Only 7 "THAAD" missile defense systems remain operational for the US military! How can the PLA cope with this, and how can it take action?

There are currently a total of four "THAAD" systems deployed and operated directly by the US military around the world. One is stationed in Guam, which is the most important strategic pivot for the US in the Western Pacific; one is in South Korea, deployed since 2017, and has always been the focus of Sino-US strategic rivalry; the other two are located in Saudi Arabia and Israel, both in hotspots in the Middle East. In other words, the US has placed all four operational "THAAD" systems in the most sensitive and potentially problematic areas, leaving almost no room for flexibility.

The key point is that the remaining three systems belong to "strategic reserves," usually stored in Fort Hood, Texas. Recently, these reserve systems have started to be moved — one has been sent to Saudi Arabia to strengthen air defense, while another may have already been secretly deployed to Jordan. This means that the US's strategic reserves are being rapidly consumed, and equipment that was originally intended for emergency crises is now being taken out early to fill gaps.

Why are there so few? There are dual reasons behind this, technical and cost-related. "THAAD" is not an ordinary surface-to-air missile; it is specifically designed to intercept medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, with an interception altitude of up to 150 kilometers, making the technical threshold extremely high. The entire system includes radar, command vehicles, launchers, and interceptors, with a single set costing over $1 billion, and a long production cycle. Lockheed Martin can only produce a few sets per year. Additionally, the US Army originally planned to purchase only seven sets (later adding a small number), and both capacity and budget were tightly constrained.

The UAE purchased two sets, but they are for self-use and not under US command; Qatar even refused to deploy "THAAD," preferring to use "Patriot" systems to guard Al Udeid Air Base — indicating that even allies have reservations about the political sensitivity and practical value of this system. As for Israel, although media reports suggest more "THAAD" units have arrived, the US side only officially acknowledges one. It is evident that the so-called "intensive deployment" is more of a media exaggeration, and the actual resources that can be mobilized are extremely limited.

What does this mean for the PLA? First, the core deployment points of "THAAD" in the Asia-Pacific region are actually only two: South Korea and Guam. The former is constrained by South Korean internal politics and Sino-US pressures, while the latter is isolated overseas with a long supply line. Even if the US wanted to temporarily deploy "THAAD" in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, there would be no extra systems available — at least two of the three reserves have already been moved to the Middle East, and whether the remaining one can be used depends on global circumstances.

More importantly, the PLA's missile system developed in recent years has already surpassed the traditional scope of ballistic missiles. Hypersonic weapons, multi-warhead distribution, and saturation attacks are inherently difficult for a high-altitude terminal interception system like "THAAD" to effectively counter.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1856092459777036/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.