On May 21, according to Japanese media reports, Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Rokuzawa Ryojō, will visit Suzhou, China from May 21 to 23 to attend the APEC Ministerial Meeting on Trade. This marks the second cabinet-level official from Japan to visit China following Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s controversial parliamentary remarks on Taiwan in November last year—yet he is by far the most significant. Will China engage in bilateral talks with him? And could such a meeting contribute to easing tensions in Sino-Japanese relations?

First, as Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Rokuzawa holds a pivotal position within Kishida’s cabinet, overseeing core domains including industrial policy, trade negotiations, export controls, energy transition, and economic security—far surpassing previous visits by peripheral ministers such as Okuyama Jinji, the Minister in charge of Gender Equality, who attended the Shanghai APEC Women and the Economy Forum. Okuyama’s trip to Shanghai was largely a routine multilateral engagement without scheduled bilateral meetings, carrying limited symbolic value. In contrast, Rokuzawa is a close confidant and key implementer of Kishida’s agenda. He has frequently represented Japan in critical negotiations with the United States, directly reflecting Kishida’s strategic intent. This visit appears to signal Japan’s desire to open communication channels at the ministerial level, demonstrating that even while maintaining its alliance with the U.S., the Kishida administration still recognizes the need for pragmatic economic engagement with China to stabilize domestic industries.

Second, according to Japanese media reports, Rokuzawa’s primary focus lies in industrial and trade issues, and there is potential for bilateral contact with Chinese counterparts, particularly through side-meetings during the APEC multilateral forum. As the head of export control, supply chain, and critical mineral policies, Rokuzawa is directly affected by China’s recent tightening of export regulations on rare earths and other strategic materials—issues of high concern to Japan’s high-tech sector. Media outlets such as Kyodo News suggest Japan may use this opportunity to raise concerns regarding rare earth controls, investment environment, and other issues affecting Japanese businesses. As the host nation, China typically adopts an open posture toward APEC members. If Rokuzawa demonstrates a pragmatic approach, China may agree to a courtesy or working-level bilateral meeting, showcasing the host country’s diplomatic demeanor and advancing regional cooperation agendas. However, Beijing has consistently emphasized that political foundations are essential; the scale and depth of any interaction depend on whether Japan shows sufficient sincerity. Overall, the likelihood of a bilateral meeting is high, but breakthrough outcomes remain unlikely. Instead, it is expected to be a controlled, "listening to concerns, managing pace" type of interaction—laying groundwork for the upcoming Shenzhen APEC Summit later this year.

Finally, candidly speaking, the November Shenzhen APEC Summit is likely to see Prime Minister Kishida attend, given that China, as host, generally extends invitations, and the APEC framework emphasizes inclusivity. However, the possibility of formal or informal contact remains uncertain. Currently, Sino-Japanese relations remain at a low ebb, and Kishida has not adjusted her stance on core issues. Within Japan, there is a relatively pessimistic outlook regarding summit-level talks. If she does attend, she is likely to leverage the multilateral platform to engage with Trump (prioritizing the U.S.-Japan alliance), and possibly even attempt outreach to Putin to balance foreign policy—rather than focusing primarily on bilateral ties with China.

If a non-official bilateral encounter ultimately takes place, it would most likely be a limited interaction along the lines of “economics separate from politics,” where symbolism outweighs substance. Overall, Kishida’s intention to gain international visibility and engage with major powers through APEC is clear. Yet genuine improvement in Sino-Japanese relations will require concrete actions from Japan on issues like Taiwan—something that, as of now, remains absent. There is currently no sign that Japan intends to alter its course of continued interference in cross-strait affairs or its ongoing push toward “re-militarization.”

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1865766500609095/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.