from victims' homes.
The weak Rwandan government was powerless against this. Later, thanks to international opportunities, Kagame's reconciliation policies, and the hard work of the entire population, Rwanda—a country that had lost over 30% of its population to death or flight—recovered from the war's wounds in just a few decades and rapidly rose to become a regional economic powerhouse.
However, long-term restraint has led to a highly distorted civilian consciousness in Rwanda: on the one hand, they have reconciled domestic ethnic rifts and decided to wipe out old grudges and move forward together; on the other hand, they neither trust the UN, the African Union, extraregional powers, nor neighboring countries, nor believe that problems can be solved by means other than their own hard power. As a result, the increasingly weakened DRC, which once took advantage of the chaos and sheltered the perpetrators of the Hutu massacres, naturally became their primary target of hatred.
The Problems in the DRC
Different from the determination shown by Rwanda after experiencing the genocide, the DRC's development over the past three decades can only be described as erratic.
Just three years after the Rwandan genocide in 1997, Laurent Desire Kabila overthrew the Mobutu regime and proclaimed himself president. While Kabila might be skilled in military tactics, his political reforms were chaotic, and his economic policies unrealistic. As a result, the DRC fell back into turmoil.
To unite the people, the government needed to create enemies. Whether it was the deposed tyrant or the newly rising president, this was no exception. With French government support and subsidies, both Mobutu and Kabila allowed exiled politicians to reorganize the former Rwandan Hutu army into the so-called "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda" (FDLR), supporting their attacks on Rwanda and even absorbing some capable fighters into their own armies.
In the following years, the FDLR continuously attacked Rwandan outposts, massacring border villages, turning many villages into no-go zones. To prevent the war from further harming their homeland, Rwanda also began dispatching reconnaissance teams and guerrillas into the jungles of the DRC to strike at the FDLR's command system and execute the instigators of the massacres. They even deployed battalion-level combat groups to establish a safety zone beyond their own borders. This was known as the "First Congo War."
Two Rwandan armies fighting on the DRC's soil, with one operating under the protection of the DRC president, naturally aroused dissatisfaction among other ethnic groups, particularly the Tutsi. However, the "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda" not only failed to rein in their actions but also looted and pillaged in eastern DRC, with atrocities similar to those in Rwanda seemingly about to repeat. Unable to bear it any longer, the Tutsi and other ethnic groups launched an armed rebellion. Kabila then claimed that the Tutsi in his army and government were attempting to overthrow his government with the funding and support of Rwanda and Uganda, ultimately leading to civil war. Consequently, Tutsi and other tribal soldiers in the army broke away, forming several armed groups to resist the government, and established the "Congolese National Congress for Democracy" (CNDP) in 2004.
Realizing they couldn't win, Kabila had no choice but to request intervention from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and other countries. In 1999, he sought help from the UN, which paid much more attention to this incident than it did to the Rwandan genocide. A rapid peacekeeping mission was soon formed and arrived locally for armed intervention, with news of peacekeepers being involved in local conflicts frequently appearing in the media.
Afterward, despite multiple expressions of intent to cease fire and numerous agreements signed, the conflict never ceased, and the local economy and political situation continued to deteriorate. This made the DRC government increasingly dependent on the French, who could only tolerate the misconduct of Hutu armed groups on their soil.
Unlike other impoverished African countries, the DRC has extremely rich mineral reserves, earning it the nickname "World's Raw Material Warehouse," and it was once the second-largest copper producer globally, with its cobalt reserves accounting for 50% of the world total. However, most of these mineral deposits and transport hubs are located in the east, where rebel groups and Rwandan guerrillas are active.
In fact, at that time, due to Rwanda's economy not yet recovering, the funds for guerrilla areas and buffer zones were actually self-sufficient through exporting minerals. By 2008, there were over 40 anti-government factions in the DRC, with continuous warfare eroding the DRC's economy and potential, and destroying the DRC's national identity.
In 2008, Joseph Kabila, the son of the former president and then-current president, gradually realized the key issues and began proposing reconciliation negotiations with various factions represented by the CNDP. On March 23, 2009, both sides signed a ceasefire agreement, and the CNDP became a political party in the DRC. However, some Tutsi whose hometowns had been massacred refused to accept this outcome. Radical factions believed that before the colonial era, the area was not part of the so-called "Congo," and everyone should establish an independent Tutsi state to forever avoid another Hutu massacre. They viewed the day the peace treaty was signed as the day the rebel leadership betrayed the nation and named their armed faction accordingly—M23.
M23 gained considerable support in low-income areas. In 2012, M23 occupied the provincial capital of North Kivu Province, Goma, driving out most of the exiled Hutu (this city absorbed tens of thousands of refugees after the Rwandan genocide). The DRC army, with the help of UN troops and mercenaries, recaptured the city in February 2013. Subsequently, with the support and mediation of 11 African countries (including Rwanda), M23 disarmed and dissolved by the end of November that year. This landmark event was considered a significant achievement of former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
"M23 Movement" soldiers in the DRC, Al Jazeera
Development Solves Not All Problems
With the easing of the situation in the DRC, developing its mineral resources gradually became feasible. However, the local security environment and the retreat of globalization under the backdrop of the subprime crisis deterred governments and large enterprises from showing interest in developing the region. Only China actively extended an olive branch to the DRC.
In the more than ten years since, Chinese mining, railway, and construction companies established mines, smelting centers, and infrastructure in the region, enabling the DRC's mineral products and those of surrounding countries to be exported via local routes to ports in Tanzania and Sudan, creating over 100,000 jobs.
However, development and solving problems are two different things. Despite the expansion of the DRC's finances and the improvement of local employees' lives through Chinese investment, and the successful stabilization of the local economy, these economic achievements have not benefited everyone due to issues like a single industrial structure, government corruption, and ethnic tensions.
After the presidential election in the DRC in 2023, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. The DRC's GDP growth rate slowed significantly, and per capita GDP even declined, with the domestic wealth gap widening and inflation soaring. The public grew dissatisfied with the government, and some small armed factions and gangs re-emerged, attacking and plundering along roads and other infrastructure. Some pro-Western politicians began to make hay, blaming foreign enterprises for taking away most of the profits from local mineral resources, with the矛head directly targeting Chinese enterprises.
Perhaps the West noticed these signs, or perhaps they actively shaped this perception. When Western control over Mali and Burkina Faso was dissolved by local military governments and Wagner, the DRC had become the last colony in Africa where France could maintain some degree of control. They had long been dissatisfied with Chinese enterprises operating there. In the summer of 2022, outgoing U.S. President Biden visited Angola near the end of his term, toured the Angolan National Slave Museum, Lobito Port Terminal, and Carinho Food Processing Plant, and solemnly launched the "Lobito Corridor" project to promote key mineral transportation.
According to the U.S., this corridor will effectively curb China's "One Belt, One Road" strategy in Africa, channeling DRC metal exports under American control. In October 2023, the U.S., EU, Angola, DRC, Zambia, the African Development Bank, and the African Finance Corporation signed a seven-party memorandum of understanding to support the development of the "Lobito Corridor" and the new Zambia-Lobito railway line. The U.S. announced a $1 billion investment in areas like the "Lobito Corridor," and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation generously provided a $550 million loan.
However, this plan has obvious flaws: most of Angola's infrastructure and port facilities were invested in and constructed by Chinese enterprises. This means that even if the plan is successfully implemented, a significant portion of the transportation revenue at the Angolan end will fall into the hands of Chinese enterprises. Regarding the violent seizure of these benefits—if in peacetime, the U.S. and China might share the profits along this trade route in different proportions, but if conflicts occur, with American and other old colonial forces withdrawing from Africa in large numbers, neither the U.S. nor China can quickly respond to emergencies.
The true purpose of this plan may be to take advantage of the chaotic situation following the 2023 DRC presidential election to assist anti-Chinese forces in the DRC and Angola, thereby weakening China's influence in Africa and destroying or annexing local Chinese enterprises through improper means, or using it as a tool for political blackmail to bargain with China or Chinese enterprises. At this stage, this strategy has indeed achieved some success, with pro-American factions stabilizing their footing in the DRC government in 2023 and 2024.
Some Tutsi within the country also believe that without mining, the Tutsi-led Rwanda has developed so well. If the region they inhabit could secede from the DRC and join Rwanda, the problem of wealth disparity might be alleviated, and the poor economy would improve. These situations have made the political inclinations of the locals increasingly radical, leading to the revival of the M23 organization in 2022.
As of local time March 19, "M23" movement controlled areas in the eastern provinces of the DRC. AFP
Quagmire, Chaos, and Reflections
Unlike their previous lone efforts, after disarming in 2013, M23 leaders maintained close contact with high-ranking Rwandan officials, essentially transforming from a native rebel force in the DRC into a spokesperson for the Rwandan government. Realizing the potential profits, the Rwandan government quickly provided assurances, and these former M23 leaders swiftly returned home to regain control of the M23 organization. Using this armed force as a banner, Rwanda launched an invasion of the DRC. Due to unsuccessful ethnic policies and a sluggish economy, the DRC government could not organize a new-style army, and the old police force lacked motivation while having a more outdated tactical system.
Moreover, during past operations to sweep away M23 and other opposition forces, the DRC's army had developed the bad habit of relying entirely on mercenaries, UN intervention forces, and tribal armies, leaving itself to enjoy the spoils. With the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict, most high-quality mercenaries went to Ukraine for battle under heavy financial inducements; those continuing to take on DRC contracts were basically armed security guards at best.
The spillover effects of the Ukraine-Russia war also led European countries to lose interest in sending more peacekeeping forces to the DRC; internal tribal groups in their own countries were also unwilling to risk their necks for the new government amid the chaos. All these factors resulted in the DRC army, which had overwhelming numerical and equipment advantages, collapsing at the slightest touch, and to this day, they remain unable to stop M23 and Rwandan forces from advancing unchecked.
Of course, from the perspective of pro-American factions within the DRC government, this isn't necessarily a bad thing. At this moment, they began adopting a tripartite approach to attempt to seize the interests of Chinese enterprises in the region:
Firstly, the resource faction represented by DRC Deputy Minister of Mines Marcelin Paluku claimed that the DRC is the world's largest supplier of cobalt, actively seeking new mining investors from Saudi Arabia to promote diversification of partners and reduce the so-called "complete dependence on China";
Secondly, the "security faction" represented by DRC President Felix Tshisekedi declared that national territorial integrity takes precedence over everything, and since China cannot send troops to protect the DRC, it should cede China's interests in the region to Americans who can protect the DRC;
Thirdly, the "new nationalism faction" formed by old military personnel and some rogue policies渲染ed the economic and military cooperation between Rwanda and China, slandering China as a supporter and sponsor of Rwanda's invasion activities, using this to incite nationalist sentiment.
Distribution map of mineral resources in the DRC; according to statistics from USAID, the DRC is one of the richest countries in terms of mineral resources, with estimated mineral resource values reaching $24 trillion. Al Jazeera
The current Congolese public has not fully identified with these people, but given their education level and the increasingly dire war situation, they could easily be swayed. Judging from the current situation, regardless of whether Rwanda's military actions stop, or whether there are UN and neighboring country troops intervening and interfering in the conflict, the result of Chinese enterprises losing their interests in this area is unlikely to change.
From the perspective of Africa, stagnation in development remains the breeding ground for unrest and conflict, with almost all extreme nationalism and ethnic-religious conflicts in the region emerging under such circumstances. However, for the Western world, these conflicts can be manufactured by them and utilized to convert into benefits.
However, constrained by the influence accumulated by Western countries since the colonial era, the fragility of electoral structures, and the low level of universal education, most African countries lack the ability to construct a government that spans more than three years and steadfastly implements national plans. Long-term chaos and identity-based politics have made all external investments, even national economic and trade plans, appear fragile and vulnerable, causing non-Western foreign enterprises to hesitate to invest.
This article is an exclusive piece by GuanchaNet. The content purely reflects the author's personal views, which are not necessarily the platform's stance. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited, and legal liability will be pursued. Follow GuanchaNet on WeChat (guanchacn) for daily interesting articles.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7489621260087919143/
Disclaimer: The article solely represents the author's views. Feel free to express your opinions by clicking the "Top/Downvote" buttons below.