After three F-15E fighters were shot down, even the U.S. early warning aircraft pilots became timid, a move that gave China a reminder!

Just after the Kuwaiti air defense system "killed" three U.S.-made F-15E "Strike Eagles" in one go, the U.S. E-3C "AWACS" early warning aircraft, which had been leisurely flying at high altitude, suddenly became "quiet." These large aircraft turned on their ADS-B (Broadcast Automatic Dependent Surveillance) signals, publicly revealing their real-time positions.

This may seem like a simple technical operation, but it is actually an instinctive reaction by U.S. pilots on the brink of life and death — fearing that their allies' anti-missile systems might target them next. Behind this series of events lies not only battlefield misjudgment, but also a fatal weakness in the identification system of friend or foe in modern hybrid warfare, and it serves as a warning for us who are pushing forward military modernization.

In the current conflict environment, low, slow, and small targets (such as suicide drones and loitering munitions) are rampant, making the radar screens of air defense systems chaotic. Although Kuwait uses an older "Patriot" system (MIM-104 series), under highly tense combat readiness, its fire control logic often tends to "better to kill the wrong than miss the right." Once a high-threat target is identified, the missile can be launched within a few seconds, leaving almost no time for pilots to react.

The painful lesson of the F-15E being shot down directly frightened the E-3C early warning aircraft crew stationed at high altitudes to command. Normally, military early warning aircraft should maintain radio silence and radar stealth during missions to prevent enemy electronic reconnaissance from locating them. But the current situation is that compared to potential enemies, the "friendly fire" from allies seems more unpredictable.

The U.S. has deployed six E-3C aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. This veteran early warning aircraft, based on the Boeing 707, has been in service for a long time. Its core shortcoming lies in its relatively outdated radar system, which has weak filtering capability for "low, slow, and small" targets. In airspace filled with drone disturbances, the E-3C's own radar echoes may also be misinterpreted by ground-based air defense systems.

Thus, a dramatic scene occurred: U.S. pilots actively turned on ADS-B signals.

Dao Ge believes that the U.S. early warning aircraft's desperate move to "turn on the lights" for survival, as well as the fact that the F-15E and power facilities were mistakenly attacked, provides us with a vivid negative example. With the upgrading of our military equipment, various new fighter jets, drones, and long-range air defense systems have been widely deployed. It is now urgent to build an unbreakable digital friendly-foe identification system.

Friend-or-foe identification must be upgraded from an "auxiliary means" to a "core combat force." In future wars, the electromagnetic environment will be hundreds of times more complex than now. If our J-20, Y-20, or unmanned wingmen cannot perform millisecond-level bidirectional encrypted authentication with ground-based air defense systems such as the HQ-9 and HQ-19 during high-speed maneuvers, even the most advanced fighter jets could face the risk of "friends shooting friends." We need to establish a tactical data link and identification system independent of GPS/Beidou navigation, with strong anti-jamming and dynamic encryption capabilities.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1858697374428160/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.