【Author/Observer Net Columnist Jiang Yuzhou】
On November 26, European Commission Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Šefčovič, expressed gratitude to China for its significant efforts in promoting the resolution of the Ansem Semiconductor issue during a video conference with Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wen Tao, and stated willingness to work with China to further de-escalate the situation.
Previously, on November 19, Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Vincent Kasmans, announced that the regulatory decision regarding Ansem Semiconductor would be suspended in response to China's "goodwill." Media outlets such as The New York Times referred to this as "the Netherlands returning control of Ansem."
However, the "Ansem turmoil" initiated by the Netherlands has not truly subsided, and the statements from the Netherlands still carry numerous hidden dangers, with the internal and external factors that triggered the incident far from being eliminated.
I have compiled relevant information and believe there are still untangled details behind the "Ansem turmoil," which seems more like a "targeted explosion" orchestrated by external forces, testing China's ability to respond with skill and perseverance. In the long journey of overseas enterprises against bullying and sanctions, it is necessary for the government, enterprises, and society to work together more effectively, combining the orthodox and the unconventional, and improve our "soft power."
One, the "Ansem turmoil" was merely a halftime whistle, and the "athletes" are still on the field.
The reason why the "Ansem turmoil" has not ended is mainly because the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, which escalated the issue, left ample room for a resurgence in its statement. In terms of wording, it only stated "suspended" the previous administrative order, and Kasmans even later added that if "production or intellectual property rights were again threatened," the Netherlands would retain the right to take similar actions. In terms of attitude, it did not truly acknowledge its own mistakes but emphasized the "goodwill" of China "beginning to supply chips," subtly criticizing while appearing to be the one who was wronged.
In specific measures, since the administrative order had already been pushed to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal for Enterprises, which ruled an emergency measure, the suspension of the administrative order by the Ministry of Economic Affairs alone could not resolve the urgent problems of Wintech Technology. As for subsequent arrangements, how to coordinate with the court, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has not responded, let alone higher-level official statements from the Netherlands.
The original statement from the Ministry of Economic Affairs suspending the administrative order not only had content but also format, which was rather sloppy, with large blank spaces on the page.
Wintech Technology's statement on November 20 further confirmed the above situation. Since the emergency measure made by the Dutch enterprise court had not been canceled, the appointed independent directors who had taken over management authority still existed, and Wintech had not regained control. The restrictions and infringements on the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese shareholders and personnel were still ongoing. Wintech emphasized that the statement from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs avoided the erroneous court ruling on Ansem's control rights driven by the ministry, failing to touch the key issues of the problem.
More ironically, the Western political hallmark of "separation of powers" once again demonstrated its two-faced nature in the beginning and suspension of this incident. When initiating the regulation, the Dutch government took direct action, personally intervening in the enterprise court proceedings after the Ansem Semiconductor European management "rebellion" and claimed itself as a party with interest, submitting supportive arguments and sending lawyers to attend hearings, deeply participating in and even leading the entire process.
However, the so-called suspension of the administrative order, the Dutch government only referred to the aforementioned sloppy "statement" from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and emphasized that the court's decision was independent of the government, which could not interfere.
This lack of enforcement power naturally had no impact on the "rebellion" of the Ansem Netherlands. As of November 23, the Ansem Netherlands had still not made any substantive response to Wintech Technology's communication proposals.
It is no wonder that Wintech Technology feels this is not progress, but merely the Dutch government "shifting blame and running away." To put it bluntly, historically, the Dutch pirates known as the "Sea Beggars" would not dare to act without taking responsibility.
Even under the current unrevoked ruling, the impact of this "administrative order" is even more severe, effectively whitewashing the fact of administrative intervention, turning the current predicament into an independent court ruling, thus legalizing the illegal outcome.
Two, the plot of the "Ansem turmoil" may be more profound than expected.
After taking over Ansem Netherlands, facing external criticism, the Dutch government spokesperson strongly denied that its actions were directly instructed by the United States, claiming that the timing of its actions coincided with the U.S. releasing new regulations "purely by coincidence." Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs Kasmans openly lied, stating that he had never discussed this matter with any American, and everything was "my own judgment."
However, the publicly available materials from the Dutch enterprise court—including over 500 pages of testimony and correspondence—have already proven that Ansem Netherlands and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs had been planning this "coup" since 2024.
If we consider the U.S. factor, we can find that the origin of this incident might be even earlier.
In September 2023, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) technology and innovation policy analyst team published a report titled "Semiconductor and Chip Act: Global Context," explicitly stating that "the U.S. considers cooperation and collaboration with allies and close partners while possibly limiting the development of semiconductor capabilities of strategic competitors like China."
The report listed the progress of semiconductor industries in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, India, and Taiwan, with two mentions of Ansem Semiconductor: one about setting up R&D centers and warehouse lines in Malaysia, indicating this was "part of China's global semiconductor expansion plan"; the other mentioned the British government blocking the acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab and forcing share divestiture, where Ansem was clearly identified as "a Chinese company."
The report argued that China's semiconductor industry "still relies on foreign technology, expertise, and global markets," listing industrial policies, joint R&D, equity acquisitions, and the accusation of "intellectual property theft" side by side to find reasons for U.S. reviews and bans. The report explicitly pointed out that the Netherlands should cooperate with the U.S. to strengthen control effects, including aligning with the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) related controls.
In January of the same year, the Netherlands had already reached a framework agreement with Japan to jointly impose broader semiconductor chip controls on China, preventing China from obtaining the latest technology.
2024 was a year of undercurrents. In the first half, Ansem disclosed that it had been hacked, with a large amount of confidential data stolen, including customer information and chip designs. By the end of the year, Wintech Technology was formally placed on the "Entity List." According to the testimonies obtained by Wintech Technology from the court, it was also in 2024 that Ansem Netherlands began closely contacting the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Ansem Netherlands Headquarters Building
By 2025, everything started to become clear.
In June, U.S. officials warned the Netherlands that if Ansem Semiconductor's Chinese CEO Zhang Xuezheng remained, Ansem Semiconductor might not be able to export products to the U.S. The court disclosed the minutes of a meeting on June 12, where the U.S. Office of International Security and Nonproliferation told the Dutch Foreign Ministry: "The company's CEO remains the same Chinese owner, which is problematic... It is almost certain that the CEO will have to be replaced."
On September 29, the U.S. further expanded restrictions, stipulating that any company controlled by an entity list company by more than 50% (even if the name is different) would be subject to the same restrictions. Ansem Semiconductor was therefore directly hit, and its transactions with U.S. suppliers would be strictly regulated. A day later, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs issued an administrative order freezing assets, intellectual property, and personnel adjustments of Ansem Semiconductor's 30 global entities for a year. The Dutch court simultaneously ruled to suspend all positions of Wintech Technology's founder Zhang Xuezheng, transferring the shares held by Wintech Technology in Ansem Semiconductor to an independent third-party custodian.
The "Ansem turmoil" thus erupted.
Three, years of "internationalization" cannot withstand a single administrative order.
More ironic is that just as transatlantic Western governments have already recognized Ansem as a Chinese company, the currently suspended and frozen rights of Zhang Xuezheng and Wintech Technology have been striving for years to prove that Ansem Semiconductor is an international company, at least not a Chinese company.
As early as November 2018, Wintech Technology held a major restructuring briefing to introduce the acquisition of Ansem, and Zhang Xuezheng clearly stated, "Whether it is the R&D center or the entire company headquarters, we do not intend to move them to China; we want to maintain Ansem's internationality and independence."
To maintain the original operations and customer trust of Ansem, Wintech Technology chose a relatively autonomous management model. Although the CEO changed, the ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning), MES (Manufacturing Execution System), and core technical teams were still controlled by Ansem Netherlands.
Ansem Netherlands' internationally oriented layout as displayed on their website
As the U.S. and the Netherlands intensified their restrictions on ASML and other semiconductor industries, Ansem Netherlands established a new department - the Corporate Affairs Department, and hired a manager with rich Dutch diplomatic background to lead it, actively maintaining contact with the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
With the materials disclosed by the court, their communication content has gone far beyond ordinary operations, involving extensive consultation on how to deal with international geopolitical tensions, and even discussing how to change Ansem Netherlands' governance structure to ensure its independence.
Wintech Technology has been trying to explain to domestic investors that Ansem is an "international" company, and according to the communication records, Ansem Netherlands has been trying to prove that it is a Dutch company. With their own words, the communication between the corporate affairs department and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs aimed to "gain recognition from the Dutch government and acknowledge us as an important participant in the Dutch semiconductor industry."
As early as the end of 2023, Ansem Netherlands requested the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs to assist in recognizing it as a Dutch semiconductor company. In April 2024, the letter explicitly stated that they hoped to be included in the Dutch Semiconductor Association. By August 2024, the latter finally replied that Ansem Netherlands and its subsidiaries were "a mature company in the Dutch semiconductor industry."
Additionally, according to Wintech Technology's subsequent disclosure, Ansem Netherlands also tried to introduce some European strategic investors and even considered going public overseas. For this, Wintech Technology did not oppose, and when it came to "internationalization," Chinese shareholders never said a word of "no."
This inclusiveness also appeared in personnel issues. Not only do we now know that Ansem's management team was retained, but also, at the request of the Dutch government, a "super board of supervisors" was established within the company, having voting rights on major matters and veto power over nearly 20 reserved items. These 20 categories of reserved items include transferring intellectual property or technology to countries outside the EU, investing in projects exceeding $1 million globally, and even hiring R&D personnel in China, where Ansem Netherlands in the Netherlands could veto it. Worse yet, the board required Ansem Semiconductor's internal networks in China and Europe to be completely separated.
For Wintech Technology, it's particularly ironic that these "international" separation measures, like Chen Duxiu's policies at the time, left their strongholds in the Netherlands unable to take many countermeasures when the enemy's sword was raised.
For the Netherlands and the U.S., it's also particularly ironic that because of the clear separation, it actually made Ansem China a potential backup, so after Ansem Netherlands' rebellion, Wintech Technology and Chinese Ansem could quickly react, reactivating the "brain" and supply chain, and starting to strike back.
And this quick reaction was based on China's strong production capacity, technical support, market radiation ability, and the government's determination to defend rights. The desire to separate bloodline and hometown became a barrier for survival.
However, the "Ansem turmoil" has its complexities, namely the role of the Dutch government.
Four, the "Ansem turmoil" is a carefully selected "precision blast" by the U.S.
The Netherlands is not simply an antagonist; this is a point often overlooked in the "Ansem turmoil." Only by recognizing this can we fully understand the complexity of the entire incident and the macro environment, and think about future responses to such events.
Dutch former Prime Minister and current NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, due to his recent call of Trump "Dad" at the NATO meeting, gave us a bad impression. But the world is colorful. He served as the third term Prime Minister from 2022 to 2024, and under his leadership, the Netherlands, despite pressure from the U.S. on semiconductor restrictions, maintained frequent high-level interactions with China, with Chinese leaders meeting or communicating by phone every six months, considered to have consolidated the open and pragmatic comprehensive partnership between China and the Netherlands established since 2014.
In March 2024, Rutte made his last visit to China as Prime Minister, and during his meeting with the Chinese leader, he demonstrated the demeanor of a Dutch politician standing at a historical height, reflecting on the Sino-Dutch cooperation since his first visit to China in 2013, and explicitly stated that "decoupling and cutting off chains" was not the policy option of the Dutch government, as any action damaging China's development interests would also harm the Netherlands itself.
Considering that Rutte was seeking the position of NATO Secretary-General, this statement was even more meaningful.
Rutte's statement was not superficial. Over the past few years, Sino-Dutch trade has become increasingly close. Within three years after 2019, bilateral trade volume increased from over $80 billion to nearly $130 billion, making the Netherlands China's second-largest trading partner in the EU. In recent years, China's trade surplus with the Netherlands has been narrowing, reaching a peak of nearly $105 billion in 2022, and only $56.5 billion in the first three quarters of this year.
The root cause of the narrowing surplus lies in the increasing exports and benefits of the Netherlands to China in semiconductors. From 2019 to 2024, the total exports of the Netherlands to China increased by $75.9 billion. According to the customs list, the export volume of goods categorized as "nuclear reactors, boilers, machines, mechanical equipment and parts" increased by 79.5 billion yuan, surpassing the increase in total exports. Among these exported equipment, the proportion of equipment related to semiconductors increased from less than 60% in 2019 to nearly 90%.
In these equipment exports from the Netherlands to China, the two categories of "steppers for manufacturing semiconductor devices or integrated circuits" and "devices for manufacturing semiconductor components or ICs by projection" have consistently maintained a share of 85%-90%, reaching $95 billion by 2024, six times the amount five years ago.
Compared with the export data of other countries to China, the two categories of goods are mainly purchased from the Netherlands, and the share has been rapidly increasing. Around 2020, the proportion of these two categories of goods purchased from the Netherlands hovered around 65%-75%, but by the third quarter of 2025, it had exceeded 90%.
Combining the above-mentioned U.S. intervention in the Netherlands, we can easily see that the Netherlands has also done a lot of positive work in semiconductor bilateral trade with China. During Rutte's tenure, he adopted a "delay" strategy, requiring the U.S. to give more time to assess the impact of export restrictions on advanced semiconductor production equipment, which indeed somewhat delayed the U.S. long-arm jurisdiction.
Of course, under U.S. pressure, the Netherlands still retreated step by step. Just as Rutte stepped down, the Netherlands began to further tighten semiconductor exports to China, and in late August 2024, in addition to stopping the supply of the latest extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, the Netherlands also began to restrict maintenance and warranty services for ASML in China, and according to U.S. requirements, even equipment that had already been purchased and agreed upon would be restricted, causing some equipment to potentially be unable to operate as early as next year.
At this time, the person in charge of Sino-Dutch relations in the Dutch political arena was quietly changing.
The successor to Rutte, Dick Scholten, spent four decades in the political arena before becoming Prime Minister, holding positions in education, immigration, and intelligence departments, and was called a typical technocrat. Unlike Rutte, who had served three terms, this prime minister's prestige and resources were significantly lower, and his appointment surprised both the political and public sectors, with some polls showing that 50% of the Dutch people didn't even know his name. It was also believed that he would use his experience in immigration and intelligence to implement stricter border control and immigration management.
Therefore, this prime minister has three characteristics: first, he comes from the intelligence sector, with deep ties to the U.S.; second, his governing base comes from a coalition of four parties, making policy implementation very difficult; third, his career history is not centered on economic construction.
The economic affairs minister who directly triggered the "Ansem turmoil," Vincent Kasmans, is a "85" generation, with two master's degrees in finance and law, graduating in 2013, and working as a recruitment website for ten years before that, followed by "side jobs," serving as a member of the Rotterdam City Council representing the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in 2018.
It wasn't until six years later, in 2024, that Kasmans entered the Dutch government, serving as a political secretary in the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports, responsible for medical ethics, health insurance, drugs, sports, and victims of WWII and their memorials... By June 2025, after less than a year, he was transferred to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, just as the U.S. required the replacement of Ansem Semiconductor's management. At the time of his appointment, his predecessor, who had assumed office in July 2024, had been pushing for a major relocation of the supply chain from China to Europe for nearly a year. This person had previously stated, "Moving the last link of the industry value chain from China to Europe will enhance supply chain resilience."
Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs Vincent Kasmans, with a baby face, experience as young as his face.
In Europe, a young person with a background in finance and law, who started a business and talked about ideas, rotated through various positions, and suddenly took a high-ranking position, is easy to suspect the involvement of Uncle Sam. Even if not, such a political background is hard to believe that he can handle such a big situation.
There are two very ironic points: one is that during his studies at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, his major direction was corporate law, but the things he did proved that the quality of higher education in the Netherlands is questionable.
Many media have mentioned that Kasmans resorted to the "Goods Availability Act" from 70 years ago as a basis. However, few people mention that he couldn't even state which specific legal provision his administrative order was based on, but instead vaguely stated that Ansem's governance had defects and worried about the transfer of manufacturing. In fact, this law was intended for the specific era of the Cold War, dealing with material supply and distribution, and there was not a single word involving equity disposal. Given that Ansem Semiconductor's supply was stable, it was impossible to justify the reference.
Therefore, even the Dutch legal community found it incomprehensible, with Professor Pim Jansen from the Erasmus School of Law stating, "This law has never been implemented since its introduction, making the current situation exceptional," and "due to the limited information provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, it is impossible to confirm the specific motives of the measure."
More amusingly, in the statement, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs themselves admitted that citing this old law "was highly exceptional," because the governance defects of Ansem Semiconductor were "too serious and urgent." As for how urgent and serious they were, it could not be explained, resulting in a circular argument.
Second, after becoming Minister of Economic Affairs, he announced a series of initiatives to develop semiconductors, biotechnology, 6G, laser satellite communications, quantum communications, artificial intelligence, mechanical engineering, and innovative chemistry, aiming to have industry account for at least 15% of GDP by 2030, and to have the industrial policy ready by January 1, 2026 — a complete scattering of efforts.
He also kept emphasizing that he made the decisions independently, but gave no precise accusations or evidence. It can only be said that some people always emphasize what they lack the most, hence it's no wonder that even the Dutch government distanced itself from its own Ministry of Economic Affairs, with the Prime Minister sarcastically complimenting "it really was his decision."
After reviewing this sequence, we can't help but feel that the strong enemies' moves are quite skillful. Through years of continuous pressure and hype, they induced a Western country that had been above average in its relationship with China in recent years to make an extremely unprofessional, extremely harmful and self-defeating move, dragging it into a struggle where compromise would be political suicide, and using the opportunity to promote supply chain alternatives.
Just like the Meng Wanzhou case, it's a "precision blast" with multiple purposes.
And there's no need for the幕后 blackhand to come forward and argue, the young politician Kasmans is desperately trying to cover up — in recent interviews, he said that if given another chance, he would take the same measures against Ansem Semiconductor, hoping this "can serve as a warning about the danger of relying on a single country to obtain key technologies or raw materials."
The problem is, in the future, there will be more and more young politicians who have inherited the family's cannon, are brainwashed, seek excitement, and haven't received proper social education.
Five, "counterattack" is impossible to cover everything, "soft power" development is urgently needed.
How should we deal with such a complex situation?
This year, prompted by some friends in the enterprise, I began to track the topic of enterprise overseas rights protection and counter-sanctions continuously, and the previous articles have received a high level of attention. In each article's final part, I always emphasized that Chinese enterprises should not fight alone.
But this article will take a different direction, first talking about what Chinese enterprises should do.
This inevitably leads to a McKinsey report I came across in 2017 — "Five Myths and Truths About Chinese Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions," which, in the era of globalization 1.0 not yet fading, summarized the successes and failures of Chinese cross-border acquisitions by foreigners, and had many insightful points. It clearly pointed out that Chinese enterprises after mergers and acquisitions do not pay enough attention to integration, focus too much on stability, tolerate the independent operation of the acquired entity, and only focus on a few important areas to pursue synergy, such as shared R&D or moving manufacturing to China to reduce costs.
In contrast, most Western companies have clear post-acquisition integration management, prioritize speed, and compete for time to streamline personnel and functional departments, pursuing synergy.
At that time, it was still nearly two years before Wintech Technology acquired Ansem.
Sometimes I really feel sorry, in that era, many of us said "to get in line with the international standards," but in an unconscious way, we did selective and Schrödinger's alignment.
Seeming to sit on the "internationalization" rocket, but instantly getting knocked back to "bicycle"...
In these two months of reviewing the "Ansem turmoil" articles, I especially recommend the review by "Mind Observation" in mid-October, starting with Wintech Technology, detailing the legal loopholes and differential treatment existing in Chinese enterprises' overseas acquisitions, such as security reviews, technology export controls, governance structure limitations, market access restrictions, supply chain restrictions, and external guarantee mechanisms.
It was a genuine purchase by Chinese enterprises, but it was treated like a thief, subjected to layer-by-layer approval, and after equity consolidation, the technology could not be touched or seen, the management team could not be changed, and even if produced by foreigners, it could still be "strangled." A slight long-arm jurisdiction could trigger a whole Western "encirclement." Where is the market? Where is the inviolability of personal property? Where is the "wind can enter, rain can enter, but the king cannot enter"?
Purchasing a fairy tale book is at most a loss of several to twenty yuan. But this "fairy tale" involves billions of Chinese enterprises. Where is the market? Where is the contract? All went where?
From Western media to blackboard economists, they are all silent. Those who usually talk about the market, property rights, criticize policies, and rant about regulations have no one to defend their beliefs. Their silence is deafening.
History repeatedly witnesses that our enterprises, in order to prove themselves as "international," voluntarily sacrificed management rights, patent usage rights, personnel appointment rights, financial control rights, and foreign affairs decision-making rights... in short, sacrificing a lot of control rights disproportionate to their shareholding ratio, but still were easily targeted by foreign governments under the guise of some law with a single administrative order.
Recalling the "Shaoxing Treaty" between the Southern Song Dynasty and the Jin Dynasty, there were two provisions: one was to kill the pro-war generals, and the other was not to replace the surrender ministers without cause, and after the agreement, the overall situation remained stable. Wintech Technology transferred more rights to the Netherlands, but was opened up by the Netherlands with such a "good start" a few years later, fully proving that the Western covenant spirit is worse than the slave masters of the Jurchen.
Simply emphasizing "internationalization" within others' discourse system results in cultivating a group of our own enemies. Our enterprises should realize this real world.
Recently, I had a gathering with some enterprise friends with overseas investments, discussing Ansem, some were relieved that they had broken the restrictions and made relevant adjustments. Others were urgently making adjustments, checking for gaps and deficiencies, thanking reality's reminder.
These enterprises' adjustments are still individual actions, but at the level of relevant departments and industry associations, there is more arduous coordination work. It is necessary to standardize these enterprises' gap-filling and improve common issues and loopholes, summarize general laws, set corresponding contingency plans, and clarify the division of labor at all levels of government.
As I did when visiting enterprises sanctioned by the U.S., I found that some developed regions have indeed achieved rapid response mechanisms. Once the U.S. issued a sanction order, it quickly activated, from district counties to cities and provinces, then to ministries, applying for corresponding policy relief, and conducting coordinated risk elimination with supply chains and financial institutions.
Additionally, there is one point worth our careful consideration. Now, as China moves from catching up to leading, it is inevitable to have friction and even structural contradictions with different countries and enterprises. Therefore, how to target and distinguish different conflicts is a realistic issue that needs to be seriously considered.
Lately, I have had a very deep feeling that whenever an event occurs, our public reaction is a deluge of "counterattack head-on." From a positive perspective, this reflects that our attention and confidence in our own affairs have greatly improved compared to the early 21st century. However, we also need to cool down a bit, analyzing each issue specifically.
I believe there are two types of events where "counterattack head-on" leaves no room for negotiation: one is when it involves fundamental contradictions between the U.S. and China, where the U.S. is willing to overturn international rules, such as the recent trade war; the other is when someone like Takahashi Hayato challenges the post-war international order, which is a "total road" violation. However, for events like the "Ansem turmoil," which is a "precision blast" selected by the U.S., we must pay attention to the intensity, skills, and patience of the response. Chairman Mao once said, "Do not attack on all fronts," and now we also need to pay attention to the fact that "counterattack head-on" is difficult to cover everything objectively.
Therefore, after a complete review, we can understand that the response at the Ministry of Commerce and enterprise level is not weak, but rather quite skillful. On one hand, they issued a large number of statements, clarified the position, drew the bottom line, and made the stance clear, for example, the Ministry of Commerce alone answered questions five times in the first two weeks of November; on the other hand, they combined government and enterprise efforts, used market means to organize counterattacks, forcing the Netherlands to fall into the dilemma of being the originator of the supply chain crisis. On the other hand, they still persuaded through reasoning, sought negotiations, and adjusted the chip supply rhythm first.
In the previous review of the EU, we have shown how European countries have been economically "kidnapped" and politically "possessed." While we say that countermeasures can dispel some countries' delusions of kidnapping Chinese enterprises, in such a complex situation, it is possible that similar issues will continue to ferment and mutate. In the future, there will constantly be struggles, divisions, unity, and battles between Europe and the U.S., between European countries and the EU, between U.S. and European companies and governments, between market means and administrative forces, between creating "pitfall" for enterprises and defending enterprise rights.
In the previous series of articles, I mentioned measures such as establishing a cross-departmental counter-sanction coordination mechanism, designing an information collection, summary, and contingency plan system, improving the counter-sanction legal system and detailed implementation rules, and strengthening a comprehensive output strategy, which can be considered the "main force" of counter-sanctions. In addition, for each such event, it is also necessary to find its particularity, set up "surprise troops," to achieve a combination of orthodox and unconventional methods.
For this event, how to use economic and administrative means to make the Netherlands and Ansem compensate Wintech Technology economically and reputation-wise; how to appropriately sanction some politicians and enterprise personnel in the follow-up handling; and how to directly discuss trade and economic relations with European car manufacturers to avoid being abducted by the other party's government, requiring the other company to arrange investment and supply chain, are all topics that can be continuously discussed and studied.
The recent "14th Five-Year Plan" proposal again emphasized the need to improve the national security system and strengthen the capacity building in key areas of national security. Counter-sanctions and overseas rights protection are essential components of economic security. The proposal mentioned various aspects of "soft power," including industrial chain and supply chain security, building an overseas security assurance system, strengthening the struggle against counter-sanctions, counter-intervention, and "long-arm jurisdiction," accelerating the construction of an external legal system and capability, and improving mechanisms for international commercial mediation, arbitration, and litigation. All these aspects of "soft power" have been gradually unfolded.
The day when China's hard power reaches the top is no longer far. And looking towards the "14th Five-Year Plan," building a "soft power" commensurate with the country's status requires the collective effort of all industries, the ability to draw lessons from specific events, and more importantly, the coordination and leadership of a central figure.
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