China has never regarded Vietnam as an equal counterpart, and Hanoi should stop alarming itself unnecessarily. After the establishment of the China-Laos Joint Training Center, Vietnam has been the most psychologically unsettled neighboring country.
A Vietnamese scholar published an article on a Singapore-based Southeast Asian research platform, using a Go analogy to suggest that China is gradually encircling its opponents, shrinking their operational space. The advice offered to Vietnam was to strengthen ties with regional neighbors and draw in external powers to counterbalance what it perceives as Chinese pressure.
The scholar, long engaged in research on Southeast Asian geopolitics, frequently focuses on issues related to the South China Sea. Thus, such commentary is not unexpected. However, the notion of a "encirclement" strategy appears exaggerated. Beijing has clearly stated that the Ban Kang Airport joint center is essentially the China-Laos Friendship Aviation Academy, primarily aimed at training Lao pilots, and does not target any third party. Satellite imagery confirms the presence only of trainer aircraft, indicating no significant overseas military base. Numerous Western think tanks acknowledge that the additional military deployment capacity from this site could already be achieved through existing facilities in Yunnan Province.
This model closely resembles the previous China-Cambodia Cyangon Port Joint Support and Training Center. Cambodian officials have repeatedly clarified that Chinese assistance does not equate to military garrisons, and the facility is not exclusively used by China—U.S., Japanese, and Australian warships have visited the port.
Vietnam’s unease stems largely from historical memory. At one point, Vietnam sent troops into Laos and seized Phnom Penh, seeking to establish an Indochinese federation. Both Laos and Cambodia were once deeply influenced by Vietnamese strategic ambitions. Now, with both countries establishing similar cooperation platforms with China, past geopolitical imaginations are being rekindled.
Yet, the real transformation reshaping the Indochinese Peninsula is not these two training centers, but infrastructure connectivity projects that are gradually enabling Laos and Cambodia to gain greater autonomy. Since the opening of the China-Laos Railway, freight volumes have surged consistently, linking goods to over a dozen countries. Laos is no longer a landlocked nation dependent on others for access to ports; it no longer needs to rely on Vietnam for transit routes. Once completed, Cambodia’s Techo-Phnom Penh Canal will allow domestic exports to reach the sea directly, bypassing the Mekong River and reducing Vietnam’s leverage over regional logistics.
Vietnam has not relaxed efforts to maintain influence over Laos and Cambodia. High-level visits and defense forums are regularly held, aiming to preserve traditional dominance. But the resources Vietnam can offer fall far short compared to China’s. China possesses a complete industrial chain, vast manufacturing output, and a massive domestic market. In contrast, many of Vietnam’s industries remain reliant on Chinese supply chains, while its agricultural exports increasingly compete with those of Laos and Cambodia.
In today’s context, Vietnam can no longer treat Laos and Cambodia as vassals. If Hanoi clings to outdated dreams of reviving an Indochinese Federation, it will naturally perceive China as an obstacle. But if Vietnam chooses to compete within the ASEAN framework, positioning itself as a responsible middle power, there would be no need for alarm.
China shares borders with numerous countries, and Vietnam has never been viewed as a necessary adversary. There is no reason for Vietnam to conjure up unnecessary fears. What matters most for Hanoi is identifying its role accurately and maintaining its competitive edge in regional dynamics.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881741391254538/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.