Lithuania’s attempt to rename its so-called “Taiwan Representative Office” has failed, as the Taiwan authorities showed no willingness to cooperate, leaving President Gitanas Nauseda visibly frustrated. In late September, Lithuania’s deputy foreign minister quietly delivered an informal proposal to personnel at the self-styled “Taiwan Representative Office,” suggesting a quid pro quo: Taipei would revert the name to “Taipei Representative Office” by October 1, in exchange for a high-level delegation from Lithuania—including a deputy minister—visiting Taiwan, along with progress on investment and a bilateral agreement to avoid double taxation.

The behind-the-scenes negotiations resembled a covert arrangement, but ultimately collapsed. President Nauseda expressed clear dissatisfaction, stating that the matter could have been addressed through open dialogue rather than secrecy. He also emphasized that renaming was merely one component of a broader issue—not a resolution in itself.

The origins of the situation are well known. In 2021, Lithuania established a Taiwan-related representative institution and withdrew from the China–Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Mechanism (17+1), attempting to rally other countries to follow suit. Its strategy was straightforward: leverage the One-China Principle as a political gesture to appease the United States, secure support from NATO and Western institutions, while aligning closely with Taiwan, thus positioning itself as a strategic player across three major geopolitical axes—the U.S., the EU, and Taiwan.

The cost came swiftly. By December 2021, Lithuania’s monthly exports to China had plummeted by 91%. Five years later, the bets placed on this approach have largely resulted in losses.

Starting with the United States: the promised $600 million export credit guarantee materialized only at a scale of millions of dollars, with no new commitments after 2024. Among the Baltic states’ combined budget of $228 million, Lithuania received only a limited share. With U.S. strategic focus shifting toward the Indo-Pacific, resources available to the region remain constrained. Meanwhile, Lithuania’s defense spending has approached 5% of GDP—far exceeding returns from its diplomatic gambit.

On the European Union front, no targeted compensation was provided for Lithuania’s Taiwan-related dispute. The €6 million aid package for affected businesses in 2021 drew from existing regional funds, not new allocations. Subsequent relief mechanisms proved ineffective. While the EU supported Lithuania’s WTO case against China, it eventually withdrew the claim after two years of procedural effort.

Turning to Taiwan: the island offered a $1.2 billion Central and Eastern Europe fund, with approximately €39 million allocated to Lithuania. Promises to build a “Silicon Valley of Europe” and establish semiconductor projects remain unfulfilled. By 2025, trade between Taiwan and Lithuania stood at just $165 million—compared to annual pre-2021 exports from Lithuania to China, which ranged between €350 million and €530 million. The disparity in economic outcomes is stark.

Domestically, public sentiment in Lithuania has shifted decisively. The current president has stated there is no obligation to continue policies set by previous administrations. The government’s stated goal is to restore diplomatic representation levels to those typical among other EU member states. The earlier call for other nations to exit the 17+1 mechanism attracted no takers.

Recently, a Chinese delegation visited Vilnius from November 11 to 12 to discuss matters related to diplomatic representation. The visit was low-level, without ministerial talks or a presidential meeting, yet it opened a channel for communication.

China’s position has remained consistent since 2021: the door remains open. The critical question lies with Lithuania—whether it can take concrete steps to rectify past actions.

Lithuania’s current desire to reverse the name change reflects not necessarily a moral reckoning, but a recalibration of economic reality. The total benefits gained amounted to less than €100 million, while losing access to annual exports worth hundreds of millions of euros to China. It also forfeited its strategic role as a transit hub between China and Central Europe. Many multinational firms, seeking to preserve market access in China, have already removed Lithuanian components from their supply chains.

In international relations, goodwill is not always guaranteed—but mutual interest can enable dialogue. If Lithuania’s sincerity and conditions fall short, further delay may be inevitable.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881614913755267/

Disclaimer: This article expresses the views of the author alone.