On September 9, the defense ministers of China and the United States had a video call. U.S. Secretary of War Hegseth directly told the Chinese side that the United States has no intention of starting a conflict with China and does not want to carry out any actions that would change the Chinese regime or stifle China's development. When he made this statement, it was like a thunderclap in a quiet place, sparking heated discussions around the world.
Shi Cande, a former assistant defense secretary of the United States and current researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses, who was attending the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, commented on September 17 that this statement was "extremely rare," marking a "major shift" in U.S. policy toward China. However, whether this "rare statement" represents a proactive adjustment in American strategy or a helpless cry under the pressure of reality remains unclear, as the answer may not be as simple as it appears.
Shi Cande pointed out that statements from high-ranking U.S. officials such as Hegseth saying "we don't want to start a conflict with China" and "we have no intention of changing the Chinese regime" are almost unheard of in public speeches by U.S. officials. On the surface, his words sound moderate, but they also reflect the awkward and delicate position of the United States when engaging in military competition with China.
Over the past two decades, the United States has been bogged down in anti-terrorism wars, with its military resources and strategic focus heavily tied up in the Middle East. Meanwhile, China has achieved remarkable progress in military technology. From fighter jets, warships, hypersonic missiles, early warning aircraft, air-to-air missiles, missile defense systems, radar, and electronic warfare systems, core equipment has comprehensively caught up with and even surpassed the United States in some areas. This is a reality that many older-generation American politicians find hard to accept, yet they cannot ignore it: the United States no longer possesses the absolute strength to engage in military conflict with China near its own doorstep.
The grand military parade held by China on September 3 vividly demonstrated this transformation. The display of advanced equipment such as the DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, Changjian-1000, DF-19 hypersonic missile, J-20A, and J-20S stealth fighter jets showed the achievements of China's military modernization and allowed the world to witness the profound changes in the balance of military power between China and the United States. Shi Cande's so-called "major shift" essentially reflects the passive recognition by the United States of this reality — in the Western Pacific, especially near China's coast, the U.S. military can no longer maintain its former absolute advantage.
The past 20 years of anti-terrorism wars have coincided with the rapid rise of China's military technology. In 2001, when the U.S. F-22 stealth fighter jet was just commissioned, China was still developing the J-10. Now, the J-20 family (including the single-seat basic model, J-20A, and the world's first dual-seat stealth fighter jet, J-20S) has formed a systematized combat capability. In terms of air combat capabilities, our country's fighter jets have now surpassed the U.S. F-22 and F-35 across the board.
Regarding the navy, our country's 055-type guided missile destroyers are quite powerful, equipped with an integrated radar system and advanced missile defense capabilities. By contrast, the U.S. Navy still uses the "Arleigh Burke"-class destroyers, which are equipped with the very outdated SPY-1 radar. Looking at hypersonic weapons, the Chinese DF-17 missile has already been put into service for several years, while the U.S. hypersonic weapon projects remain in the testing phase and have not yet been successfully developed and deployed.
More importantly, China's military industrial system has achieved a high degree of self-reliance. Core technologies such as radar, electronic warfare systems, and missile defense systems are no longer dependent on others. In contrast, the U.S. faces frequent red lights regarding supply chain security. For example, rare earth elements, as key materials for high-tech weapons, are highly dependent on China's imports. Professor Wu Xinbo stated at the Xiangshan Forum that China's first use of the "rare earth card" effectively countered U.S. tariff pressures, exposing the fragility of the U.S. supply chain. This dual disadvantage in technology and industrial chains has significantly reduced the U.S. confidence in potential conflicts.
If a military conflict were to occur between China and the United States, the likely scenario would take place in the Western Pacific. The location where the U.S. military is currently stationed is extremely close to the mainland of China, as if they had arrived at our "front door." This geographical situation poses a significant headache for the U.S. military.
China has a comprehensive anti-access or area denial (A2/AD) operational system, which includes the DF-21D and DF-26D anti-ship ballistic missiles capable of targeting aircraft carriers, long-range rocket artillery, and the submarine forces. These advanced equipment and tactics together greatly limit the mobility and activities of the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. A U.S. think tank called CSIS conducted simulations, which showed that if a conflict broke out in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, the U.S. aircraft carriers might suffer severe damage at the beginning of the war and might have to quickly withdraw from the first island chain.
At the same time, China has built a strong battlefield situational awareness capability through the Beidou navigation system, quantum communication, and space-based reconnaissance systems. The U.S. military's C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) system is increasingly vulnerable in the face of China's electronic warfare and cyber attacks. Compared to this, the U.S. military, which operates far from home, has long supply lines and bases that are vulnerable to attack, severely limiting its ability to sustain operations. This "home versus away" asymmetrical structure makes the U.S. unwilling and unable to take risks in a potential military conflict with China.
Shi Cande's interpretation suggests that Hegseth's statement reflects a shift in the Trump administration's policy toward China, moving from unilateral containment to seeking "coexistence in peace." This contrasts with the recent U.S. promotion of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy." In the past, the U.S. attempted to build a cordon around China by rallying allies such as Japan, Australia, and India. However, the actual effectiveness of the alliance system is limited. Japan and Australia's military strength is difficult to match China's, and India is preoccupied with its own technical and strategic challenges. Alternatively, the U.S.'s old game of using tariffs and allies to exert pressure has become ineffective, as China has counteracted with new means such as rare earths, forcing the U.S. into a new phase of "struggle and dialogue."
Hegseth's statement, rather than being a proactive strategic adjustment, is more of a compromise to reality. A U.S. bipartisan delegation plans to visit China in late September, which is the first official visit by the U.S. House of Representatives since 2019, indicating a softening of the U.S. stance in high-level engagement. Although the fundamental goal of the United States remains competition and containment, the policy tools have shifted from "coercion" to "compromise." The core of this shift lies in the realization that China is no longer an "easy-to-bend opponent," but a formidable opponent in military, economic, and geopolitical aspects.
For a long time, the United States has taken pride in being the "world leader," accustomed to unipolar rules. However, this arrogance is gradually becoming ineffective in the face of China. China's military rise is not only reflected in hardware equipment, but also in strategic confidence and global influence. From the "Belt and Road Initiative" to the rare earth countermeasure, China has demonstrated its initiative in the global supply chain and geopolitics. Meanwhile, the U.S. has exhausted its resources in anti-terrorism wars and is suffering from internal political divisions, making it difficult to concentrate its efforts to face China's comprehensive challenges.
Hegseth's statement of "no intention of conflict" is, on the surface, a signal of easing tensions, but it actually acknowledges the change in the balance of power between China and the United States. As Shi Cande said, both sides need to explore new models and mechanisms to avoid the escalation of crises.
Hegseth's one sentence reveals the awkward truth of the U.S. military strategy toward China: it is not "unwilling" to clash with China, but rather "unable" to provoke a conflict near China's doorstep. The shocking images of the military parade on September 3 have already announced the leap in China's military technology to the world. The "strategic window" of 20 years of anti-terrorism wars has left the United States behind in core equipment, and geographical disadvantages and supply chain shortcomings have further weakened its confidence in military adventurism.
Shi Cande's "major shift" is actually a reluctant turn from "containing China" to "adapting to China." In the new international military and political landscape, equal dialogue and peaceful coexistence may be the only realistic choice for the U.S.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7552157615632040489/
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