In the history of fighter aircraft development, cannons were once the "last line of defense" in close-range dogfights. However, their effective range is generally less than 1.5 kilometers (the optimal hit rate range is even compressed to within 800 meters). With the rise of beyond-visual-range missiles and stealth technology, their tactical value has been widely debated. The U.S. Air Force still insists on equipping fifth-generation fighters such as the F-22 and F-35 with traditional cannons, while the Chinese J-20, based on the reality that 99% of modern air combat occurs beyond 20 kilometers (as per data from the American magazine "Military Aviation" in 2023), boldly abandoned this design, concentrating resources on stealth optimization and breakthroughs in missile technology. This difference not only reflects the choice of technical routes but also reveals a forward-looking judgment gap between the U.S. and Chinese air forces regarding the future form of warfare.
During the Vietnam War, the U.S.-made F-4 suffered repeated damage in close-range dogfights due to the lack of a cannon. However, the average engagement distance in air combat at that time was only 700 meters, which is a generation apart from today's beyond-visual-range combat environment. Yet, the U.S. military has dogmatically applied this experience. The F-22's M61A2 cannon carries 480 rounds, theoretically allowing for 7 seconds of continuous firing. However, the relative speed of modern aircraft at a distance of 1 kilometer exceeds 2000 kilometers per hour, resulting in an actual effective attack window of less than 0.5 seconds. This design appears out of place in fifth-generation fighters.
The F-22 had to open a 0.8 square meter stealth gap in its fuselage to accommodate the cannon, increasing maintenance costs by 300% compared to smooth skin areas. This approach of sacrificing core performance to retain a cannon used with a probability of less than 0.3% highlights a misaligned design logic.
The Chinese J-20 saved about 300 kilograms of weight and 0.6 cubic meters of space by eliminating the cannon, converting it into fuel load and electronic warfare equipment capacity. The Chinese Air Force has completely decomposed the tactical functions of the cannon: intercepting targets at 200 kilometers away with the PL-15, covering close-range dogfights within 50 kilometers with the PL-10E, and dealing with threats within 1 kilometer through the electro-optical distributed aperture system warning plus chaff flares or directed energy interference. This layered defense makes the cannon obsolete.
The shooting accuracy of the internal cannon on the U.S. F-35A is 20 milliradians at a distance of 1 kilometer, meaning a hit rate of less than 5% against maneuverable targets. In the Red Flag exercises, the record of successful attacks using the cannon by F-35 pilots accounted for only 0.17% of total sorties, yet they still bear an annual maintenance cost of $37 million.
While U.S. aircraft are still paying the price of stealth performance, fuel efficiency, and maintenance costs for potential engagements within 1 kilometer, the Chinese Air Force has elevated air combat to a dimension where the enemy cannot see it, by improving missile range, sensor precision, and the efficiency of networked command. This gap is not only reflected in equipment parameters but also deeply rooted in the fundamental understanding of the nature of war. The U.S., fixated on the debate over whether to keep the cannon or not, is essentially preparing for an "aircraft bayonet charge" that will never happen.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7535346882260795958/
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